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Abstract
Essays on Financial Intermediation and Collateral Requirements
Chuan Du
2021
This collection of essays examines nancial intermediation and collateral require-
ments in economies where limited enforcement of repayment necessitates loans to be
backed by eligible collateral. Collateralized lending was a key feature of the 2008 nan-
cial crisis, with signicant policy interventions in major economies directed towards
restoring leverage and nancial intermediation. Similarly, given the unprecedented
shock of the COVID-19 pandemic, rms that face binding collateral constraints and
nd it dicult to secure loans on aordable terms may struggle to weather the crisis.
Governments and central banks worldwide have instigated large scale policy responses
to ease credit conditions. Theoretical models of nancial frictions that account for
endogenous variations in leverage across the business cycle are thus important for
guiding policy design and for analyzing the propagation and amplication of shocks
through the nancial sector.
In Chapter 1, I examine how central banks should intervene to improve credit
conditions during a downturn. Specically, I analyze the setting of collateral require-
ments in central bank lending facilities. Traditionally, central bank lending during
times of crisis followed Bagehot's rule. That is to lend freely to solvent institutions,
against collateral that is good in normal times, and at high interest rates. The rule
is designed so that the central bank can improve credit conditions without taking on
any credit risk. Lately, central banks began to deviate from this approach, conducting
more direct lending to rms, against a broader class of collateral, and reducing the
haircuts imposed on the collateral posted. Which is the more appropriate response?
Should central banks take on greater credit risk in order to provide a larger stimulus?
i
To answer the question, I develop a model of central bank intervention in collat-
eralized credit markets. I nd that when the downturn is severe it is optimal for the
central bank to take on greater credit risk. The analysis suggests that credit facilities
set up by the Federal Reserve in response to COVID-19, such as the Main Street
Lending Program, can achieve greater participation and eectiveness by easing their
terms of lending.
In Chapter 2, I present joint work with Agostino Capponi and Stefano Giglio
on the determinants of collateral requirements in central clearinghouses for credit
default swaps (CDSs). The empirical results in Capponi et al. (2020) demonstrate
that extreme tail risk measures have higher explanatory power for observed collateral
requirements than the standard Value-at-Risk rule. To provide a theoretical foun-
dation for these ndings, we develop a model of endogenous collateral requirements
in the CDS market, where counterparties trade state-contingent promises backed by
cash as collateral. Trading occurs due to dierences in market participants' beliefs
about the uncertain states of the world.
We show that it is the nature  rather than the degree  of these belief dierences
that determines collateral requirements in equilibrium. For instance, the equilibrium
level of collateral increases both when the optimist becomes more pessimistic (which
reduces the extent of the disagreement), and when the pessimist becomes more
concerned about tail events (which increases the extent of the disagreement). We can
thus point to the clearinghouse's concerns about extreme tail events as an explanation
for the highly conservative levels of collateral observed in practice.
In Chapter 3, I propose a generalization of the Binomial No-Default Theorem
of Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015). The Binomial No-Default Theorem states that
in binomial economies with nancial assets serving as collateral, any equilibrium
is equivalent in real allocations and prices to another equilibrium in which there
is no default. I extend this theorem to economies with more than two states of
ii
nature when debt can be ordered by seniority. For instance, with three states of
nature, borrowers can issue both senior secured debt and junior unsecured debt. The
senior secured debt is explicitly backed by the risky nancial asset held by the rm,
whereas the junior unsecured debt is implicitly backed by the residual value of the
rm after the senior creditors satisfy their claims. The interest rates and credit risks
associated with each creditor tier are endogenously determined in equilibrium. The
Multinomial Max-Min theorem I prove states that any equilibrium is equivalent to
another equilibrium where the senior tranche never defaults, and the junior tranche
only defaults in the worst state of the world. The expanded theorem allows for the
application of the endogenous leverage framework to a richer set of models with more
than two states and where some loans are not contractually secured.
Finally, in a joint paper with David Miles presented in Chapter 4, I examine
the interaction between the real interest rate and capital requirements in the risk
taking behavior of banks. In this model, banks can undertake costly screening to
discover private information about the probability of success on their potential lending
projects. Once this probability is known, each bank sets a cut-o threshold for the
likelihood of success on a project that determines whether or not to lend. When banks
are highly leveraged, a combination of asymmetric information and limited liability
means that banks screen too little (insucient participation) and accept projects
that are too risky (insucient prudence) relative to the rst-best benchmark.
We show that the real interest rate and capital requirements function as imperfect
substitutes. Qualitatively, raising either the real interest rate or the capital require-
ment on banks can increase prudence at the cost of decreased participation. But
the two policy instruments work through very dierent mechanisms. An increase in
capital requirements forces banks to hold more skin in the game and is targeted
at the subset of poorly capitalized banks in the population. In contrast, an increase
in the real interest rate increases the opportunity cost of lending for all banks, and
iii
is thus a much blunter instrument. The interaction between these two policy levers
means that the optimal capital requirement on banks rises as the interest rate falls,
suggesting tougher macro-prudential capital standards in a lower-for-longer interest
rate environment.
iv
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1 Collateral Requirements in Central Bank Lending
1.1 Introduction
Central bank lending during times of crisis traditionally followed Bagehot's rule: lend
freely to solvent institutions, against collateral that is good in normal times, and
at high interest rates. The rule is designed so that the central bank can improve
credit conditions without taking on any credit risk while also limiting moral hazard.
Lately, central banks have begun to deviate from this approach in their response
to COVID-19, conducting more direct lending to rms, against a broader class of
collateral, and reducing the haircuts imposed on the collateral posted. Which is the
more appropriate response? Should central banks take on greater credit risk in order
to provide a larger stimulus?
I develop a model of central bank intervention in collateralized credit markets that
combines the Credit Cycles in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and the Leverage Cycle
in Geanakoplos (1997). I nd that when the downturn is severe, it is optimal for
the central bank to take on greater credit risk. Specically, the central bank should
intervene by lending at more favorable interest rates compared to the private market,
while simultaneously lowering collateral requirements. The potential losses for the
central bank on the loans extended falls on taxpayers.
In the model, rms borrow in order to purchase capital for production. There
are two sources of nancial frictions. First, rms can only borrow using simple debt
contracts that are non-state-contingent. Second, each debt contract must be backed
by one unit of capital as collateral in order to enforce repayment. Crucially, rms can
choose one or more contracts from an entire spectrum of such simple debt contracts
that dier only in the size of the promised repayment. When the promise exceeds the
value of the collateral at the point of delivery, rms default. Since all debt contracts
are backed by one unit of capital as collateral, a debt contract with a higher promised
1
repayment implies greater credit risk for the lender. The price of each debt contract,
the rms' choice of contracts, and thus the credit risk faced by the lenders are fully
endogenized in competitive equilibrium. This is in contrast to many papers in the
literature where the amount the rm can borrow against each unit of collateral is
exogenously given and the lenders face xed value-at-risk when lending.
The borrowing constraints faced by rms amplify negative aggregate productivity
shocks. During a downturn, rms experience an endogenous reduction in their liquid
wealth and their ability to borrow. As a consequence, rms hold too little capital in
the downturn relative to the socially ecient level.
A central bank can intervene in this case by lending to rms against collateral at
more favorable terms relative to the market. Central bank loans are funded through
the issuance of a public liability to households that carries the safe rate of interest,
and crucially, without the need to post collateral. The central bank is able to borrow
at the risk-free rate without posting collateral because it is backed by the ability of
the government to tax. As such, any ex post losses incurred on central bank loans
will need to be recouped through recourse to the Treasury.
Since the amount rms can borrow against each unit of collateral is fully endog-
enized in the model, we can assess two dierent types of central bank interventions.
The central bank can either reduce the risk-free interest rate on low loan-to-value
debt contracts, or subsidize riskier loans with high loan-to-value. If the central bank
is unwilling to bear any credit risk, then the size of the stimulus may be limited.
Instead, optimal intervention during severe downturns requires the central bank to
take on greater risk in order to provide a larger stimulus. By oering contracts that
private lenders are able, but unwilling, to make during a downturn, the central bank
can achieve signicant gains in productive eciency through its intervention.
2
The paper suggests that credit facilities set up by the Federal Reserve in response
to COVID-19, such as the Main Street Lending Program, can achieve greater partic-
ipation and eectiveness by easing their terms of lending.
Background: Central banks response to COVID-19
Given the enormous eect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the real economy, central
banks across the world are intervening aggressively in credit markets to cushion the
impact. In addition to pushing the benchmark policy rate to historic lows and
conducting very large asset purchases, the Federal Reserve launched a number of
new credit facilities in March 2020. For instance, the Primary and Secondary Market
Corporate Credit Facilities are joint programs set up by the Federal Reserve and
the US Treasury, whereby a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is established to purchase
qualifying bonds from eligible issuers either directly, or through the secondary market.
The Treasury made the initial $10bn equity investment and the Federal Reserve com-
mitted to lend to the SPV on a recourse basis.3 The stated goal of these facilities is to
support credit to employers through either bond issuance, or by providing liquidity
to the market for outstanding corporate bonds.4 Similarly, the Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility extends loans secured by eligible asset-backed securities; and
the Main Street Lending Program purchases participations in loans originated by
eligible lenders. In the UK, the Bank of England and HM Treasury announced a
similar suite of measures, including the COVID-19 Corporate Financing Facility and
the Term Funding Scheme with additional incentives for SMEs.
This paper joins a growing literature that examines the design and ecacy of
these dramatic interventions.
3Source: Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility Term Sheet
(original version published on March 23, 2020), available at:
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/les/monetary20200323b1.pdf
4More details can be found at: www.federalreserve.gov
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Key Themes and Related Literature
The analytical framework in this paper draws from two seminal models that study how
nancial frictions amplify shocks to the real economy: Credit Cycles by Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997); and The Leverage Cycle by Geanakoplos (1997, 2003, 2010). In Credit
Cycles, borrowers secure loans subject to a borrowing constraint that is tied to their
net worth. During a downturn, the fall in borrower's net worth reduces their ability
to borrow, leading to a fall in their capital holdings which reduces future revenue
and net worth, thus completing a dynamic feedback loop to even lower asset prices
and net worth today. Crucially however, in the Credit Cycles model the collateral
constraint faced by borrowers is exogenously given: the loan to value (LTV) against
each unit of collateral is xed, and the interest rate always equals the lender's rate
of time preference (i.e. the risk-free interest rate). Geanakoplos (1997) provides a
natural framework for endogenizing the collateral constraint. In the Leverage Cycle,
loan to value - and equivalently leverage - is too high in normal times, and crashes
when bad news arrive. The bad news about the value of borrower's collateral also
reduce their liquid wealth and further restricts their purchasing power today.
In this paper I combine the key features of both the Credit Cycle and the Leverage
Cycle frameworks. Firms and households are dierentially productive with a durable
capital good, and rms face an endogenous borrowing constraint when they try to
secure loans against capital as collateral. A key theme here is that rms have the
option to choose from an entire spectrum of collateralized debt contracts that dier in
LTV and the contractual/promised interest rate. For given collateral, a high LTV debt
contract trades o a larger loan today at the cost of a higher promised rate of interest.
Plotting the promised interest rate against the LTV on each debt contract that arises
in the competitive collateral equilibrium generates the credit surface (Figure 1.1).
The credit surface summarizes the prevailing credit condition at each point in time;
and shifts in the credit surface reect changing circumstances. During a downturn,
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credit conditions deteriorate and the corresponding credit surface shifts inwards and
upwards. So for a rm that was originally highly leveraged, it must now either
accept a much larger haircut on the same collateral in order to maintain the same
interest rate; or retain a similar (albeit slightly reduced) LTV at the cost of a much
higher interest rate. Figure 1.2 plots the option-adjusted spread on US corporate
debt against credit rating, and highlights how credit conditions - especially for riskier
loans - could deteriorate during recessions in this fashion, in spite of central bank
interventions.
The analytical framework in this paper accounts for the richer picture of credit
market conditions that we observe in practice. Firms optimize simultaneously over
their desired capital holding and the type of debt contract they wish to issue. Choos-
ing a high LTV contract means a lower haircut and a larger sized loan today, in
return for a higher promised interest rate to compensate lenders for the increased
credit risk. Importantly, rms' choices over leveraged debt contracts determine what
the optimal central bank intervention should look like during a downturn (Figure 1.3).
Interventions targeted at the low-LTV end of the credit surface can reduce the risk-free
interest rate faced by rms without exposing the central bank to signicant credit
risk. In contrast, subsidizing riskier high-LTV loans can provide a larger stimulus,
but at the cost of potential losses for the central bank that will ultimately fall on
taxpayers. I show that when the downturn is severe rms demand larger and riskier
loans against their dwindling pool of collateral. In such cases, it is optimal for the
central bank to take on more credit risk.
Figure 1.4 shows that during the current COVID-19 recession high-yield corporate
debt issuance in the US, as a proportion of investment grade issuance, rst collapsed
at the onset of the crisis before recovering quickly after the Federal Reserve intervened
aggressively in the credit markets. Gilchrist et al. (2020) nd that the Federal
Reserve's Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF) has been eective
5
Figure 1.1: Model generated Credit Surface
The Credit Surface plots the promised interest rate on a collateralized debt contract against its loan
to value (LTV) - both of which are determined endogenously in equilibrium. The haircut imposed
on the collateral posted is dened as one minus the loan to value. The credit surface is composed of
three parts. The horizontal segment to the left represents the risk-free spectrum of the market where
the haircut is so high on the collateral posted that the loan is eectively risk-free. The increasing
function in the middle of the credit surface captures the fact that as the haircut falls (and the LTV
rises), the lender starts to take on more credit risk and must be compensated through a higher
promised interest rate. Lastly, the credit surface becomes vertical once the maximum loan-to-value
is reached. During normal times, interest rates are low across the credit surface. In a downturn,
credit conditions deteriorate and the corresponding credit surface shifts inwards and upwards. So
for a rm that was originally highly leveraged, it must now either accept a much larger haircut on
the same collateral in order to maintain the same interest rate; or retain a similar (albeit slightly
reduced) LTV at the cost of a much higher interest rate.
6
Figure 1.2: US Corporate Index Option-Adjusted Spread
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data.
Figure 1.2 plots the option-adjusted spread on US corporate debt against credit rating, for the three
most recent recessions in the US. It compares the average spread during each recession against the
average in the preceding years. The gure shows that, in spite of central bank interventions, credit
conditions deteriorate during recessions. The interest rate spreads on riskier loans are especially
elevated.
in reducing credit spreads on corporate bonds. The ndings in my paper support
calls for the Federal Reserve to further ease lending terms on existing facilities, such
as the Main Street Lending Program (English and Liang (2020), Anderson (2020)),
in order to increase participation and ecacy.
Hanson et al. (2020) is a recent and closely related paper which models the business
credit programs conducted by the Federal Reserve during the current recession. The
authors also conclude that in contrast to the classic lender-of-last-resort thinking that
underpinned much of the response to the 20072009 global nancial crisis, an eective
policy response to the pandemic will require the government to accept the prospect
of signicant losses on credit extended to private sector rms. Similarly, Koulischer
and Struyven (2014) argued for looser central bank collateral requirements during
credit crunches to reduce risk spreads and increase output. In both of these papers,
the collateral constraints faced by borrowers are exogenously xed. By endogenizing
7
Figure 1.3: Central Bank Intervention during a downturn
In the model, a central bank can intervene in the collateralized debt market during a downturn by
either reducing the interest rate on low loan-to-value (LTV) debt contracts (blue dashed line); or
by reducing the interest rate on high LTV loans (red dotted line). Interventions aimed at the high
LTV end of the market entail greater credit risk for the central bank.
Figure 1.4: US Corporate High Yield / Investment Grade Issuance
Source: SIFMA (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association) and own computations.
Figure 1.4 shows that during the current COVID-19 recession high-yield corporate debt issuance in
the US, as a proportion of investment grade issuance, rst collapsed at the onset of the crisis before
recovering quickly after the Federal Reserve intervened aggressively in the credit markets.
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the size of the loan that can be secured against each unit of collateral, I provide a
novel and richer framework to assess the design of central bank credit facilities during
a crisis.
1.2 The Model
Agents, goods and uncertainty
Consider a discrete time general equilibrium model with two types of representative
agents: households and rms, both risk-neutral and price taking. There are two goods:
a numeraire consumption good which depreciates fully between periods (a fruit)
and a durable capital good (a tree). Let xt and Kt denote the rms' holding of the
consumption good and the capital good in period t respectively. The corresponding
terms for the households are denoted by x̃t and K̃t.
5 The total supply of capital in
the economy is exogenously xed at K̄ = 1.
Both households and rms can use the capital good as an input to produce
the consumption good. The production technology is dierent between households
and rms, but in both cases production occurs with one period delay. Specically,




, with G ∈ C2,
G
′
(·) > 0 and G′′ (·) < 0, where ỹt+1 is the units of the consumption good produced.
Firms have a linear production technology, but one that is subject to uncertainty:
yt+1 (s
t+1) = at+1 (st+1)Kt (s
t), where the productivity coecient a ∈ {aU , aD} can
take either a high value aU or a low value aD depending on the state of nature in
period t+1. The productivity of rms is the main source of uncertainty in the model.
Figure 1.5 summarizes the timing and the structure of this uncertainty.
The model starts at period t = 0 with a certain state S0 = {0}, before any
production has occurred. From period t = 1 onward, there are at most two possible
5Throughout the paper, I will use ∼ to dierentiate variables associated with households and
those associated with rms.
9
Figure 1.5: Timing and Uncertainty
states st ∈ St = {U,D}: an Up-state with at (U) = aU and a Down-state with
at (D) = aD.
6 The path the economy can take is summarized by its history st ∈ St.
In period t = 1, there are two possible histories S1 = {U,D}, that are reached
with probability p and (1− p) respectively. If the Up-state is reached at t = 1 (i.e.
s1 = U), then the economy will stay in state st = U , ∀t > 1. If instead the Down-state
is reached at t = 1 (i.e. s1 = D), then the state of the economy can either switch back
to U with probability p in period t = 2 and stay there forever, or remain at D for all
t ≥ 2 with probability (1− p). Therefore by t = 2 all uncertainty has resolved and
there are three possible histories: S2 = {UU,DU,DD}. These three histories captures
the three possible paths for this economy. On the rst path 0→ U → UU → . . . , the
rm is found to be highly productive. On the second path 0→ D → DU → . . . , the
rm suers a temporary negative productivity shock in period 1, but recovers from
6Technical side note: while the rm's productivity coecient is state dependent and path/history
independent: at (s
t) = at (st) ∀t, st (i.e. realized productivity today is independent of whether
there was a Down-state previously); the price of capital is history dependent. Temporary shocks
will have a persistent eect on real outcomes.
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period 2 onward. On the third path 0→ D → DD → . . . , the negative productivity
shock is permanent.
Markets
Firms and households trade in three markets in each period t and history st. The
rst is a spot market for the numeraire consumption good, with price normalized to
1. The second is a spot market for the capital good, with price qt (s
t). Third, and
most importantly, there is a credit market for one-period loans with the capital good
K serving as collateral. The key assumption here is that in this economy the only
way to enforce repayment of loans is by requiring collateral.
Specically, a loan contract at time t is composed of a promise to repay j units of
the consumption good in all states of the world in period t + 1, backed by 1 unit of
the capital good as collateral. Given the limited enforcement of repayment, whenever
the promised amount exceeds the price of the collateral posted, the borrower will
simply default on the loan and hand over the collateral posted. The actual delivery












At each period t and each history st an entire spectrum of such debt contracts
are available, indexed by j the size of the promise (and all backed by 1 unit of the
capital good as collateral). The price of each loan contract j, denoted by πj,t (s
t), is
determined endogenously in equilibrium. Equivalently, one can interpret πj,t (s
t) as
the size of the collateralized loan that promises to repay j next period.
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A key feature of this set-up for the credit market is that for each loan j, we can























Plotting the loan to value on the x-axis against the promised interest rate on
the y axis for each contract j generates the credit surface in Figure 1.6. The credit
surface is composed of three parts.7 The horizontal segment to the left represents
the risk-free spectrum of the market where the haircut is so high on the collateral
for given promise j ≤ j := minst+1 (qt+1 (st+1)) that the loan is eectively risk-free.
I refer to j as the max-min leverage contract, because it is the maximum promise
against one unit of collateral that still minimizes credit risk to the lender. The
increasing function in the middle of the credit surface captures the fact that as
the haircut falls (and the LTV rises), the lender starts to take on more credit risk
and must be compensated through a higher promised interest rate. Lastly, the
credit surface becomes vertical once the maximum loan-to-value is reached. This
cap on loan-to-value arises endogenously because the highest credible promise j̄ :=
maxst+1 (qt+1 (s
t+1)) is given by the maximum possible valuation of the collateral next
period. I refer to j̄ as the maximum leverage contract. From the denition of j and
j̄ it is evident that how much a borrower can promise to repay on their collateralized
debt contract depends on the future price of capital. So any changes in the expected
7This concept of the Credit Surface was introduced in Geanakoplos and Zame (2014) and
Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015). Geanakoplos (2016) discusses the implications of the credit surface
for monetary policy.
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price of capital tomorrow can inuence credit conditions today. Firms' choice of
contracts along the credit surface also determines the credit risk faced by lenders in
equilibrium. The possibility, and the occurrence, of defaults play an essential role in
the model.
Without loss of generality, I show later that the optimal contract for rms lies on




. Intuitively, when collateral
is scarce, the max-min leverage contract j is preferable to contracts j < j because
it allows the rm to borrow more at the same interest rate against the same unit
of collateral. On the other side of the credit surface, any contract j > j̄ will have
the exact same expected delivery as contract j̄ and will thus be priced the same:
πj>j̄ (s
t) = πj̄ (s
t). So using the maximum leverage contract j̄ allows the rm to
borrow the same amount as contracts j > j̄ but with a lower promised interest rate.
Finally, let ϕj,t (s
t) > 0 denote that the rm is selling the contract j (i.e. borrowing
an amount equal to |ϕj|πj), and ϕj,t (st) < 0 indicate the rm is buying the contract
j (i.e. lending |ϕj| πj). The corresponding notation for households is ϕ̃j,t (st).
Agent Optimization
By assumption both the representative rm and household are price taking and risk






















Figure 1.6: Credit Surface - Choice of Leverage
The credit surface plots the loan to value on the x-axis against the promised interest rate on the






promises to repay the
lender an amount equal to the minimum possible value of the collateral next period. Therefore j
is the maximum promise that minimizes credit risk to the lender - a max-min leverage contract.






promises to repay the lender the maximum possible value of the
collateral next period. j̄ is the maximum credible promise the borrower can make, and is therefore
















































































Relative to the standard general equilibrium model, the collateral constraint is the
key addition here. The collateral constraint states that the total number of loans the
rm takes out across all contracts j,
∑
j max (ϕj,t (s
t) , 0), must be weakly less than
the units of capital it holds. This is due to the requirement that each loan must be
backed by one unit of capital. The collateral constraint is asymmetric: only borrowers
need to post collateral, and lenders do not; hence the max operator in the expression.
The representative household solves a similar optimization problem, replacing
only the uncertain CRTS production function for rms with households' certain
but concave production function G (·). For brevity, I omit the (st) notation where












x̃t + qtK̃t −
∑
j∈J







ϕ̃j,t−1 min {j, qt} =: w̃t
(1.8)∑
j
max (ϕ̃j,t, 0) ≤ K̃t (1.9)
Collateral Equilibrium
The solution concept of interest is a collateral equilibrium. Formally, a Collateral
Equilibrium is a vector consisting of the price of capital, contract prices, consumption,
capital holdings and contract trades (q (st) , π (st)) , (x (st) , K (st) , ϕ (st)) ,
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s.t. at all period t and all history
st:
1. All agents optimize (equations 1.4 to 1.9); and
2. All markets clear:








































= K̄ ≡ 1 (1.11)









= 0 ∀j (1.12)
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First-best Benchmark
Before characterizing the collateral equilibrium of the model, it is useful to establish
the rst-best outcome as a frame of comparison. In the rst-best, I assume there is a
central planner who assigns capital between rms and households in each period and
each history in order to maximize the sum of their discounted utility (suppressing the







βt (x̃t + xt)
]




+ atKt−1 ∀t ≥ 0
Kt + K̃t = K̄ = 1 ∀t ≥ −1
The rst-best level of capital holdings therefore equalizes the marginal productiv-






= Et [at+1] (1.13)
Kfbt = K̄ − K̃
fb
t (1.14)
The rst-best benchmark also coincides with the decentralized solution when we
remove the two main sources of productive ineciencies in the collateral equilibrium:
(1) the endogenous collateral constraint which restricts agents' ability to borrow; and
(2) limitations in the rm's liquid wealth (which arise both exogenously at the start,
and then endogenously in certain histories, e.g. during the downturn at s1 = D).
Specically, if we assume (1) rms and households are suciently well-endowed in
every history to ensure they can always consume in addition to any desired capital
purchases and lending; and (2) there exists a perfect enforcement mechanism for debt
repayments, so promises are always honored and there is no need for posting any
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collateral; then the equilibrium price of capital qt will adjust to equate the marginal











βEt [at+1 + qt+1], and it is easy to verify that K̃t = K̃
fb
t ∀t ≥ 0.
1.3 Characterizing the Collateral Equilibrium
The rst-order conditions for both the rm and household's optimization problems are
reported in Appendix 1.6. I impose assumptions on preferences, production functions
and endowments as follows. These assumptions are fairly weak (with risk neutrality
arguably being the strongest). The assumptions provide analytical tractability and
help restrict attention to equilibria of interest.
Assumptions and household's behavior in equilibrium





Assumption A2 [Common discounting]: 1 > β̃ = β > 0.
Assumption A3 [Production functions]:
1. 1 > p > aD
aU







Assumption A3.1 imposes an upper bound on the probability of the downstate (1− p).
Assumption A3.2 states that the households are as productive as the rm in the
Up-state if they hold no capital; but if they hold the entire stock then their marginal
productivity becomes as low as the rm in the Down-state.
Assumption A4 [Endowments]:
1. K̃−1 = K̄ and K−1 = 0.




1−βaU , ∀t ≥ 0 and ∀s
t ∈ St.
The rst part of assumption A4 states that households start period 0 with the entire
stock of capital. The second part restricts the rms' endowment of consumption good
in period 0 (their starting liquid wealth) and stipulates further that rms receive no
more exogenous endowments from period 1 onward. These two parts combined imply
that the rms will borrow from households in order to invest in the capital good. The
third part of assumption A4 ensures that households are suciently well endowed to
lend and consume in all periods and histories.
Lastly, I impose a no-bubble condition to rule out an ever increasing price for
capital in equilibrium, whereby any arbitrary price for capital today can be justied







<∞ ∀st ∈ St (1.15)
Under assumptions A1-4 and the no-bubble condition, we can characterize the
behavior of the representative household as follows:
Lemma 1. [Household behavior in equilibrium]
1. The household always consumes: x̃t (s
t) > 0 ∀t ≥ 0 and ∀st ∈ St.
2. The household never borrows: ϕ̃j,t (s
t) < 0 ∀t ≥ 0 and ∀st ∈ St.
3. The household is always indierent between consuming and purchasing another
























4. The household is always indierent between consuming and lending, so the
equilibrium price of contract j (i.e. the size of the loan granted for a promised








= Et [βmin {j, qt+1}] ∀j
Proof. Very briey, the household always consumes and never borrows because by
assumption they are given very large exogenous endowments in every period and
every history. The price of capital and the price of contract j are both expressed
in the form of standard asset pricing equations (stochastically discounted cash ows,
from the household's perspective), which can be derived directly from household's rst
order conditions (Appendix 1.6). More details can be found in Appendix 1.6.
Collaterals Value and the Optimal Choice of Leverage for rms
For households, who never need to borrow, the capital good is simply a means to
transfer wealth into the next period through production or resale. For rms however,
the capital good serves as both an investment opportunity and the only means to
secure loans (courtesy of the collateral constraint - equation 1.6). Consequently, from
the rm's perspective, the price of capital reects both its stochastically discounted
cash ow and its value as collateral.
When the rm purchases capital on leverage using contract j, the standard asset
pricing equation yields:




(at+1 + qt+1 − δj,t+1)
]
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where the left-hand-side of the expression is the down-payment required, and the
right-hand-side gives the stochastically discounted cash ow from the transaction,
composed of dividends plus the price next period and minus actual delivery on debt
next period. γt denotes the marginal utility of income of rms in period t and history
st. Re-arranging this equation illustrates how the price of capital can be decomposed
into its fundamental value and its collateral value to rms.
Lemma 2. [Collateral Value] When rms' capital holding is strictly positive Kt > 0






































collateral value when using contract j
(1.18)
where γt denotes the marginal utility of income of rms in period t and history s
t; and
γ̃t = γ̃t+1 = 1 for households. Note that since the rm does not necessarily consume
in every history, in general γt 6= u
′
(xt) = 1.
Let λt denote the Lagrangian multiplier for the rm's collateral constraint at period
t and history st, and γt the multiplier for its budget constraint, then the equilibrium
collateral value can be expressed as:


















In other words, collateral value is the dollar value the rm attaches to a marginal
relaxation of its collateral constraint.
Proof. Both equations can be derived directly from rm's rst order conditions (Ap-
pendix 1.6).
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Equation 1.18 highlights the dual role capital plays for rms, and equation 1.19
shows that the collateral value is positive whenever the rm's collateral constraint is
binding (λt > 0). Furthermore, when the collateral constraint is binding, the rm
will choose the debt contract j that maximizes collateral value. Thus even though an
entire spectrum of contracts j ∈ R+ is priced, potentially only a single contract (if
any) will be actively traded in equilibrium. Lemma 3 below examines how the rm
chooses the optimal contract j∗.
Lemma 3. [Optimal leverage] Suppose in equilibrium the collateral constraint is
binding (λt > 0), then:





where j := minst+1 (qt (s
t+1)) is the max-min leverage contract, and j̄ := maxst+1 (qt (s
t+1))
is the maximum leverage contract.
2. The rm's optimal choice of debt contract is given by:
j∗ =

j̄ if γt > γ
U
t+1





if γt = γ
U
t+1
where γUt+1 is the rm's marginal utility of income in period t+ 1 if the Up-state
is realized (i.e. st+1 = U).
Lemma 3 states that in general the rm will choose between either the left-hand
or the right-hand side kink of the credit surface (see Figure 1.7). In the knife edge
case where γt = γ
U





formal proof can be found in Appendix 1.6.
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Figure 1.7: Choosing a point on the credit surface
Due to linear preference, when rms borrow against capital as collateral, they do so with either
the max-min leverage contract j or the maximum leverage contract j̄. Firms prefer the max-min
leverage contract when their marginal utility of income today γt is lower than their marginal utility
of income tomorrow in the Up-state γUt+1. Intuitively, this is because the max-min leverage contract
entails a larger downpayment today, but allows the rm to transfer more resources into the Up-
state tomorrow. In contrast, in any ensuing Down-state, rms default - regardless of whether they
borrowed using the max-min leverage contract or the maximum leverage contract today.
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To see why the choice between the max-min leverage contract j and the maximum
leverage contract j̄ depends only on the marginal utility of income in the Up-state
tomorrow γUt+1, and not the Down-state γ
D
t+1, note that with buying K using contract
j = qDt+1 the rm's cash ow in period t + 1 is given by:
 aU + qUt+1 − qDt+1
aD
.
In comparison, if the rm bought K using contract j̄ = qUt+1 instead, its cash ow
would be given by
 aU
aD
. The net dierence between the two is
 qUt+1 − qDt+1
0
,
an Up-Arrow security that delivers only in the Up-state. Therefore the rm would
choose the max-min contract j when the marginal utility of income in the Up-state
tomorrow is suciently high.
Illustratives Example
Having described households' behavior and the choice of rms with regard to collat-
eralized debt contracts, we can now proceed to characterize the collateral equilibrium
along the dierent possible paths of the economy. The main complication that arises
when solving the model is that prices and choices today depend on the expectation
of prices tomorrow. The model is thus solved through backward induction, from
deterministic steady states that can be eventually reached after the uncertainty has
been fully resolved8, back to the uncertain histories in periods t = 0, 1. The path
(0 → D → DU → DUU . . . ), whereby the rm's productivity suers a temporary
negative shock in history D before recovering permanently to aU in period t ≥ 2, is
the most interesting trajectory for our purpose. I illustrate the key features of the
collateral equilibrium with a simple numerical example below, before extending the
key results in the form of general propositions.
Consider an economy characterized by the set of parameters shown in Table
1.1. Restricting attention to the path where rms suer a negative, but temporary,
8A full characterization of the deterministic steady states can be found in Appendix 1.6.
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Table 1.1: Parameters for Illustrative Example
Parameter Value Parameter Value
p 0.75 β̃ 0.8
aU 1.5 β 0.8











Note: While assumption A4.2: e0 < β
2aDK
fb
0 , which restricts rms' starting endowment in period 0,
is useful in the analytical proofs of my Propositions, the assumption is much stricter than necessary.
In this illustrative example, I relax this assumption signicantly and demonstrate that the key
implications of the model are robust.
productivity shock (0→ D → DU → DUU . . . ), Figure 1.8 plots the dynamics of the
rms' capital holding in the collateral equilibrium against the rst-best benchmark.
In the initial period 0, rms start with no capital and very limited endowment of the
numeraire consumption good, so they borrow using the maximum leverage contract to
purchase as much capital as they can. Endogenously, the model generates two further
instances of productive ineciency along this temporary downturn path. First, rms
default in historyD, their ability to borrow and leverage collapse and rms' holding of
capital falls even further. Second, even when the uncertainty has been fully resolved
at history DU and beyond, the recovery to the rst-best level is gradual. I address
the causes of each of these two distortions in turn.
The Downturn (s1 = D)
During the downturn (history D), rms experience low productivity. The price of
capital falls because a larger proportion of capital is transferred to households, whose
production function exhibits diminishing returns. Firms would like to hold more
capital in order to produce next period during the potential recovery phase, but
cannot due to a tightening borrowing constraint arising from the reduction in their
liquid wealth and a fall in the borrowing capacity of capital as collateral. Crucially,
even though at both history 0 and D there is a common probability p that aggregate
productivity will be high (aU) next period and (1− p) that it will be low, the situation
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Figure 1.8: Proportion of capital held by rms
The representative rm's capital holding collapses during the downturn (history D) before gradually
recovering in subsequent periods towards the rst-best benchmark. Even though by history DU all
aggregate productivity uncertainty has been resolved, a full recovery is not achieved immediately.
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Figure 1.9: Credit Surface during the downturn
Credit conditions deteriorate during the downturn (orange dashed line) relative to normal times
(blue solid line). Firms that wish to borrow using the maximum leverage contract face both a higher
interest rate and a higher haircut for each unit of capital posted as collateral.
for rms at history D is much worse. This is because in history DD the negative
aggregate productivity shock would be permanent. The price of capital at history
DD, qDD, is signicantly lower than that in history D. Consequently, each unit of
capital is much more valuable as collateral at history 0 than at history D. Thus
credit conditions deteriorate during the downturn relative to normal times (Figure
1.9). Firms that wish to borrow using the maximum leverage contract face both a
higher interest rate and a higher haircut for each unit of capital posted as collateral.
The collateral constraint faced by rms and this endogenous fall in the borrowing
capacity of their collateral amplify the adverse aggregate productivity shock to the
real economy, and feed back into even lower capital holding by rms.
I generalize these ndings in the two propositions below. In the statement of
these propositions (and corresponding proofs) I adopt a simplied set of notation,
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combining the time subscript t and the dependence of variables on histories (st) into a
single subscript whenever the context is clear. For instance, let KD := Kt=1 (s
1 = D).
Proposition 1. [Productive ineciency and leverage during the downturn]
Under assumptions A1 − 4 and given the no-bubble condition (equation 1.15), at
history D:
1. KD < K
fb
D : rms hold too little capital relative to the rst best; and
2.
∑
j∈J max {ϕD,j, 0} = KD: the collateral constraint is binding (i.e. rms pur-
chase capital using leveraged debt contracts).
Proof. Intuitively, at history D credit conditions are so tight and rms' liquid wealth
are so low that rms are unable to purchase the rst-best level of capital even if they
borrow using the maximum leverage contract. Credit conditions tighten at history
D because the negative productivity shock signicantly reduces the expected price
of capital in the next period. Specically, if the shock proves to be permanent, the
price of capital in history DD would be signicantly lower. The arrival of the bad
news at D therefore endogenously reduces the borrowing capacity of rms against
each unit of collateral. Moreover, rms have limited means to transfer their limited
liquid wealth from the initial history 0 to history D. If rms used leverage during
history 0 to purchase capital, they would default at historyD, hand over the collateral
to lenders and retain only the consumption goods produced. The resulting amount
of liquid wealth is insucient to purchase the rst best level of capital at D given
the prevailing credit conditions. On the other hand, rms may try to transfer more
resources into history D by purchasing capital without leverage at history 0 (and
thus avoiding default at D).9 But for rms to have enough liquid wealth at history D
9Another way for rms to transfer resources into history D is by lending to households at history
0. However, since households start with the entire stock of capital and their productivity is concave,
it is easy to show that rms strictly prefer purchasing capital without leverage to lending at history
0.
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to purchase KfbD with this strategy, the price of capital in the downturn qD must be
suciently high relative to its initial price q0. In such situations, the household would
also like to purchase more capital in period 0, which would push q0 beyond the level
required for the rms' strategy to succeed. For the second part of the proposition,
because rms hold too little capital relative to the rst-best benchmark at history D,
they are in expectations more productive than households and would like to utilize
leveraged debt contracts to increase their holding of capital. A formal proof can be
found in Appendix 1.6.
Proposition 1 states that rms would use leveraged debt contracts during the
downturn, but is silent on the optimal choice of contracts j∗D. From corollary 3 we
know that the choice is essentially between the maximum leverage contract j̄D = qDU
and the max-min (risk-free) leverage contract j
D
= qDD. The following proposition
shows that rms will use maximum leverage when the downturn is severe, and
max-min leverage when it is more moderate.
Proposition 2. [Optimal leverage during the downturn] Under assumptions




j̄D := qDU if KD < K̂D
j
D
:= qDD if KD > K̂D{
j̄D, jD
}
if KD = K̂D
(1.20)
Proof. From Lemma 3, we have previously established that rms prefer the maximum
leverage contract over the max-min leverage contract when their marginal utility of
income today is suciently high relative to their marginal utility of income tomor-
row in the Up-State. When rms start history D with very limited liquid wealth,
households will hold the majority of capital in equilibrium and rms will hold very
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little (high K̃D and low KD). This implies that the equilibrium price of capital will
be very low from the perspective of the rm, so rms' marginal utility of income at
history D is very high and they would like to borrow the maximum amount possible
to take advantage of these re sale prices. In contrast, if rms have access to more
resources at history D, the price of capital would be higher and rms may nd it
optimal to use the max-min leverage contract to transfer more resources into the
Up-state at history DU where the uncertainty surrounding their productivity has
been resolved favorably. Given the linearity in preferences and the continuity of
households' production function G (·), there exists a threshold value of KD whereby
the rms are indierent between the max-min leverage contract and the maximum
leverage contract. A formal proof can be found in Appendix 1.6.
In summary, Proposition 2 shows that when the production distortions in the
downturn is severe (i.e. very low KD) rms would like to use maximum leverage
contracts to maximize their purchasing power. But when the production distortion
is more moderate (KD closer to K
fb
D ), then the max-min leverage contract is optimal
instead.
The Recovery (s2 = DU)
In the illustrative example (Figure 1.8) above, in the recovery phase rms honor the
promise made in history D and repay the loan (j̄D := qDU) by either selling their
capital holding or equivalently handing over the collateral posted. This leaves rms
with just the output from production wDU = aUKD with which to rebuild their stock
of capital. Unfortunately, this amount of liquid wealth is insucient to purchase the
rst-best level of capital, even if they use the maximum leverage contract to minimize
the size of the down-payment required. Thus full recovery is not achieved at history
DU even though the uncertainty surrounding aggregate productivity has been fully
resolved. Lemma 4 generalizes this result.
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Lemma 4. [Gradual Recovery]:






















Proof. If rms used maximum leverage contracts at s1 = D, then their liquid wealth
at history DU is given by wDU,(j∗D=j̄D)
= aUKD. In order to purchase the rst-best
level of capital KfbDU , the minimum down-payment required in equilibrium is given




= βaU per unit of capital. So KDU is less than
KfbDU whenever KD < βK
fb
DU . If instead rms used maximum leverage contracts
at s1 = D, then their liquid wealth at history DU is given by wDU,,(j∗D=jD)
=








Comparing wDU with the minimum down-payment required again yields inequality
1.22.
Recovery from a downturn will typically be gradual because rms held too little
capital in history D and will need more time to build up sucient liquid wealth
to purchase the ecient level of capital at equilibrium prices. Recovery from a
moderate downturn will be faster than that from a severe downturns for two reasons.
First, trivially, rms retain a higher stock of capital in a moderate downturn (by
denition) and this increases their production in history DU . Second, more subtly,
rms optimally choose a lower level of leverage during moderate downturns (the
max-min leverage contract j
D
instead of the maximum leverage contract j̄D - see
Proposition 2). This more conservative choice of leverage helps rms transfer a higher
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level of liquid wealth into the recovery phase, reducing the time required to achieve
the ecient level of production.
1.4 Central Bank Intervention
In the previous section, we saw how the negative aggregate productivity shock to the
real economy is amplied by the borrowing constraints faced by rms. A combination
of reduced liquid wealth and decline in the borrowing capacity of collateral leads to
rms holding too little capital during the downturn relative to the rst-best. A
central bank can intervene in this case by lending to rms against collateral at more
favorable terms relative to the market (πCBj,st := (1 + χj,st) πj,st). Central bank lending
is funded through the issuance of a public liability m to households that carries the
risk-free rate of interest, and crucially, without the need to post collateral. The central
bank is able to borrow at the risk-free rate without posting collateral because it is
backed by the ability of the government to tax. As such, any ex post losses incurred
on central bank loans will need to be recouped through recourse to the Treasury.
By circumventing the collateral constraints faced by rms, a central bank can fully
alleviate the aggregate productive ineciencies in this model if it is willing to take
on the necessary level of credit risks.
Formally, the central bank aims to achieve the rst-best ecient level of aggregate
production, by choosing subsidy {χj,t} on loan j at history st and the amount of public
liability issued mt at history s















subject to households' optimization (equations 1.4 - 1.6), rms' optimization (equa-











new lending (to rms)
≤ mt+τ









where ϕCBj denotes the number of collateralized debt contract j held by the central
bank, with ϕCBj < 0 indicating the central bank is selling contract j (i.e. lending).
The size of the loan oered on contract j: πCBj := (1 + χj) πj depends on the size
of the subsidy oered (χj) relative to prevailing market rates. Lastly, T is the lump
sum tax required to balance the budget in every history (representing recourse to
the Treasury when positive and transfer of surplus when negative). The new market
clearing condition for collateralized debt contracts is given by:
ϕCBj,t+τ + ϕj,t+τ + ϕ̃j,t+τ = 0 ∀τ ≥ 0,∀j ∈ J (1.25)
A key point here is that the central bank can intervene both across time t and
across the credit surface. By choosing which segment of the credit surface, or which
specic contract j, it is willing to subsidize {χj,t}, the central bank is simultaneously
setting both the interest rate and the haircut it imposes on the collateralized loan to
rms:









The central bank can also choose the timing of the intervention. Since period
0 production is heavily dependent on starting endowments (which are exogenous
parameters in the model), we will instead focus attention on the optimal policy
intervention during the downturn, when credit conditions tighten and rms' holding
of capital falls endogenously. In the following sections, we will rst examine the
optimal policy intervention during the downturn (history D) when the central bank's
actions are unanticipated, before turning to the period 0 impact of such policies if
they were anticipated instead.
Unanticipated intervention at history D
From Proposition 2 we see that rms will choose either the max-min leverage contract
j
D
or the maximum leverage contract j̄D during the downturn depending on the
severity of the recession. Correspondingly, central bank responses can be grouped
into two broad categories: (1) intervene at the risk-free, low LTV end of the credit
surface j
D
; or (2) intervene at the high LTV end j̄D.
Proposition 3 states that when the downturn is severe and rms wish to borrow
using the maximally leveraged loans, then the central bank can bring about the
rst-best level of capital holding by subsidizing contract j̄D. In contrast, intervening
at the risk-free end of the credit surface may not be sucient to achieve the rst-best
outcome, when the central bank abides by an eective-lower-bound on interest rates10
and never lends more than the promised repayment amount (πCBj ≤ j, ∀j).
Proposition 3. [Unanticipated Intervention] Under assumptions A1 − 4 and
given the no-bubble condition (equation 1.15), at history D if j∗D = j̄D, then:
1. There exists χ∗j̄D > 0 s.t. π
CB
j̄D
≤ j̄D and KCBD = K
fb
D ; and
10The eective-lower-bound here is not a constraint in the strict sense, because the central bank
can always choose to lend at an negative interest rate that is below its cost of funding. But doing
so guarantees a loss of public funds on every loan made.
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2. There may not exist χ∗j
D




and KCBD = K
fb
D .
Proof. Intuitively, when rms nd it optimal to use the maximum leverage contract
j∗D = j̄D during the downturn, they will purchase as much capital as they can with
their available liquid wealth wD. The central bank can increase the amount of capital
the rms can buy for given wD by subsidizing loans to the rms and thus eectively
reducing the down-payment required on each unit of capital. The intervention will
raise the equilibrium price of capital during the downturn (qCBD > qD) as well as
during any subsequent recovery (qCBDU > qDU), which will aect credit conditions in
the private market during the downturn (see Figure 1.10, dashed line). The central
bank can oset the impact of these price increases on the down-payment required
for rms by simultaneously reducing the haircuts and the interest rates on high LTV
loans, pushing the credit surface downwards and outwards (Figure 1.10, dotted line).
In fact, when the central bank is willing to intervene at the high LTV segment of
the market, it is always possible to reduce the down-payment faced by rms such
that they can purchase the rst-best level of capital for given liquid wealth wD. In
contrast, when the central bank intervenes only at the risk-free segment of the market,
the maximum loan amount it can oer while ensuring full repayment is given by the
price of capital in history DD, where the rms are permanently unproductive. In
general, the price of capital at DD, qDD, is so low that the loan amount - even with
the central bank subsidy - is insucient to allow rms to purchase the rst-best level
of capital. The full proof can be found in Appendix 1.6.
Figure 1.11 plots rms' capital holding given optimal central bank intervention,
along the path where the productivity shock is temporary, using the same illustrative
parameters as previously. It shows that when the central bank is willing to take on
credit risks, it becomes possible for rms to hold the socially ecient level of capital.
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Figure 1.10: Unanticipated Intervention: Credit Surface
The solid orange line plots the credit surface during the downturn in the absence of any central bank
intervention. Given this deterioration in credit conditions, the central bank intervenes at the riskier
segment of the credit market. This intervention raises the price of capital immediately (qCBD > qD)
as well as during any subsequent recovery (qCBDU > qDU ). The net eect of the price increase is that
for given contract j < j̄D on the private market, the interest rate remains unchanged but the loan
to value (LTV) falls (green dashed line). But the central bank intervention simultaneously lowers
the interest rate and the haircut on high LTV loans, so the actual credit surface faced by rms is
given by the green dotted line. As a consequence of the intervention, rms can borrow at a higher
LTV and at a lower interest rate.
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Figure 1.11: Unanticipated Intervention: Firms' Capital Holding
The unanticipated central bank intervention during the downturn ensures that rms can purchase
the rst-best benchmark level of capital at history D. This increase in capital holding improves
rms' nancial position at history DU as well. Consequently, the recovery at history DU (green
dotted line) is more robust than that under the no-intervention case (orange dashed line).
Moreover, the recovery is more robust in the following period because rms hold more
capital during the downturn.
Sustained support at history DU and its announcement eect at history D
From Figure 1.11 we see that even though the recovery at history DU is stronger
with central bank intervention at D than without, rms' capital holding does not
immediately reach the rst-best benchmark once the uncertainty surrounding aggre-
gate productivity has been resolved.11 This is because even if the rms held the
rst-best level of capital during the downturn (KCBD = K
fb
D ), their available liquid
11In the illustrative example, full recovery occurs at period t = 3 and history DUU , one period
after the resolution of uncertainty at period t = 2. A more protracted recovery period is possible
with alternative parameterizations, with full recovery not reached until period t = 4 or beyond.
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wealth during the recovery may not be sucient, in general, to ramp up production
fully to the new, higher, ecient level (KfbDU > K
fb
D ).
An immediate implication of the above observation is that it is optimal for the
central bank to continue its credit support during the recovery phase: χ∗jDU=qDUU > 0.
Lemma 5. [Sustained credit support] If KDU < K
fb
DU , then ∃χ∗jDU=qDUU > 0 s.t.





Proof. The proof of Lemma 5 is analogous to that for the rst part of Proposition
3.
A second, more subtle, implication is that whether or not the private sector antic-
ipates continued credit support at history DU can have important scal implications
for the public sector. Specically, suppose the central bank credibly announces its
commitment to sustained credit support if and only if the resolution of uncertainty
next period is favorable (i.e. at historyDU but not atDD). The anticipation of credit
support during the recovery raises the expected price of capital at DU , which in turn
increases the borrowing capacity of each unit of capital at D. Credit conditions in
the private market ease and capital prices rise immediately at D. The net result is a
reduction in the rate at which central bank loans must be subsidized ( χ falls), but an
overall increase in the total loan amount ((1 + χ) π increases). With or without the
announcement, the central bank still ensures rms hold the rst-best level of capital
at D; but with the announcement the larger total loan size means that the return on
public funds in the following period becomes a mean-preserving spread.
Formally, when the central bank makes the announcement, let qAnD denote the
price of capital at history D; qAnDU the price at history DU ; πj̄D=qAnDU the price of the





central bank subsidy required to achieve the rst-best benchmark at D. Furthermore,
let central bank lending at D be nanced through the issuance of the risk-free
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πj̄D=qAnDU . And let any shortfalls/windfalls






















is the expected price of capital
next period and is equal to the expected delivery on the maximum leverage contract.
I prove the following proposition:







, and prefer the maximum leverage contract during the downturn j∗D = j̄D,
then, when the central bank announces conditional credit support at history D, such









































windfall in the recovery phase) and TDD|χAnj̄D > TDD|χ
∗
j̄D
(larger shortfall in the
permanent downturn).
Proof. The intuition of the proof is as follows. A credible announcement of continued
credit support during any subsequent recovery raises the price of capital during
the down-state. Conventionally, one would expect this price increase to improve
the balance sheet position of rms and reduce the amount of central bank lending







default in history D and hand over their entire stock of capital to lenders. As a
result, rms must rebuild their stock of capital from scratch at history D. The
increase in capital prices therefore increases the total amount the central bank must
lend to rms, even as private market credit conditions improve and the required rate
of subsidy falls. A larger initial loan implies a larger windfall in the recovery phase
but also a larger shortfall in any permanent downturns. Lastly, since with or without
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the announcement the central bank will ensure the rms hold the rst-best level of
capital at history D, the expected cost to taxpayers is unchanged. A formal proof
can be found in Appendix 1.6.
Proposition 4 shows that even though a credible announcement of sustained
credit support in the future can have signicant immediate eects on asset prices
and credit conditions, the expected return/loss on public funds may stay the same
with or without the announcement. This is a somewhat surprising result. In tra-
ditional Diamond-Dybvig style models with multiple equilibria, a commitment to
do whatever it takes can shift the economy to a more virtuous equilibrium and
reduce the initial stimulus required. In my model, having abstracted away from the
asymmetry of information that is central to models of nancial crises and panics,
we see that a credible announcement of future support provides no additional gains
when responding to big shocks to the real economy. In fact, if the public sector is
instead risk-averse with taxpayer funds, it might prefer to surprise the market with
additional stimulus instead of announcing them in advance. The model therefore
suggests that the optimal central bank response might look very dierent when the
shocks are predominantly hitting the real economy (such as during the COVID-19
crisis) as opposed to the nancial sector.
Anticipated Intervention
What if the intervention at history D and beyond are anticipated by market partic-
ipants in advance? Conventional wisdom suggests that if agents expect the central
bank to provide credit support during a downturn, they may take on excessive
leverage during normal times, potentially leading to greater productive distortions
and exacerbating the severity of the downturn. There exists however an alternative
narrative. Anticipating low asset prices and central bank credit support during the
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downturn, rms may be incentivized to reduce leverage in normal times in order to
exploit more favorable investment opportunities during the downturn.
In the following Proposition, I show that if rms are using maximum leverage
contracts j∗0 = j̄0 := qU at history 0, then the anticipation of central bank intervention
at history D will lead to either: (1) rms continuing to use maximum leverage
contracts at period 0 and hold the same level of capital at history 0; or (2) a jump to
an equilibrium whereby rms are purchasing capital without leverage at history 0 .
Proposition 5. [Waiting for the downturn] If j∗0 = j̄0 := qU in the absence
of central bank intervention, and it becomes common knowledge that χ∗j̄D > 0, then
either:




U and K0 = K
CB
0 ; or
2. ϕCB0,j = 0, ∀j.




0,j denote respectively the equilibrium price for capital in
history U , the rms' optimal capital holding and contract sales at history 0, when
central bank intervention is fully anticipated.
Proof. For the rst part of the proposition, I show that if rms continue to nd it
optimal to use the maximum leverage contract at t = 0, then their capital holding in
equilibrium remains unchanged. This is because when rms use maximum leverage
contracts, the required down-payment is given by the opportunity cost of production











. And given G
′
(·) < 0, we have
K0 = K
CB
0 . The capital holding of rms remains unchanged despite the change in
equilibrium prices and credit conditions.
For the second part of the proposition, recall that the payo to the rm from
purchasing capital at history 0 without leverage is given by
 aU + qU
aD + qD
 in the two
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possible states. Correspondingly the payo to the rm from purchasing capital on
leverage is
 aU + qU − qD
aD




the maximum leverage contract. We see that the dierence in payos between the
max-min leverage contract and the maximum leverage contract is simply an Up-Arrow
security
 qU − qD
0
, which is reected in a higher down-payment required with the
max-min leverage contract. Consequently, rms will only switch from the maximum
leverage contract to the max-min leverage contract when their marginal utility of
income in the up-state is suciently higher than their marginal utility of income in
the current period12. The central bank intervention at history D is aimed at reducing
the down-payment required when purchasing capital on leverage during the downturn.
This drives up the rms' marginal utility of income at D: γCBD > γD, but leaves their
marginal utility of income at U unchanged. Thus the rm will either continue with
the maximum leverage contract at history 0, or switch to purchasing capital without
leverage. Purchasing capital without leverage generates the highest payo in the
down-state for each unit of capital, and may become the optimal choice for rms
when their marginal utility of income at D becomes suciently high. When rms
purchase capital without leverage: ϕCB0,j = 0, ∀j.
A subtle implication of Proposition 5 is that even when rms continue to use the
maximum leverage contract at period 0 and their holding of capital remain unchanged,
the loan to value on their collateralized debt contract may actually increase due to
the change in equilibrium asset prices. The loan to value on the maximum leverage
contract at history 0 is the ratio between the size of the loan πj̄0 = β [pqU + (1− p) qD]
and the price of capital q0. The anticipation of central bank interventions increases
both q0 and qD, the former reduces LTV on debt contracts and the latter increases it.
For broad parameterizations, the proportional increase in qD typically outweigh the
12For more details, see Lemma 3
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increase in q0, so the net eect is often an increase in the period 0 leverage of the rm.
The proposition shows that when the economy is already highly leveraged in normal
times, the anticipation of central bank interventions during any potential downturns
may indeed increase leverage further. However rms may be borrowing more just
to purchase the same amount of capital, because the price of capital is higher when
central bank interventions are anticipated. Therefore the increase in leverage during
normal times does not always translate directly into greater productive ineciencies.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
A salient feature of the central bank intervention examined in this paper is the
potential need for recourse to taxpayer funds, when losses are incurred on the loans
extended. In this sense, the intervention is a joint public sector eort - similar to the
style of the programs we are seeing during the current pandemic. For instance, in
both the Primary and Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility, the US Treasury
provides the equity investment in the facility, and the Federal Reserve lends against
the assets held in the facility.
A second point is that although every debt contract is collateralized by a durable
asset in the model, in practice a substantial portion of the underlying bonds/loans
in the credit facilities may not be explicitly secured. Nevertheless, such loans are
still implicitly backed by the value of the tangible assets of the rm. So a high-LTV
collateralized debt contract in the model simply corresponds to a loan with a higher
degree of credit risk to the lender. The central message of the paper - that central
banks should take on greater credit risk when the downturn is severe - remains un-
changed regardless of whether the loan is contractually collateralized. The analytical
framework presented here highlights the role of defaults and limited enforcement of
repayment in equilibrium outcomes. It can be extended into more general settings
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where, instead of posting collateral explicitly, promises on debt contracts are backed
by the assets of the rm.13
Third, the central bank in the model lends directly to rms that engage in
production, whereas traditionally central banks preferred to lend to nancial interme-
diaries. Extending the model to encompass a third sector functioning as the nancial
intermediary is an interesting direction for future research. Nevertheless, current
credit facilities like the Main Street Lending Program in the US demonstrate a policy
shift towards more direct lending to the real economy.
Most importantly, the paper emphasizes that central banks have much more than
just interest rates in their policy toolkit. Collateral requirements (and risk appetites)
are also an important part of the transmission mechanism. Under the Bagehot rule
and as standard practice during normal times, collateral requirements at central banks
are set mechanically to ensure the central bank never takes on signicant credit risk.
This leaves the risk-free interest rate as the main policy instrument. In my model -
as in real life - variations in collateral requirements allow central banks to intervene
across the credit surface, and to provide support to riskier borrowers who may be
shut out of the credit markets during a downturn. As such, collateral requirements
in central bank lending should play an integral role in policy discussions.
13In a separate working paper, Du (2020), I analyze the collateral equilibrium in economies with
more than two states of nature when debt contracts can be ordered by seniority and backed by
nancial assets. For instance, with three states of nature, borrowers can issue both senior secured
debt and junior subordinated debt, where the junior subordinated debt is backed by the residual
value of the rm after senior creditors are repaid. I show that any equilibrium in this economy is
equivalent to another equilibrium where the senior tranche never defaults, and the junior tranche
only defaults in the worst state of the world.
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1.6 Appendices
First-order conditions to agents' optimization










(xt − atKt−1 − et) + qt (Kt −Kt−1) +
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j∈J














where γt denotes the rm's marginal utility of income at period t, and λt denotes the
marginal utility from relaxing the rm's collateral constraint.
The rst-order conditions for the rm can be derived as follows (omitting the
notation (st) for brevity):
∂Lt
∂xt
= βtu′ (xt)− βtγt ≤ 0 (1.28)
∂Lt
∂Kt
= −βtγtqt + Et
[
βt+1γt+1 (at+1 + qt+1)
]





βtγtπj,t − Et [βt+1γt+1δj,t+1]− βtλt ≤ 0 if ϕj,t≥0















= 0 ∀j (1.33)
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Correspondingly, the rst-order conditions for the household are given by:
∂L̃t
∂x̃t
= β̃tu′ (x̃t)− β̃tγ̃t ≤ 0 (1.34)
∂L̃t
∂K̃t







































= 0 ∀j (1.39)
Household behavior
In this subsection I provide a sketch of the proof for Lemma 1, as well as further
discussions on its implications.
Lemma 1 follows quite naturally from assumptions A1-A4. In particular, assump-
tion A4.3 ensures that households always have sucient endowments to consume
after any desired capital purchases, current lending and repayment on existing debt
obligations. Households would not borrow from rms in order purchase capital on
leverage because (1) households are well endowed in every history (A4.3); and (2)
household production exhibits diminishing return to scale (A3.2).
Households are always indierent between consumption and holding capital. Sup-
pose not, then households are consuming yet strictly prefer holding capital. By





= aD, so the price of capital must be so low that rms also want
to hold capital, thus violating the market clearing condition for equilibrium. Simi-




(0) = aU , and the price of capital would be too high for rms to
want to hold capital either in equilibrium, leading to another contradiction.
Lastly, when households lend (i.e. purchase debt contract j), they do so at a
price that equates their marginal utility from lending to their marginal utility of
consumption. Consequently, both the price of capital q (equation 1.16) and the price
of loans πj (equation 1.17) can be derived from the household's rst-order conditions.
A consequence of these two asset pricing equations is that a strictly positive down-
payment is always required when purchasing capital on leverage.
Corollary 1. Down-payments are strictly positive in every history and for every
contract j:














> 0 ∀j, t, st (1.40)
Specically, the down-payment on the maximum leverage contract j̄ := maxst+1 {qt+1 (st+1)}
is given by:





Corollary 1 shows that the loan will never exceed the price of the capital good
posted as collateral. Intuitively, this is because the price of the capital good today
reects both its price next period as well as its expected production next period, but
the output from production cannot be collateralized, so the price of the loan reects
only the price of the capital good next period. When the rm defaults, it hands over
only the capital good, and not the output from its production.
For the maximally leveraged contract, j̄ = maxst+1 qt+1 (s






. The down-payment on this maximum leverage contract is equal to the
value of foregone production for households, and depends on households' preferences,
production function, and capital holding.
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Optimal Leverasge for Firms (Proof for Lemma 3)





Recall j := minst+1 (qt (s
t+1)) is the max-min leverage contract. When the rm is
borrowing using contract j, it is promising to repay an amount equal to the lowest





= j, the contract is risk-free and will be priced at πj,t = βj with





. Selling any other debt contracts j < j will
also incur the same risk-free interest rate but raise a lower amount of funds at time
t: πj,t = βj < πj,t ∀j < j. Since every contract j must be backed by one unit of
collateral, the rm will always choose j over any j < j when the collateral constraint
is binding.
Suppose instead the rm is borrowing using contract j̄ := maxst+1 (qt (s
t+1)). This
is the maximum leverage contract, because with any promise j > j̄ the rm will
always default and the promise is no longer credible. Consequently any contract
j > j̄ generates the same expected delivery as j̄ and will be priced identically. It is
therefore possible to restrict attention to j ≤ j̄ without loss of generality.
The second and third part of Lemma 3 state that if the rm's marginal utility of
income is high today relative to tomorrow in the Up-state, then the rm will choose
the maximum leverage contract; and conversely the max-min leverage contract if the
















































; and for jt = jt when
the inequality is reversed. Setting β̃ = β and γ̃t = γ̃
U
t+1 = 1 simplies the condition
to γt > γ
U
t+1 ⇒ j∗t = j̄t as required.
Deterministic Steady States
There are two possible deterministic steady states. One where the rm's productivity
is known to be aU permanently, and another where it is aD permanently. Let's denote
these two steady states by U∞ and D∞ respectively.
In the Up-steady-state U∞, the rm will consume and hold the entire stock of
capital (as per the rst-best benchmark). In the absence of uncertainty, there is only
one risk-free collateralized debt contract available to trade (with promised repayment
j = j̄ = qU∞) and rms are indierent between purchasing the capital with and
without leverage. In the following lemma, I summarize the equilibrium outcomes in
U∞ when the rm purchases capital on leverage.
Lemma 6. [The Up-steady-state] In the deterministic steady state U∞ where a =
aU , prices and allocations in the collateral equilibrium are given by:
1. Capital and contract prices: qU∞ =
β
1−βaU ; πj=qU∞ = βqU∞
2. Capital holdings: K̃U∞ = K̃fb = G
′−1 (aU); KU∞ = K̄ − K̃U∞
3. Contract trades: ϕj=qU∞ = KU∞ = −ϕ̃j=qU∞




+ βaUK̃U∞; xU∞ = (1− β) aUKU∞
In the Down-steady-state D∞, the household will end up holding the entire stock
of capital. The rms that are shown to be permanently unproductive exit the market.
Lemma 7. [The Down-steady-state] In the deterministic steady state D∞ where
a = aD, prices and allocations in the collateral equilibrium are given by:
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1. Capital and contract prices: qD∞ =
β
1−βaD; πj=qD∞ = βqD∞
2. Capital holdings: K̃D∞ = K̄; KD∞ = 0
3. Contract trades: ϕj=qD∞ = 0 = −ϕ̃j=qD∞
4. Consumption: x̃D∞ = ẽD∞ + aD; xD∞ = 0
I omit proofs for Lemma 6 and 7 as they can both be readily derived from the
relevant rst-order conditions.
It is also clear that neither steady states will be reached immediately upon the res-
olution of uncertainty in the model. Even when the rm is known to be permanently
productive at time t, (at+τ = aU ∀τ ≥ 0), in general the rm might not have enough
liquid wealth to purchase KU∞ and consume xU∞ . A period of transition is required
whereby the rm gradually builds up its liquid wealth and capital stock towards the
steady state. During this transition towards deterministic Up-steady-state U∞, it is
possible to show that the rm will use leverage in order to accumulate capital faster.
The transition to the Down-steady-state D∞ is straight-forward. Once the rm is
known to be permanently unproductive at history s2 = DD, the rm will exit the
market by handing over any collateral, liquidating its remaining capital stock, and
consuming the entirety of its net worth. The deterministic steady state D∞ will then
be reached immediately in the following period.
Proof of proposition 1 [Productive ineciency and leverage during the
downturn]
For the rst part of Proposition 1 I show that rms will not begin history s1 = D
with enough liquid wealth to purchase the rst-best benchmark level of capital KfbD
given equilibrium prices for capital and debt contracts.
1. Suppose to the contrary that KD ≥ KfbD , then rm's liquid wealth at history
D must be high enough to at least purchase KfbD using the maximum leverage
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KfbD given corollary 1






2. If the rm used any leverage debt contracts in period 0 (j ∈ J = [qD, qU ]), then
during the downturn it will surrender the collateral posted and retain only the
products of its capital holding, so wD = aDK0. For the rm to be able to aord
KfbD in history D, we must have:
K0 ≥ βKfbD
= βKfb0 by denition of K
fb
t (eqn 1.13)
However this level of capital holding in period 0 cannot be achieved given the

















= βKfb0 by assumption A4.2
So we reach a contradiction K0 < βK
fb
0 ≤ K0.
3. Suppose instead the rm purchased capital without leverage in period 0. Then













≥ wD > βaDKfbD





> 1 then the household would also want to purchase more
capital instead of consuming, leading to a contradiction with respect to Lemma
1. Intuitively, for the rm to transfer enough resources into state D to purchase
KfbD without using leverage in period 0, the price of capital in the downturn qD
must be suciently high relative to the initial price q0. But in such situations,
the household would also like to purchase more capital in period 0, which would
push q0 beyond the level required for the rm.
To prove the second part of Proposition 1, I show that when rms hold less capi-
tal than under the rst-best benchmark, they will prefer to purchase capital using
leverage than without leverage.
Lemma 8. If Kt (s
t) < Kfbt (s
t), then
∑
j∈J(st) max {ϕt,j (st) , 0} = Kt (st), ∀t ≥ 0
and ∀st ∈ St.
Proof. It is sucient to show that the maximum leverage contract j̄t is preferable to
purchasing capital without leverage, when Kt < K
fb
t . The expected rate of return
from buying capital with contract j̄ at time t is given by:
γt,j̄ :=
Et [βγt+1 (at+1)]














The expected rate of return from buying capital without leverage is given by:
γt,no :=
























∀a, b, c, d > 0, we have γt,j̄ > γt,no if and only if Et[γt+1at+1]G′(K̃) >
Et[γt+1qt+1]
Et[qt+1]
. Furthermore, since Kt < K
fb
t ⇔ K̃t > K̃
fb

















pγUt+1aU + (1− p) γDt+1aD






t+1 + (1− p) γDt+1qDt+1
pqUt+1 + (1− p) qDt+1
With a little algebra we can show that the sucient condition captured in the






Since the price of capital is always given by households' asset pricing equation, it
is bounded above and below by its value in the deterministic Up and Down steady













⇒ γt,j̄ > γt,no
as required.
Lemma 8 concludes the proof for Proposition 1. In summary, during the downturn,
rms hold too little capital relative to the rst-best benchmark. Consequently they are
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in expectations more productive than households and would like to utilize leveraged
debt contracts to increase their holding of capital. But a combination of fallen liquid
wealth and worsened credit conditions constrain the rm's purchasing power. These
two nancial frictions work together to exacerbate the downturn.
Proof to Proposition 2 [Optimal leverage during the downturn]
From Lemma 3 we know that j̄D is weakly preferred to jD if and only if rms' marginal
utility of income during the downturn is weakly greater than its marginal utility of
income during the subsequent recovery: γD ≥ γDU . So to determine the optimal debt
contract for rms at history D, we need to sign the dierence between γD and γDU ,
which is given by:











































) since γDD = 1
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First, when KD = K
fb
D (and K̃D = K̃
fb
D ), we have γD − γDU ≤ 0:
γD − γDU =
[

























) since γDU ≥ 1
=




) since G′ (KfbD ) = E [a]
= 0
Second, when KD = 0 (and K̃D = 1), we have γD − γDU > 0
γD − γDU =











> 0 since p ≥ aD
aU
by assumption A3.1
Since G ∈ C2, by the intermediate value theorem ∃K̂D ∈ (0, KfbD ] s.t. γD−γDU = 0
and the rm is indierent between the maximum leverage contract and the max-min
leverage contract. This concludes the proof.
Proof of proposition 3 [Unanticipated Intervention at D]
When rms nd it optimal to use the maximum leverage contract j∗D = j̄D, they will
purchase as much capital as they can with their available liquid wealth wD. So rms'
capital holding is given by KD =
wD
qD−πj̄D=qDU
< KfbD (inequality by Proposition 1).
Suppose the central bank subsidizes the maximum leverage contract j̄D. This will
allow the rms to hold a larger stock of capital in equilibrium, and the equilibrium




DU > qDU . The required level of subsidy to achieve the rst-best benchmark




















q̄CBDU , which follows immediately given K
fb
D > 0, wD > 0 and q̄
CB
DU ≥ q̄CBD . The
last condition q̄CBDU ≥ q̄CBD claims that the price of capital will be (weakly) higher
during the recovery (history DU) than during the downturn (history D). This
is equivalent to showing that rms will hold a higher proportion of capital in the
recovery: KDU > K
fb
D . We do this in two steps. First, observe that in history DU the
uncertainty surrounding rms' productivity has been fully resolved and the economy is
transitioning towards the Up-steady-state. Second, rms use leveraged debt contracts

















For the second part of the proposition, suppose the central bank subsidizes the
max-min leverage contract j
D
. The equilibrium price for capital will be (weakly)
higher during the downturn: qCB
D
≥ qD; and remains unchanged if the productivity
shock turns out to be permanent and the households hold the entire stock of capital:
qCBDD = qDD. The required level of subsidy to achieve the rst-best benchmark

























Consequently, for suciently low wD and suciently large gap in the price of capital
between periods qCB
D
− qDD, both of which depend in part on the specications of the
initial endowment for rms e0 and on the household's production function G (·), the
size of the central bank loan required to achieve the rst-best outcome may exceed
the promised value of repayment: πCBj
D
=qDD
> qDD, thus violating the eective-lower-
bound condition.
Proof to Proposition 4 [The Announcement Eect]
When the central bank optimally provides credit support in history DU , χ∗jDU=qDUU >
0, we know that the rms' capital holding at DU is raised to the rst-best benchmark
KfbDU . Consequently, the price of capital rises relative to the scenario where the central
bank is only expected to intervene at D: qAnDU > q
CB
DU . The price of capital at history
DD remains unchanged: qAnDD = q
CB
DD because the rms will always default and the
households hold the entire stock of capital at DD. Higher capital prices during the
recovery eases credit conditions in the private market at history D. For the maximum
leverage contract: πj̄D=qAnDU > πj̄D=qCBDU , so the rms can secure a larger loan against
the same unit of capital. The improved access to credit leads to an immediate increase
in capital prices: qAnD > q
CB
D . With and without the announcement, the central bank
will set subsidy, χAnD and χ
CB
j̄D
respectively, such that rms hold the rst-best level of
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πj̄D=qCBDU > 0 (1.45)
where wD = aDK0 because the rm used leverage at history 0.
Since agents' capital holdings are unchanged, from households' asset pricing equa-
tions (see equation 1.41) we know that the net down-payment required on the private
market for maximum leverage contracts also remains unchanged, despite the changes
in the price of capital and the size of the loan:





= qAnD − πj̄D=qAnDU (1.46)










































































































Lastly, identical liquidation value qADDD = q
CB
DD at history DD but larger public












larger shortfall at DD: TDD|χAN > TDD|χ∗j̄D ; and correspondingly a larger windfall
at DU .
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2 The Collateral Rule - Theory for the Credit De-
fault Swap Market15
2.1 Introduction
The empirical results in Capponi et al. (2020) demonstrate that extreme tail risk
measures have a higher explanatory power for observed collateral requirements than
the standard Value-at-Risk rule. This nding lends support to models where the
collateral rule is determined endogenously, like Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015). A
key prediction of Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015) is that in a binomial economy (i.e.
when there are two states of nature only), any collateral equilibrium is equivalent to
one in which there is no default - that is, where collateral covers the most extreme
losses. But linking the empirical results on the CDS market to this model faces two
main limitations: (1) the conclusions only hold if there are two states of nature; and
(2) defaults on CDS obligation, although rare, do arise in practice.
We develop a new model of endogenous collateral that is specically suited for the
CDS market: it features a continuum of states (as opposed to just two), and non-zero
default probability in equilibrium. Trade in this model occurs because of dierences
in beliefs. The model presented in this paper is a natural adaptation of Simsek
(2013), where belief disagreements are central to asset prices and endogenous margin
requirements. But unlike Simsek (2013) who considers standard debt contracts and
short selling, our model is specialized to an economy where the only contracts available
for trading are state contingent promises (CDSs) backed by risk-free collateral (cash).
Thus the model presented here is not a nested version of Simsek (2013), but an
extension of the framework to the CDS market.
In our model, optimists naturally sell insurance (CDS protection) to pessimists,
and pessimists require that the sellers post collateral (in the form of cash). The
15This is joint work with Agostino Capponi and Stefano Giglio.
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amount of cash required to collateralize the CDS contract (the collateralization rate)
arises endogenously in the model. we show that what matters for the level of collat-
eralization is not the extent of the disagreement between market participants per se,
but the nature of their disagreement. In particular, when the optimists becomes more
optimistic, the level of collateralization falls; but when the pessimists attach a larger
weight to negative tail events, the level of collateralization rises. In both cases the
level of disagreement between participants widened, but the change in the collateral
requirement went in opposite directions.
Most importantly, the model can generate the high margin requirements and low
default probabilities we observe in the data, when the clearing house (i.e. the pessimist
in the model) places a greater emphasis on extreme tail risks. Moreover, whilst the
collateral requirement that arises in such an equilibrium may be viewed as onerous by
the clearing members (the optimist in the model), it may nevertheless not be enough
to fully prevent default when viewed from the clearinghouse's perspective.
2.2 Model Setup
Consider an economy with two periods t = {0, 1} and two risk-neutral agents: one
optimist and one pessimist. All agents trade in period t = 0 and consume in period
t = 1. Uncertainty is captured by a continuum of states s ∈ S = [smin, smax] realized
in period t = 1, with smin normalized to zero for simplicity. The pessimist, denoted by
i = 0, holds prior beliefs over S given by the distribution F0 and corresponding density
f0. The optimist, denoted by i = 1, has prior beliefs characterized by the distribution
F1 and density f1. The optimist has a higher expectation than the pessimist on the
state in period 1, i.e., E1 [s] > E0 [s]. These prior beliefs are common knowledge for
all agents.
At the start of period t = 0, each agent i = {0, 1} is endowed with ni units of
the numeraire consumption good which can be safely stored without depreciation for
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consumption at period t = 1. I assume that the only other asset available is cash,
which also yields one unit of the consumption good in period t = 1, but - unlike the
the consumption good - cash can be used as collateral in CDS contracts. At t = 0,
the entire endowment of cash (normalized to 1) is held by an un-modeled third party,
who can sell cash in exchange for the numeraire consumption good at the equilibrium
price p. The price of the consumption good is normalized to 1.
The optimist and pessimist have identical (linear) preferences over the consump-
tion good, so trading between the two is driven purely by dierences in beliefs. I
assume that the only class of nancial contracts available to trade is a simple CDS
contract. Recall that the payo of a CDS contract is zero if there is no default of
the underlying (in our model, when s high), and 1− R in the case of default, where
R is the state-contingent recovery rate of the underlying bond. Since the recovery
R worsens as the fundamentals of the underlying deteriorate, the payo of the CDS
becomes larger as the state s becomes worse. I model the promised payo of a CDS
in a simple way, i.e., as smax − s. We can think of the case s = smax as the event in
which the underlying bond does not default, so that the CDS does not pay anything;
0 < s < smax as the intermediate case in which the underlying bond defaults, but
there is positive recovery, so that the the CDS pays o some amount; and s = 0 as
the extreme case of zero recovery, where the payo of the CDS is maximal (and equal
to smax).
To enforce payment of the promise, the seller of CDSs needs to post some amount
of collateral. Following the endogenous collateral literature, consider the family of
CDS contracts BCDS =
{
[smax − s]s∈S , γ
}
, each composed of a promise of (smax − s)
units of the consumption good in state s at t = 1, backed by γ units of cash as
collateral. Denote by q (γ) the t = 0 price of such a CDS contract with collateral
level γ. In general, multiple CDS contracts may coexist in equilibrium: they have the
same promised payment (smax− s), but dierent amounts of collateral posted γ, and
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 as a consequence  trade for dierent prices q(γ). Thus we can index the dierent
CDS contracts in BCDS by γ.
Since the promised payment on a CDS contract is enforceable only through the
potential of seizing the collateral, the actual delivery on each contract in state s is
given by the minimum of the promised payment and the value of the collateral in
that state: δ (s, γ) := min {smax − s, γ}. In other words, in any state s̃ such that
smax − s̃ > γ, the seller of the CDS contract would default on her promise, and the
buyer would only receive the value of the collateral γ.
Denote by µ+i , µ
−
i , respectively, agent i's long and short positions on CDS contracts
(where a long position means that the agent has purchased the corresponding CDS
contract). Let ai ∈ R+ denote agent i's holding of the numeraire consumption good;
and ci ∈ R+ be her cash holdings. Then agent i's budget constraint can be written
as:
ai + pci +
∫
γ∈BCDS
q (γ) dµ+i ≤ ni +
∫
γ∈BCDS
q (γ) dµ−i , (2.1)
where the left hand side represents the total value of the agent's portfolio, comprised
of her holding of the numeraire good ai, the value of her cash holding pci and her
long-position in CDS contracts
∫
γ∈BCDS q (γ) dµ
+
i . The right hand side represents the
total value of the funding available to the agent, comprising of her endowment of
the consumption good ni and the amount she can raise by shorting CDS contracts,∫
γ∈BCDS q (γ) dµ
−
i . If an agent i has a short position on the CDS contracts, then she
is also subject to the collateral constraint:
∫
γ∈BCDS
γdµ−i ≤ ci, (2.2)
which means that agent i must have sucient cash holdings to satisfy the collateral
requirements for the CDS contracts sold. In contrast, the purchaser of the CDS
contracts (the party who is long) is not subject to any collateral requirements.
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ai + ci + Ei
[∫
γ





min {smax − s, γ} dµ−i
]
(2.3)
subject to the budget constraint (2.1) and the collateral constraint (2.2).









and a set of prices (p ∈ R+, q : γ → R+) such that the portfolio choices solve the
optimization problem (2.3) of each agent i ∈ {0, 1}; and the prices are such that
the market for cash clears
∑








We will show that although the entire family of CDS contracts will be priced, only
one contract will be traded in equilibrium. This result is line with the literature on
collateral equilibrium (Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015); Simsek (2013)). Furthermore,
the collateral level γ of the actively traded CDS contract, and the price of cash p, will
be determined endogenously. The equilibrium level of collateral requirement γ will
depend on the nature of belief dierences between the optimist and the pessimist.
2.3 Existence and Uniqueness of the Collateral Equilibrium
Following the approach in Simsek (2013), it is possible to show that (under suitable
assumptions over initial endowments and beliefs) the collateral equilibrium exists, is
unique, and is equivalent to a principal-agent equilibrium where the optimist chooses
her cash holdings and the optimal CDS contract to sell, subject to the pessimist's
participation constraint. To this end, we impose the following assumptions on initial
endowments and prior beliefs, that parallel similar assumptions in Simsek (2013):
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E1 [smax − s]
− n1 (2.5)
The rst inequality ensures that the optimist's initial endowment is not large
enough to purchase the entire supply of cash in the economy with her own
resources alone (that is, she will need to raise some more of the numeraire con-
sumption good by selling CDS contracts).16 The second inequality ensures that
the initial endowment of the pessimist (n0) is large enough that the pessimist
will always have some residual consumption after paying for the CDS.17
Since the pessimist is risk neutral, this implies that her expected return on any CDS
contracts purchased must also be equal to 1 in equilibrium. Thus the equilibrium
price of a CDS contract with collateral γ must be given by:
q (γ) = E0 [min (s
max − s, γ)] . (2.6)
This pricing equation serves as a convenient characterization of the pessimist's par-
ticipation constraint.
We can now formulate the optimist's problem as choosing the level of cash holdings
c1, and the CDS contract γ to sell, so as to maximize the expected payos, subject
to the pessimist's participation constraint of achieving an expected return of 1 on the
16For a more detailed discussion of this, see Appendix 2.7.
17More specically, this inequality implies that the sum of the endowments needs to be greater













E1 [min {smax − s, γ}] (2.7)
s.t. pc1 = n1 +
c1
γ
E0 [min {smax − s, γ}]
This leads us to dene the principal-agent equilibrium as follows:
Denition 2. A principal-agent equilibrium is a pair of optimist's portfolio choices
(c∗1, γ
∗) and price for cash (p∗) such that the optimist's portfolio solves her optimiza-
tion problem (2.7), and the market for cash clears: c∗1 = 1.
In order to show equivalence between the principal-agent equilibrium outlined here
and the collateral equilibrium dened previously, further restrictions on the nature of
belief dierences are required:
Assumption A2: [Restrictions on Prior Beliefs] The probability densities of







for every s1 > s0 (2.8)
Note that this assumption implies: (1) rst-order stochastic dominance: F1 (s) <
F0 (s),∀s ∈ (smin, smax); (2) monotone hazard rate: f1(s)1−F1(s) <
f0
1−F1(s) ,∀s ∈










We can then prove the following Proposition:
Proposition 6. [Existence, Uniqueness, and Equivalence of Equilibria] Un-
der Assumptions A1 and A2:
1. There exists a unique principal-agent equilibrium (p∗, (c∗1, γ
∗)) s.t. p∗ > 1.
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optimist sells CDS to the pessimist (i.e. µ̂+1 = µ̂
−
0 = 0), and only a single CDS
contract is actively traded (i.e. µ̂+0 is a measure that puts weight only at one
contract γ̂ ∈ BCDS). This collateral equilibrium is unique in the sense that
the price of cash p̂ and the price of the traded CDS contract q (γ̂) are uniquely
determined.
3. The collateral equilibrium and the principal-agent equilibrium are equivalent:
p̂ = p∗, ĉ1 = c
∗
1, γ̂ = γ
∗
and q (γ̂) = E0 [min (s
max − s, γ∗)]
The detailed proof is reported in the Appendix. Intuitively, because under assumption
A1 the pessimist will hold a surplus of the consumption good in equilibrium (he has
a larger endowment than what the optimist would want to borrow), he must be
indierent between holding the consumption good (with a sure return of 1) and
holding the CDS sold by the optimist. Hence, the optimist eectively holds all
the bargaining power when deciding which CDS they should trade, and will only
trade in the contract that maximizes the optimist's expected return. Assumption A2
provides the sucient conditions for there to exist a unique contract γ∗ that solves
the optimist's principal agent problem.
2.4 Characterizing the Equilibrium
In this section, we show that in equilibrium the optimist will wish to sell CDS contracts
to the pessimist (so as to bet on the events she thinks are more likely). But, to do so,
the optimist must rst obtain more units of the numeraire good from the pessimist
by selling CDS contracts, in order to purchase the cash required to collateralize the
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CDS contracts.18 Because cash is the only asset that can be used as collateral, its
equilibrium price will exceed its fundamental value (p > 1), so cash is held exclusively
by the optimist in equilibrium.
To formally characterize the equilibrium, rst substitute c1 =
n1
(p− 1γE0[min{smax−s,γ}])
from the optimist's constraint into his objective function. This reduces the dimension
of the problem by one, and allows us to restrict attention to choosing only the optimal
contract γ. The resulting rst order condition characterizes the optimal contract
choice for given p:
Proposition 7. Under assumptions A1 and A2, and xing a price for cash p, the
optimal CDS contract, s̄, with respect to the optimist's problem (2.7) is given by the
unique solution to:
p = F0 (s
max − s̄) + (1− F0 (smax − s̄))
E0 [s
max − s|s ≥ smax − s̄]
E1 [smax − s|s ≥ smax − s̄]
=: popt (s̄) (2.9)
Inverting popt (s̄) gives the optimal CDS contract s̄ for the optimist, for given price
of cash p. This rst order condition eectively determines how much collateralization
the optimist (seller) chooses for the CDS contract, since the states s ≤ smax−s̄ are the
ones where the optimist is defaulting on the promise of delivering the CDS payment
and is instead relinquishing the collateral. Once the equilibrium price of cash p∗ is
known (see Eq. (2.11) below), we can use Eq. (2.9) to derive the equilibrium level of
collateral γ∗ by setting p∗ = popt (γ∗).
Equation (2.9) also implies that the price of cash is composed of two parts: (a)
the pessimist's assessment of the probability of default on the CDS: (F0 (s
max − s̄)),
multiplied by the pessimist's valuation of cash in the default state (1); plus (b) the
pessimist's assessment of the probability of the no-default state, multiplied by the
value of cash to the optimist in the non-default state (each unit of cash allowed the
18This mechanism is analogous to a mortgage contract, where the borrower is raising funds from
the lender in order to purchase the collateral (i.e. the house) required to back the mortgage.
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optimist to borrow 1
s̄
E0 [s
max − s|s ≥ smax − s̄] from the pessimist, with an expected
actual delivery of 1
s̄
E1 [s
max − s|s ≥ smax − s̄]). Given the dierences in beliefs, the
optimist expects to deliver less than what the pessimist envisages on the CDS con-
tract: E0[s
max−s|s≥smax−s̄]
E1[smax−s|s≥smax−s̄] ≥ 1. Hence, p ≥ 1, i.e., cash generates collateral value.
Consistent with the Asymmetric Disciplining of Optimism result in Simsek (2013),
the pessimist's beliefs are used in assigning weights to the default and non-default
states. The belief of the optimist enters only in determining the value of collateral in
the non-default state.
Further, we show in the proof of Proposition 7 that popt (s̄) is an increasing function
of s̄. To see this intuitively, denote the optimist's perceived interest rate on (borrowing
through selling) the CDS contract as
1 + rper1 (s̄) :=
E1 [min {smax − s, s̄}]
E0 [min {smax − s, s̄}]
(2.10)




< 0). In other words, given the nature of belief dierences, oering a
CDS contract with higher margin requirements is more attractive for the optimist.
Thus the higher the margins s̄ posted, the greater the discrepancy between expected
deliveries becomes, and the more attractive selling the CDS is to the optimist. Thus,
increasing s̄ increases the collateral value of cash.
To close the model, we impose the market clearing condition for cash. The budget





E0 [min {smax − s, s̄}]
Since the supply of cash is normalized to 1, we have:
p = n1 +
1
s̄
E0 [min {smax − s, s̄}] =: pmc (s̄) (2.11)
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We show that pmc (s̄) is a decreasing function of s̄,19 with boundary conditions
pmc (smin) > popt (smin) and pmc (smax) < popt (smax). Hence, the unique intersection
between popt (s̄) and pmc (s̄) pins down the equilibrium price for cash p∗ and margin
requirement γ∗.
Proposition 8. Under assumptions A1 and A2, there is a unique principal-agent
equilibrium (c∗1, γ
∗, p∗) characterized by:
c∗1 = 1
p∗ = pmc (γ∗) = popt (γ∗)
where popt (·) and pmc (·) are respectively dened in equations (2.9) and (2.11).
Proof. See appendix.
2.5 Comparative Statics and Illustrative Example
We present a simple numerical example to illustrate the collateral equilibrium and
perform comparative statics, before presenting the more general results as proposi-
tions.
Suppose that the starting endowments of the numeraire consumption good are
n0 = 3 and n1 = 0.5 for the pessimist and the optimist respectively. Let the set of
states and the prior beliefs be given by: S = [0, 1] and
F0 (s) = s
1
2 ∀s ∈ S (2.12)
F1 (s) = s
3 ∀s ∈ S (2.13)
19pmc (s̄) is downward sloping because 1s̄E0 [min {s
max − s, s̄}] is decreasing in s̄. Intuitively,
even though a CDS contract with higher margin requirements demands a higher price (i.e.
E0 [min {smax − s, s̄}] is increasing in s̄), the need to post more margins reduces the number of such
contracts the optimist can sell with a single unit of cash as collateral. The overall eect is that posting
more margins reduces the total amount that the optimist can borrow, 1s̄E0 [min {s
max − s, s̄}], and
this reduction in the purchasing power of optimists reduces the market clearing price of cash.
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Panel A of Figure 2.1 plots the upward sloping cash price schedule {popt (s̄)}s̄∈[0,smax]
(equation (2.9)), and the downward sloping cash price schedule {pmc (s̄)}s̄∈[0,smax]
schedule (equation (2.11)), the intersection of which characterizes the equilibrium
price of cash p∗ and the equilibrium margin requirement γ∗.
Suppose instead that the optimist becomes less optimistic, such that:
F̃1 (s) = s
3
2 ∀s ∈ S
Then we can see from equation (2.9) that the decreased optimism of the optimist
shifts the popt (s̄) schedule downwards and leaves the pmc (s̄) schedule untouched. The
resulting equilibrium, as illustrated in panel B of Figure 2.1, is comprised of a lower
price for cash p̃∗ and higher margin requirements γ̃∗.
We generalize this intuition in the following general proposition:
Proposition 9. [Change in optimist's beliefs] Suppose that the optimist's beliefs
becomes 'less optimistic' in the sense that it changes from F1 to F̃1, s.t. the monotone




for every s0, s1 ∈ [smin, smax] and
s1 > s0 . Then the equilibrium level of collateral (γ
∗) increases, and the equilibrium





for every s0, s1 ∈ [smin, smax] and s1 > s0 , then the
equilibrium level of collateral falls and the equilibrium collateral value rises.
Proof. See appendix.
While the changes in the optimist's beliefs lead to unambiguous changes in the
equilibrium, the same is not true for the pessimist's beliefs. Since the pessimist's
beliefs feature in the cash price schedule of both the optimist (i.e, popt) and the
pessimist (i.e., pmc), a given change in the pessimist's beliefs can either increase or
decrease equilibrium collateral levels depending on the initial equilibrium. Intuitively,
when the pessimist becomes more pessimistic, she is willing to pay more for any given
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CDS contracts (i.e. E0 [min {smax − s, s̄}] increases). This means that the optimist is
now both: a) able to raise more funding from selling CDS contracts; and b) willing to
pay more for each unit of collateral. The former eect shifts up the market clearing
schedule pmc, and the latter eect can push up the popt schedule. Therefore, whether
the equilibrium collateral level increases depends on the interaction of these two
eects. Moreover, since the popt schedule also depend on the pessimist's evaluation
of the default probability (i.e. F0 (s
max − s̄))20, the eect of increased pessimism is
not always monotone along S = [0, 1]. For low levels of collateral s̄, the protection
oered may be deemed insucient, so the new popt schedule may be lower than before;
but for high levels of collateral, the new popt schedule might be higher. In short, the
popt schedule may pivot as well as shift in response to a change in pessimist's beliefs,
creating further ambiguity in the direction of the equilibrium collateral level γ∗.
Instead, we show that a sucient (but not necessary) condition for the equilibrium
collateral level to increase is for the pessimist to become more concerned about the tail
risks (i.e. to place a larger weight on the default states {s ∈ S : γ < smax − s} ) such
that the probability density she attaches to all the non-default states are consistently
lower than before, i.e., f̃0 (s) < f0 (s) ∀s ∈ [smax − γ∗, smax].
For illustration, consider a change in pessimist's beliefs from F0 (eqn. 2.12) to F̃0:
F̃0 (s) = s
1
4 ∀s ∈ S
Then the equilibrium collateral level and collateral value both increase (Panel C of
Figure 2.1). Note that under the specic beliefs outlined here, the equilibrium level
of collateral in Panel C is 0.8251, and the optimist believes default will occur with
probability 0.0053. This is consistent with our empirical nding that extreme tail
risk measures are important in explaining the high collateral levels and low default




max − s̄) and (1− F0 (smax − s̄)) respectively.
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frequencies observed in practice. We state this result more formally in the following
proposition.
Proposition 10. [Pessimist's concern for tail events]: For any given initial
equilibrium (γ∗, p∗), if the pessimist becomes more concerned about tail events in
the sense that her beliefs changes from F0 to F̃0, such that: f̃0 (s) < f0 (s) ∀s ∈
[smax − γ∗, smax], then the equilibrium collateral level (γ∗) increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, note that the key to high collateral requirements in the model is the
nature  rather than the degree  of the belief dierence between the two agents.
The equilibrium level of collateral increases both when the optimist becomes more
pessimistic (which reduces the extent of the disagreement), and when the pessimist
becomes more concerned about the tail events (which increases the extent of the
disagreement). What the market participant disagree about matters more than how
much they disagree per se.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that under suitable assumptions, a unique collateral equilibrium
exists for the trading of CDS contracts between optimists and pessimists. In this
equilibrium, the pessimist buys CDS contracts from the optimist. Since selling a CDS
requires cash as collateral, the optimist needs to secure more cash from the market. In
equilibrium, the price of cash will be higher than the value of the non-collateralizable
numeraire consumption good. This endogenous premium on cash reects its value as
collateral.
In the collateral equilibrium, only one CDS contract with a particular level of
collateral γ∗ will be actively traded. Default on the CDS obligations will, in general,
happen with positive probability. The level of collateral γ∗, the price of the CDS
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contract q(γ∗), and the price of cash p∗ all depend on the belief disagreement between
the optimist and the pessimist. In particular, the higher the disagreement about the
probability of states in which counterparty defaults may occur (i.e. the left tail of the
distribution), the higher the margin requirements γ∗ in equilibrium, and the higher
the CDS price q (γ∗) the buyer is willing to pay.
The methodological framework presented here can thus generalize the key intuition
of Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015), which predicts that observed collateralization levels
might be set extremely conservatively in order to cover extreme losses in tail events.
But unlike Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015), which restricts attention to economies
with two states and the collateral equilibrium without default, the model in this paper
allows for a continuum of states, and a low but strictly positive probability of default.
Furthermore, we show that as the optimist's beliefs become 'less optimistic', or when
the pessimist becomes even more concerned about tail events, the equilibrium level
of collateralization rises, such that from the perspective of the market participants
the probability of default on CDS contracts tend to zero.
The model can therefore explain the particularly high collateral levels (γ∗) and
the low but strictly positive probability of default events that we observe in the
data (Capponi et al. (2020)). Viewed through the lens of this endogenous collateral
framework, the empirical results point to disagreement about the states of the world
in which CDS sellers would default on their obligations to the clearinghouse as the
fundamental reason why collateral levels are set so high.
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2.7 Appendices
Figure 2.1: Collateral Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
Panel A illustrates the upward-sloping popt (s̄) schedule (eqn 2.9, blue line) and the downward-sloping pmc (s̄) schedule
(eqn 2.11, red line) , the intersection of which gives the collateral equilibrium (γ∗, p∗). The popt (s̄) schedule is
increasing in the level of collateralization (s̄) because the pessimist is willing to pay a higher price for a better
collateralized CDS, which in turn increases the collateral value of cash (p) for the optimist. The pmc (s̄) schedule is
decreasing in the level of collateralization (s̄) because even though each unit of a better collateralized CDS is worth
more, the scarcity of collateral implies that a fewer number of such contracts can be written and the total amount of
funding the optimist can raise from the pessimist is lower. Therefore, in order for the market for collateral (i.e. cash)
to clear, its equilibrium price (p) must fall as the level of collateralization increases.
Panel B illustrates the case where the optimist becomes 'less optimistic': in the sense that her beliefs changes from










and s1 > s0 . When the optimist becomes
more pessimistic, the popt (s̄) schedule shifts down to p̃opt (s̄) (yellow dashed line). Intuitively, this is because as the
optimist and pessimist's beliefs converge, trading in CDSs becomes less attractive for both, so the optimist's demand
for cash (the required collateral) falls (weakly) for every level of collateralization. The resulting equilibrium is one
where the price of cash (its collateral value) is lower and the level of collateralization is higher.
Panel C illustrates the case where the pessimist becomes more concerned about the tail risks associated with the
default states {s ∈ S : s < smax − γ∗}. Specically, the pessimist's beliefs changes from F0 (s) to F̃0 (s), where
f0 (s) > f̃0 (s) ∀s ∈ [smax − γ∗, smax] . A greater concern for tail events increases the value of highly collateralized
CDS contracts, and decreases the value of less collateralized contracts, so the collateral value of cash for the optimist
is higher only when it is used to back highly collateralized CDS contracts (the popt schedule pivots to p̃opt, yellow
upward-sloping dashed line). The total amount of the numeraire good the optimist can raise through selling such
CDS contracts also rises, pushing up the market clearing price for cash (thepmc schedule shifts up to p̃mc, purple
downward-sloping dashed line). The resulting equilibrium is one where the equilibrium level of collateralization (γ∗)
is higher (see Proposition 10). Note that under the specic beliefs outlined in the illustrative example section of the
main text, the equilibrium level of collateral in Panel C is 0.8251, and the optimist believes default will occur with
probability 0.0053.
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A. Additional discussion of the assumptions
We discuss here in greater detail some of the assumptions in the model. The rst
inequality (2.4) states that the optimist's initial endowment is not large enough to
purchase the entire supply of cash by issuing only fully collateralized CDS contracts.
To see this, note that the value of one unit of cash to the optimist when selling




[E0 [min {smax − s, γ}]− E1 [min {smax − s, γ}]]
The total amount of funding the optimist can raise by selling riskless CDS con-




E0 [min {smax − s, smax}]
We assume that the optimist's endowment is not large enough to nance the




E0 [min {smax − s, smax}] < 1 +
1
smax




E1 [min {smax − s, smax}]
= 1− 1
smax






≤ 1, this in turn ensures that the optimist cannot simply purchase
the entire stock of cash (normalized to 1) without borrowing from the pessimist.
B. Proof of Proposition 7
Returning to the optimist's problem under the principal-agent formulation (2.7), we
can substitute the pessimist's participation constraint into the objective function to
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E0 [min {smax − s, γ}]
) [1− 1
γ








where we dene RCDS1 (γ) as the expected return to the optimist who buys one unit




E1 [min {smax − s, γ}]
p− 1
γ
E0 [min {smax − s, γ}]
=
γ − E1 [min {smax − s, γ}]
pγ − E0 [min {smax − s, γ}]
(2.15)
(the numerator is the expected t = 1 payo from purchasing the cash whilst simulta-
neously selling the CDS; the denominator is the down payment required to purchase
the cash).
Note that since Ei [min {smax − s, γ}] ≡ γFi (smax − γ)+
∫ smax
smax−γ (s
max − s) dFi (s),
we have
dEi [min {smax − s, γ}]
dγ
= Fi (s
max − γ)− γfi (smax − γ)− (−1) (smax − (smax − γ)) fi (smax − γ)
= Fi (s
max − γ)




(1− F1 (smax − γ)) (pγ − E0 [min {smax − s, γ}])
(pγ − E0 [min {smax − s, γ}])2
− (p− F0 (s
max − γ)) (γ − E1 [min {smax − s, γ}])
(pγ − E0 [min {smax − s, γ}])2
=
1
(pγ − E0 [min {smax − s, γ}])
[
(1− F1 (smax − γ))− (p− F0 (smax − γ))RCDS1 (γ)
]
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The rst order condition for the optimist's problem simplies to:
(1− F1 (smax − s̄)) = (p− F0 (smax − s̄))
s̄− E1 [min {smax − s, s̄}]
ps̄− E0 [min {smax − s, s̄}]
Re-arranging and simplifying notation (let Fi := Fi (s
max − s̄)) gives:
p =
(1− F1)E0 [min {smax − s, s̄}] + F0E1 [min {smax − s, s̄}]− s̄F0



























max − s) f0 (s) ds∫ smax
smax−s̄ (s
max − s) f1 (s) ds
= F0 +
(1− F1) (1− F0)E0 [smax − s|s ≥ smax − s̄]
(1− F1)E1 [smax − s|s ≥ smax − s̄]
= F0 (s
max − s̄) + (1− F0 (smax − s̄))
E0 [s
max − s|s ≥ smax − s̄]
E1 [smax − s|s ≥ smax − s̄]
=: popt (s̄)
as required.
Lemma 9. The price of cash (i.e. the collateral) is strictly increasing in the optimist's
desired level of collateralization: dp
opt(s̄)
ds̄
> 0 for s̄ ∈ (smin, smax).










1− Fi (smax − s̄)
∫ smax
smax−s̄




max − s̄)) (1− Fi (smax − s̄))− fi (smax − s̄)
∫ smax
smax−s̄ (s
max − s) f1 (s) ds
(1− Fi (smax − s̄))2
=
s̄fi (s
max − s̄)− fi (smax − s̄)Ei [smax − s|s ≥ smax − s̄]




1− Fi (smax − s̄)
(s̄− Ei [smax − s|s ≥ smax − s̄])
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Dierentiating popt (s̄) (and using short-hands: fi := fi (s
max − s̄), Fi := Fi (smax − s̄),
and Ei := Ei [s


























































max − s) f0 (s) ds∫ smax
smax−s̄ (s




where the rst inequality follows from s̄ > E1 [s
max − s|s ≥ smax − s̄] ∀s̄ ∈ (smin, smax),





(smax − s) f1 (s) ds− f1
∫ smax
smax−s̄




(smax − s) [f0 (smax − s̄) f1 (s)− f1 (smax − s̄) f0 (s)] ds






f0 (smax − s̄)
∀s > (smax − s)
Lemma 10. The optimist's perceived interest rate on the CDS is strictly decreasing
in the level of collateral s̄:
d(1+rper1 (s̄))
ds̄
< 0 for s̄ ∈ (smin, smax).
Proof. Recall from equation (2.10) that the perceived interest rate is dened as
1 + rper1 (s̄) :=
E1[min{smax−s,s̄}]




max − s̄)) yields:




max − s̄)E0 [min {smax − s, s̄}]− F0 (smax − s̄)E1 [min {smax − s, s̄}]
(E0 [min {smax − s, s̄}])2
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Because the denominator in the above expression is always positive, to show that
d(1+rper1 (s̄))
ds̄




F0(smax−s̄) . Proceed as follows:
E1 [min {smax − s, s̄}]
E0 [min {smax − s, s̄}]
=
s̄F1 (s
max − s̄) +
∫ smax
smax−s̄ (s
max − s) f1 (s) ds
s̄F0 (smax − s̄) +
∫ smax
smax−s̄ (s




max − s̄) +
∫ smax
smax−s̄ (s
max − s) f0 (s) F1(s)F0(s)ds
s̄F0 (smax − s̄) +
∫ smax
smax−s̄ (s









max − s) f0 (s) ds
s̄F0 (smax − s̄) +
∫ smax
smax−s̄ (s




F0 (smax − s̄)
where the rst inequality follows from Assumption A2 (f0 (s)
F1(s)
F0(s)
< f1 (s)), and the





C. Proof of Proposition 8
In the main body, we argued that the principal-agent equilibrium is given by the inter-
section of the optimality condition popt (s̄) = F0 (s
max − s̄)+(1− F0 (smax − s̄)) E0[s
max−s|s>smax−s̄]
E1[smax−s|s>smax−s̄]
derived from the optimist's optimization problem, and the market clearing condition
for cash: pmc (s̄) = n1 +
1
s̄
E0 [min {smax − s, s̄}]. From the proof to Proposition 7, We
have also established that popt (s̄) is strictly increasing in s̄ over s̄ ∈ (smin, smax). It
remains to show that (i) pmc (s̄) is strictly decreasing in s̄ over s̄ ∈ (smin, smax); and (ii)
the boundary conditions are such that an intersection exists: pmc (smin) > popt (smax)
and pmc (smax) < popt (smax).
1. Show that pmc (s̄) is strictly decreasing in s̄ over s̄ ∈ (smin, smax) .
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Given pmc (s̄) = n1 +
1
s̄


























2. Consider the boundary conditions for pmc (s̄) and popt (s̄):
(a) For s̄ = smax, we have:
pmc (smax) = n1 +
(


















max − s]− E1 [smax − s]




E1 [smax − s]
= popt (smax) .
(b) For s̄ = smin ≡ 0, using L'Hospital's rule, we have:
lim
s̄↓0






















max − s̄) + (1− F0 (smax − s̄))
E0 [s
max − s|s ≥ smax − s̄]














max − s) f1 (s) ds
= 1 + lim
s̄↓0











max − s) f1 (s) ds




s̄f1 (smax − s̄)














3. Because popt (γ) and pmc (γ) are both continuous functions, by the intermediate
value theorem they intersect at some interior point γ∗ ∈ (smin, smax) and
p∗ ∈ [1, E0[s
max−s]
E1[smax−s]). Since p
mc (s̄) is strictly decreasing, and popt (s̄) is strictly
increasing, the intersection is unique.
D. Proof of Proposition 6
The existence of a unique Principal-Agent equilibrium has been shown in the proof of
propositions 7 and 8. In this section we show that a collateral general equilibrium as
dened in the main body exists and is equivalent to the principal-agent equilibrium.
1. Step 1: Simplifying observations for solving the collateral general equilibrium:
(a) Without loss of generality, we can show that the equilibrium price of cash
satises p̂ ∈
[
1, 1 + [E1[s]−E0[s]]
smax
)
. Since cash guarantees a safe return of
1, its equilibrium price will never fall below 1. The optimist attach a
higher value to cash, because by using cash as collateral in selling CDS
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contracts γ, an optimist also gains the dierence in the expected delivery
1
γ
[E0 [min {smax − s, γ}]− E1 [min {smax − s, γ}]]21. This dierence in be-
liefs is fully exploited when the CDS is fully collateralized at γ = smax.
So the maximum price an optimist is willing to pay for cash is equal
to: 1 + 1
smax
[E0 [min {smax − s, smax}]− E1 [min {smax − s, smax}]] = 1 +
[E1[s]−E0[s]]
smax
, at which point the optimist would also weakly prefer to hold
the illiquid asset instead. [E1[s]−E0[s]]
smax
can be interpreted as the upper bound
on the equilibrium collateral value for cash. For the rest of the proof, we




(b) Note that each agent's optimization problem (2.3) is linear in the objective
variables, thus their value functions will take the form vini, where vi
denotes the return on agent i's endowment ni.
(c) Since the agents can always just hold their endowment of the illiquid asset







Ei [min {smax − s, smax}]
p− 1
smax
E0 [min {smax − s, smax}]
}
∀i = {0, 1} (2.16)










represents the expected rate of return on
buying cash to use as collateral in selling the CDS contract γ = smax. For
the latter, the expected payo in the second period is 1 (from the cash) mi-
nus 1
smax
Ei [min {smax − s, smax}] (the expected delivery on the CDS con-




E0 [min {smax − s, smax}]
)
,
21Note that even though 1γ [E0 [min {s
max − s, γ}]− E1 [min {smax − s, γ}]] is maximized at γ =
smax. This is does not mean the optimist will always want to sell the fully collateralised CDS at
any p. The popt (s̄) curve plots the optimal collateral level s̄ for the optimist at any given price p.






where p is the price paid for the unit of cash, and 1
smax
E0 [min {smax − s, smax}]
is the amount raised from selling the CDS to the pessimist who values it
the most.
(d) Summing over the two agents' budget constraints (2.1), and imposing the
market clearing conditions in equilibrium (holdings of CDS contracts must
cancel out and the sum of total cash holdings is normalized to 1) yields:
a0 + a1 + p̂× 1 = n0 + n1
Recall that by Assumption A1 n0 + n1 >
E0[smax−s]





, so p̂ ∈ [1, 1 + [E1[s]−E0[s]]
smax
] implies that a0 + a1 > 0 (i.e. one
or more agents must hold the illiquid asset in equilibrium).
(e) Since p < 1 + [E1[s]−E0[s]]
smax
, we know from equation (2.16) that v1 > 1.
Therefore, the pessimist must be the one holding the illiquid asset in the
collateral equilibrium, which gives us v0 = 1.
(f) Lastly, without loss of generality, CDS contracts with γ > smax will not be
used in equilibrium (such contracts tie down a larger amount of collateral
without a compensating increase in price).
2. Agents' bid and ask prices for CDS contracts:
(a) An agent's bid price is the price that would make her indierent between
buying the CDS contract and simply receiving the equilibrium value per
net worth vi , so:
qbid0 (γ) =
E0 [min {smax − s, γ}]
v0
= E0 [min {smax − s, γ}]
> qbid1 (γ) =




(b) An agent's ask price for the CDS contract γ is the price that would make
the trader indierent between taking a negative position in the CDS γ and































i (γ) > q (γ), then some buyer wants to buy an innite
amount, but seller can only sell a nite amount due to the collateral con-









so we must have mini q
ask
i (γ) ≥ q (γ))
(d) A CDS contract is traded in positive quantities only if:
qaski (γ̂) = q (γ̂) = q
bid
j (γ̂) for some {i, j} = {0, 1}
(e) Claim the pessimist's ask prices are always higher than optimist's bid
prices:
qask0 (γ) = γ (p− 1) + E0 [min {smax − s, γ}] from eqn (2.18)
> E0 [min {smax − s, γ}] since p > 1
= qbid0 (γ) > q
bid
1 (γ) from eqn (2.17)
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so there are no traded CDS contracts in which the optimist buy and the
pessimist sell.
(f) The equilibrium prices of CDS contracts are therefore:

q (γ̂) = qbid0 (γ̂) = q
ask













 The optimist faces quasi-equilibrium prices for all CDS contracts (even
those that are not positively traded in equilibrium):
q̃ (γ) = qbid0 (γ) = E0 [min {smax − s, γ}] (2.20)




















dµ−1 ≤ c1 [collateral constraint] (2.23)
 Since v1 > 1, the collateral constraint binds in equilibrium. Let λ1 denote
the Lagrangian multiplier for the collateral constraint. v1 will correspond
to the multiplier for the budget constraint
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 The FOCs for c1 and µ
−
1 yields:




E0 [min {smax − s, γ}] ≤
1
γ




 Combining the FOCs yield:
v1p = 1 + λ1
≥ 1 + v1
1
γ
E0 [min {smax − s, γ}]−
1
γ




E1 [min {smax − s, γ}]
p− 1
γ
E0 [min {smax − s, γ}]




 As per the proof of Proposition 7, RCDS1 (γ) has a unique maximum char-
acterized by popt (γ = s̃). So again the unique collateral-GE is pinned down
by the intersection between popt (s̄) and the market clearing condition for
cash: pmc (s̃) = n1 +
1
s̄
E0 [min {smax − s, s̃}], s.t. the equilibrium collateral
level γ̂ and the price of cash p̂ satises:
p̂ = popt (γ̂) = pmc (γ̂)
4. It follows that the unique general equilibrium is equivalent to the principal-agent
equilibrium.
E. Proof of Proposition 9
We prove the case where the optimist becomes 'more pessimistic'. Let g1 (s) :=
f1(s)
1−F1(smax−s̄) ∀s ∈ [s
max − s̄, smax] , ∀s̄ ∈ [smin, smax) and g̃1 (s) := f̃1(s)1−F̃1(smax−s̄) ∀s ∈
[smax−s̄, smax) . Then by Assumption A2 g (·) and g̃ (·) must also satisfy the monotone












> 0 ∀s ≥ (smax − s̄).
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This in turn implies Ẽ1 [s|s > smax − s̄] < E1 [s|s ∈ smax − s̄] ∀s̄ ∈ (smin, smax), so the
upward sloping popt curve shifts down when the optimist becomes 'more pessimistic'.
The converse of the proposition follows from the same logic.
F. Proof of Proposition 10
We show that a sucient (but not necessary) condition for the equilibrium collateral
level to increase is for the pessimist to attach suciently larger probability weights
to the default states.
Let F0 (s) and F̃0 (s) denote the initial and the new beliefs of the pessimist respec-
tively. For brevity, let Ẽ0 [x] := EF̃0 [x]; p̃
opt (s̄) := F̃0 (s
max − s̄)+
(




and p̃mc (s̄) := n1 +
1
s̄
Ẽ0 [min {smax − s, s̄}]. Dene, respectively, the initial and the
new equilibrium collateral levels γ∗ and γ∗∗ implicitly as:
popt (γ∗) = pmc (γ∗)
p̃opt (γ∗∗) = p̃mc (γ∗∗)
Then given p̃mc is strictly decreasing, popt is strictly increasing, and the two curves
intersects within (smin, smax) (see proofs for Propositions 7 and 8), we have γ∗∗ > γ∗
i:
p̃mc (γ∗) > p̃opt (γ∗)
⇔ p̃mc (γ∗)− pmc (γ∗) > p̃opt (γ∗)− popt (γ∗)
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With a little bit of algebra, we can show that:














(smax − s) f̃0 (s) ds− γ∗F0 −
∫ smax
smax−γ∗











(smax − s) f̃0 (s) ds−
∫ smax
smax−γ∗
(smax − s) f0 (s) ds
]
and




) Ẽ0 [smax − s|s > smax − γ∗]
E1 [smax − s|s > smax − γ∗]
· · · −
[
F0 + (1− F0)
E0 [s
max − s|s > smax − γ∗]









max − s) f̃0 (s) ds−
∫ smax
smax−γ∗ (s
max − s) f0 (s) ds
]
E1 [smax − s|s > smax − γ∗]
Taken together, we get:
[p̃mc (γ∗)− pmc (γ∗)]−
[







E1 [smax − s|s > smax − γ∗]
] [∫ smax
smax−γ∗
(smax − s) f̃0 (s) ds−
∫ smax
smax−γ∗




















Therefore, whether the collateral requirement in the new equilibrium increases





f0 (s)− f̃0 (s)
)
ds
is positive, for which a sucient condition is that f0 (s) > f̃0 (s) ∀s ∈ [smax −
γ∗, smax).
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3 From Binomial No-Default to Multinomial Max-
Min
3.1 Introduction
The theoretical model of collateral equilibrium presented in Chapter 1 draws from the
analytical framework rst developed in Geanakoplos (1997). Fostel and Geanakoplos
(2015) went on to provide a complete characterization of the collateral equilibrium
in models with two states of nature in every period (i.e. binomial models) with a
nite number or a continuum of heterogeneous agents, and where debt contracts are
backed by nancial assets.22 In contrast, the model in Chapter 2 draws from Simsek
(2013), which characterize the collateral equilibrium in models with a continuum of
states, but only two agents. A natural next step is therefore to generalize the insights
of the endogenous leverage framework to models with more than two agents and more
than two states.
The Binomial No-Default Theorem of Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015) states that
in binomial economies with nancial assets serving as collateral, any equilibrium is
equivalent in real allocations and prices to another equilibrium in which there is no
default. In this Chapter, I extend this theorem to economies with more than two
states of nature when debt can be ordered by seniority. For instance, with three
states of nature, borrowers can issue both senior secured debt and junior unsecured
debt. The senior secured debt is explicitly backed by the risky nancial asset held by
the rm, whereas the junior unsecured debt is implicitly backed by the residual value
of the rm after the senior creditors satisfy their claims. The Multinomial Max-Min
theorem I prove states that any equilibrium is equivalent to another equilibrium where
22In Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015), a nancial asset is dened as an asset that gives no direct
utility to investors, and pays the same dividends no matter who owns it. Note that the capital good
K used as collateral in Chapter 1 is not a nancial asset under this denition, due to its dierential
productivity under dierent agents.
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the senior tranche never defaults, and the junior tranche only defaults in the worst
state of the world.
The Multinomial Max-Min theorem nests the Binomial No-Default theorem when
there are only two states of the nature in every period, and it shows that the analytical
framework in Geanakoplos (1997) can be generalized to models where debt contracts
are not explicitly collateralized, but are instead implicitly backed by the residual value
on the assets of the debtor.
3.2 Set-up
Consider a simple model with two periods t = {1, 2}: with a certain initial period
S1 = {0} and three possible states of nature in the second period S2 = {U,M,D}.
Let there be a single perishable consumption good c and a risky asset Y that pays
dividends dY = (dU , dM , dD) in units of the consumption numeraire in the second
period. Suppose, without loss of generality, dU > dM > dD > 0. Agents h ∈ H derive
utility from their holding of the consumption numeraire ch in every period.
In the initial period, the agents in the model can trade in the risky asset Y ,
and also in simple non-state-contingent debt contracts with a creditor hierarchy
that determines the priority of claims in the event of default or insolvency. At
the top of the creditor hierarchy is senior secured debt that promises to repay
j units of the consumption numeraire in all three states in period 2. Every unit of
senior secured debt sold must be backed by 1 unit of the risky asset Y as collateral.








Y −1 = 0
Y −2 = 0

 that dier only in the promised repayment amount j (the
rst vector), which we will use to index the debt instrument being traded. The second
component of J represents the collateral used to back the contract, which is one unit
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of Y for all contracts j ∈ J . The terms Y −1 and Y −2 denote any residual claims on
Y and will be dened shortly.
If the promised repayment j ever exceed the value of the collateral Y in the second
period, the issuer of the debt will default. Therefore, the actual delivery on the






 = min{j1̃, dY } (3.1)
The key observation here is that whenever a senior secured debt j is sold, it creates
a new nancial asset that is given by the residual claim on Y . Let's denote this
rst-order residual claim by Y−1 (j), which comes with a period 2 payo vector of
dY−1 (j) = d
Y − δ (j).
For given senior secured debt j issued against Y , a junior subordinated debt
instrument can also be written that is either contractually or implicitly backed by the
residual claim Y−1 (j). Let the promised repayment on junior subordinated debt be
denoted by k. The spectrum of possible junior subordinated debt instruments is given









Y −1 = ej
Y −2 = 0

, where ej denotes a 1× (J + 1) vector with
1 on the (j + 1)'th element and zeros elsewhere.23 The actual delivery on junior
subordinated debt (j, k) is given by:





23Note that Y = Y−1 (0), so the dimension of ej is J +1 to accommodate the case where there are
no senior secured debt issued, and any junior subordinated debt eectively becomes senior secured
debt.
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This junior subordinated debt in turn creates a second-order residual claim
on Y , denoted by Y−2 (j, k), with a period 2 payo vector of d
Y
−2 (j, k) = d
Y −
δ (j) − δ−1 (j, k). We can also think of this second-order residual claim as simply
the equity stake in Y . An interesting observation is that a state contingent equity
contract can therefore also be expressed as a collateralized debt contract with non-








Y −1 = 0
Y −2 = ej,k

, where ej,k denotes a (J + 1)× (K + 1) matrix with 1
on the (j + 1, k + 1) element, and zeros elsewhere. The actual delivery on equity
(l, j, k) is given by:
δ−2 (j, k, l) = min
{
l1̃, dY−2 (j, k)
}
(3.3)
The key point here is that even though the promised repayment amount on equity
contract (l, j, k) is not state-contingent, the actual delivery on the contract is very
much state-contingent due to the changing value of the collateral across states.
In summary, the set of feasible contracts are composed of senior secured debt
J ⊆ R+, junior unsecured debt K (j) ⊆ RJ+ and equity contracts L (j, k) ⊆ RJ
K
+ .
All contracts are essentially backed by the same unit of the risky asset Y , but the
claims are ordered in a creditors' hierarchy. The contract space is clearly very large.
However, although all contracts will be priced in equilibrium, I will show that we can
restrict attention to a much smaller subset of actively traded contracts in equilibrium
without any loss of generality, a result that I will refer to as the Multinomial Max-Min
Theorem.
Before moving on to the statement of the theorem, it is helpful to rst dene the
max-min contract for each creditor tier (which will be the only actively traded
contracts in the equilibria of interest). First, I will refer to j∗ = dD as the max-min
senior secured debt contract. This is because the promise to repay j∗ = dD will always
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be honored when it is backed by 1 unit of Y as collateral. So j∗ = dD is the maximum
credible promise that ensures minimum credit risk to lenders (it is essentially risk
free). In a similar sense, I will refer to k∗ (j∗) = dM − dD as the max-min junior
subordinated debt contract. This is because given that a senior secured claim j∗ has
already been issued on the underlying collateral Y , the best junior creditors can hope
for is to be made whole in states other than the worst state D. So k∗ (j∗) = dM − dD
is the maximum promise that can be honored in all states other than D. Lastly,
the max-min equity contract l∗ (j∗, k∗) = dU − dM is worth zero in states M and D,
but pays o dU − dM in the best state U . This max-min equity contract l∗ (j∗, k∗)
can be equivalently thought of as purchasing the risky asset Y on leverage whilst
simultaneously issuing tiered debt contracts j∗ and k∗ against Y .
As a nal point on notation, let ϕh (j) > 0, ϕh−1 (j, k) > 0 and ϕ
h
−2 (j, k, l) > 0
denote respectively the number of senior secured contracts j, junior subordinated
contracts (j, k) and equity contracts (j, k, l) sold by agent h. Let π (j), π (j, k),
π (j, k, l) be the price of these respective contracts; and let p denote the price of the
risky asset Y at period 1. We are now ready to state the Multinomial Max-Min
theorem and its relation to the Binomial No-Default Theorem.
3.3 The Multinomial Max-Min Theorem
The Binomial No-Default Theorem of Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015) states that
in binomial economies with nancial assets serving as collateral, any equilibrium is
equivalent in real allocations and prices to another equilibrium in which there is no
default. The Multinomial Max-Min Theorem generalizes this powerful result to the
three states set-up outlined above with tiered collateralized debt contracts.
Theorem 1. [Multinomial Max-Min Theorem]: Suppose that S = {0, U,M,D},
that Y (and its corresponding residuals Y −1, Y −2) are nancial assets, and that the
max-min debt contracts j∗ = dD ∈ J , k∗ = dM − dD ∈ KJ are available for trade in
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with the same asset and contract prices and the same consumption, in which j∗and
k∗ are the only debt contract traded: ϕ̄hk = ϕ̄
h
j = 0 if j 6= j∗ and k 6= k∗.
Like the Binomial No-Default Theorem, the power of the Multinomial Max-Min
Theorem lies in the observation that even though the agents can trade a very wide
spectrum of debt contracts J and KJ , we can instead restrict attention to the
equilibrium where the only contracts traded are the max-min debt contracts j∗ and
k∗ (j∗), without any loss of generality. However, unlike the Binomial No-Default
Theorem where there is no default in equilibrium, with the three states set-up above
and when junior subordinated debt are issued (i.e. when ϕ̄hk∗ > 0 for some h), defaults
can occur in equilibrium. Such defaults are kept to the minimal extent, in the sense
that the buyers of junior subordinated debt k∗ never expected to be paid in state D.
When trading the max-min debt contracts in equilibrium, the senior tranche never
defaults, and the junior tranche only defaults in the worst state of the world.
The proof of the Multinomial Max-Min Theorem mirrors that of the Binomial
No-Default Theorem and proceeds in three steps. First, the Payo Cone Lemma
shows that the portfolio of assets and contracts that any agent h holds in equilibrium








must lie in the cone positively spanned by the
three max-min contracts j∗, k∗ (j∗) and l∗ (j∗, k∗). Second, the State Pricing Lemma














I show that for any given equilibrium, it is possible to construct a new equilibrium
that is equivalent in consumption and asset prices, but where the agents trades only
the max-min debt contracts. Details of the formal proof is left to the appendix.
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3.4 Concluding Remarks
The goal of the Multinomial Max-Min Theorem is to show that the insights of
Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015) are even more general than previously envisaged. The
theorem improves the tractability of the endogenous leverage framework in models
with a continuum of agents and more than two states. The connes of simple
non-state-contingent collateralized debt contracts are also not as restrictive as it
might rst appear. With appropriately dened residual claims on the underlying
asset, we can encompass both senior secured and junior unsecured debt using the
same analytical toolkit. One can even characterize the payos of a state-contingent
equity instrument as equivalent to that of a suitably collateralized and subordinated
debt contract. I hope the analysis presented here can form an important step in
incorporating the insights of the endogenous leverage framework of Geanakoplos
(1997) into larger DSGE-style macroeconomic models.
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3.5 Appendix - Proof
The proof of the Multinomial Max-Min Theorem proceeds in three steps.
Payo Cone Lemma









the three states using only the three max-min contracts j∗, k∗ (j∗) and l∗ (j∗, k∗).
Lemma 11. [Payo Cone Lemma]: The portfolio of assets and contracts that









the cone positively spanned by the three max-min contracts: (1) the j∗ = dD senior
secured debt contract with actual delivery δ (j∗) = (j∗, j∗, j∗); (2) the k∗ (j∗) = dM−dD
junior subordinated contract with actual delivery δ−1 (j
∗, k∗) = (k∗, k∗, 0); and (3) the
l∗ (j∗, k∗) = dU − dM equity contract with actual delivery δ−2 (j∗, k∗, l∗) = (l∗, 0, 0).
Note that the l∗ (j∗, k∗) equity contract is equivalent to an Arrow-U security, with
actual delivery δ−2 (j
∗, k∗, l∗) = dY − δ (j∗) − δ−1 (j∗, k∗) that can be obtained by
buying the asset Y while simultaneously selling the max-min debt contracts j∗ and
k∗ (i.e. purchasing Y on leverage by issuing senior secured and junior subordinated
debt against it). Since there are no Arrow-M nor Arrow-D securities available for









satisfying this condition can be replicated using only the three
max-min contracts.
State Pricing Lemma
The next step of the proof is to demonstrate the existence of unique state prices at
t = 1 for the delivery of the consumption numeraire in each state at t = 2:
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Lemma 12. [State Pricing Lemma]: There exist unique state prices a, b, c such












Proof. In three broad stages: (1) Establish that the max-min contracts can be priced
using a unique vector of state prices. (2) Use the payo cone lemma to establish these
state prices as the upper bound on contract and asset prices. This is because buyer
won't pay more than the state prices because otherwise they can replicate the delivery
using max-min contracts instead at lower costs. (3) Argue that the state prices are
also the lower bound on contract and asset prices, because otherwise for sellers the
cost of obtaining the collateral required to sell the max-min contracts would exceed
the value received.
1. [Unique State Prices] Find state prices for the max-min debt contracts j∗ =
dD, k







dM − dD dM − dD 0







which gives: a = πl∗
dU−dM
; b = πk∗
dM−dD
− a; and c = πj∗
dD
− a− b.
 Note that πl∗ = a (dU − dM) is the price of buying the (dU − dM , 0, 0)
Arrow U securities, which equals to buying the asset Y and selling the
max-min contracts j∗ and k∗ (j∗), so p = πj∗+πk∗+πl∗ , and thus the asset
Y itself is also priced using the state prices.
 Note also that the promised interest rate on the junior subordinated debt













2. [Upper bound on residual assets prices pY−1 (j) and p
Y
−2 (j, k)] We want to
show that the dividends on residual assets, dY−1 (j) = d
Y − δ (j) and dY−2 (j, k) =
dY−1 − δ−1 (j, k), for Y−1 (j) and Y−2 (j, k) respectively, cannot be priced more






 · δ (j)





 · δ−1 (j, k)
By the payo-cone lemma, the dividends on the residual assets Y−1 (j) , Y−2 (j, k)











 · δ−1 (j, k) respectively. Otherwise buyers can replicate the
same payo for cheaper using the max-min contracts instead.
3. [Upper bound on πj and πk] Suppose that the senior secured debt contract j
with j 6= j∗ = dD is positively traded in equilibrium, then πj ≤ amin {j, dU}+





 · δ (j). Similarly for k (j) with j 6= j∗ or
k (j∗) 6= k∗ (j∗) = dM − dD, we must have πk(j) ≤ amin {k, dU −min {j, dU}}+
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 · δ−1 (k, j)
.
This is because by the Payo Cone Lemma, the delivery of contracts j and k
are both positively spanned by the Arrow U security and the max min contracts
j∗, k∗, all of which are priced by a and b (by the previous step). Thus if πj,
πk were priced higher than the value of its delivery under (a, b, c), the buyer
can achieve the same deliveries by buying a linear combination of the max-min
contracts j∗, k∗, l∗ (where l∗ = dU − dM is equivalent to the Arrow U contract).
We have therefore established an upper bound for πj, πk.
4. [Lower bound on πj] Suppose that a senior secured debt contract j with






 · δ (j).
(a) Consider rst the case j ≤ j∗ = dD. This contract j fully delivers in all
states and is proportional to the delivery under contract j∗. So if its price
were less than j
j∗




of contract j∗ instead (which is feasible because it requires less collateral).
(b) Consider next the case j ∈ (dD, dU ]. In order to sell contract j, the seller
need to purchase the asset Y on leverage, incurring net costs p − πj, and
receiving the residual delivery vector dY−1 (j). By a previous step, we have
established that the price of dY−1 (j) (denoted p
Y














 · dY−1 (j)


























 · δ (j)
112





 · δ−1 (j, k), we have:





 · dY−2 (j, k)

































 · δ (j)






 · δ (j).
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5. [Lower bound on πk]: For k (j) with j 6= j∗ or k (j) 6= k∗ (j∗) = dM − dD, we





 · δ−1 (k, j) .





 · δ (j), we
must have:





 · dY−2 (j, k)



























 · δ−1 (k, j)





 · δ−1 (k, j).
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6. [Lower bound on residual asset prices pY−1 and p
Y
















·dY−n for n = 1, 2
(otherwise there would be innite demand for the asset Y which violates market
clearing).
Construction of the new max-min equilibrium





































































2. Verify that all agents are optimizing under the new max-min equilibrium:
 It is easy to check that the proposed portfolio
(
ȳh, ϕ̄h0 (j














 By the payo cone lemma and the state pricing lemma, the portfolio then
must have the same cost.
 Note that since ϕ̄h (j∗) ≤ ȳh and ϕ̄h−1 (k∗) ≤ ȳh, this portfolio choice
satises the collateral constraints.
 Lastly, since Y is a nancial asset that yields the same payo to ev-
ery agent, every agent is optimizing given the new proposed portfolio(
ȳh, ϕ̄h0 (j




3. Verify that markets clears:





































































ϕh−1 (k (j)) = 0 in the original equilibrium)
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 Since the vectors (dU , dM , dD), (dM − dD, dM − dD, 0) and (dD, dD, dD) are















so all markets clear.
This completes the proof to the Multinomial Max-Min Theorem.
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4 Capital requirements, the safe real interest rate
and the fundamental problem of bank risk taking24
4.1 Introduction
The great nancial crisis that started in 2007-08 revealed that many banks in many
countries had taken excessive risks. Asymmetry of information between banks and
those that provide them with debt, high leverage and limited liability makes a ten-
dency for banks to take excessive risks more than just an occasional phenomenon
linked to episodes of excessive exuberance, but rather something more fundamental
and persistent. How best to counter this excessive risk taking is a major policy issue
facing governments and their central banks. It has prompted some questioning of
whether it is wise to use monetary policy simply to hit ination and real activity
targets, without attention to incentives that low interest rates might give to excessive
risk taking in the banking sector. It has raised a pressing policy issue about the right
level of bank capital requirements. It also raised questions about how the level of
interest rates and limits on bank funding structure (capital requirements) interact
and about which has the greater eect on excessive risk taking. These are the issues
we address in this paper.
We develop a model where banks take excessive risks because of asymmetric
information and limited liability. By excessive risks we mean investment risks that
would be rejected by a well-informed, risk-neutral agent who is entitled to the entirety
of the investment payo. Excessive risk taking by banks arises because banks know
more about the probability of the success of the risky loans extended than do investors
(including households) who provide the debt funding to banks. Acquiring assets with
excessive risks is optimal for banks because they are protected in the down-state by
limited liability. Recognizing this, investors charge a higher interest rate on loans
24Joint work with David Miles.
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made to banks with lower internal equity (or 'skin-in-the-game'), disincentivising
them from carrying out socially valuable, but privately costly, screening of potential
investments. Thus in the absence of intervention, we have sub-optimally low levels of
screening by banks; and excessive risk taking by those banks that do screen.
There are only imperfect tools available to bank regulators, central banks and
governments to counter this tendency for banks to take too many risks. One tool is
to use capital requirements to force banks to use more equity funding than they would
choose themselves. Another tool is to raise the safe real interest rate to push up the
real cost of debt to banks. Limits on bank leverage oset incentives to gamble at the
expense of those supplying debt; a higher safe interest rate raises the required return
on bank liabilities, incentivising them to be more selective on the assets they acquire.
We show that capital requirements and the safe real interest rates are (imperfect)
substitutes when used to combat excessive risk taking by banks. Neither policy
instruments are perfect remedies and both incur costs. We illustrate under what
conditions each tool is more eective and when both might be used.
There are a number of ways through which a national authority might be able
to inuence the local safe real interest rate. A government could choose to oer a
savings vehicle paying a guaranteed real interest rate (and that has been the original
rationale for many governments to issue real, ie inationproof, debt). Central banks
set a nominal interest rate that feeds through to the safe real interest rate given
nominal rigidities. For the remainder of the paper, we refer to attempts by a scal or
monetary authority to aect the safe real interest rate as 'interest rate policy'. The
scope to use such policies may be limited however. With a perfectly integrated global
capital market the safe real rate may be exogenous to any government. In this case
one can interpret the results in this paper in another way, which is about what eect
changes in a global real interest rate should have on the appropriate setting of bank
capital requirements. We nd such eects are substantial. Given the large decline in
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the average real yields on ination-proof government bonds in recent decades this set
of results is of signicant practical relevance.
There is a growing literature on the impact of capital requirements on bank
lending; there is also a much larger (and older) literature on the eects of interest rates
on banks. But there is less research on the interaction of bank capital requirements
with variations in the safe real interest rate in osetting inecient lending - which is
the focus of this paper.
The broad consensus in the existing literature is that stricter capital requirements
can curb excessive risk-taking and lending (see for instance Furlong and Keeley (1989);
and Gersbach and Rochet (2017)); and a tightening of monetary policy could achieve
similar eects, albeit potentially at a cost to other macroeconomic considerations
(Farhi and Tirole (2009) and Nicolò et al. (2010)). A separate body of work exists
on the role of bank capital in the transmission of monetary policy (such as Kashyap
and Stein (1994), Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Bolton and Freixas (2006))25.
More recently, Angeloni and Faia (2013) compared the performance of dierent
Taylor Rules under four banking regimes. They concluded that the optimal mone-
tary policy rule should incorporate some response to nancial conditions. Angelini
et al. (2014) analyzed the impact of monetary policy and capital requirements on
macroeconomic performance and stability, and discussed the need for cooperative
arrangements between the authorities responsible for each instrument.
Woodford (2012) asks to what extent one might tilt monetary policy away from a
'pure' ination targeting stance because of its potential impact on nancial stability.
He says:
The real issue, I would argue, should not be one of controlling the possible
mispricing of assets in the marketplace ... but rather one of seeking to
deter extreme levels of leverage and of maturity transformation in the
25See Borio and Zhu (2012) for a survey of this literature
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nancial sector. ... Even modest changes in short-term rates can have a
signicant eect on rms' incentives to seek high degrees of leverage or
excessively short-term sources of funding. ... Acceptance that monetary
policy deliberations should take account of the consequences of the policy
decision for nancial stability will require a sustained research eort.
Much of the literature which explores whether monetary policy should play a role
in reducing problems in the nancial sector assumes that interest rates can be used
to control leverage and that - for reasons not modeled - leverage is sometimes too
high. An exception is Stein (2012) who is precise about the source of market failure
and we follow that route. Not being clear about exactly why nancial outcomes are
problematic means that policy conclusions are not robust. The fundamental source
of market failure in our model is precisely that which provides the most compelling
rationale for the existence of banks - namely their specialization in collecting and
interpreting information on types of assets whose risks are hard to assess and which
make their nancing through the issuance of securities in capital markets problematic.
Our paper develops a simple theoretical framework to illustrate the trade-os
involved in using interest rate policy and capital requirements to inuence banks' risk
taking decisions. We analyze what an optimal combination of capital requirements
and interest rate policy might look like for a policy-maker maximizing the aggregate
expected return on investments undertaken. The model we use is an extension of
the framework developed in Bernanke and Gertler (1990), which focused on nancial
fragility and economic performance. Their model described an economy with two
types of risk-neutral agents: entrepreneurs that have access to risky investment
projects; and households from whom the entrepreneurs must borrow in order to fund
their investment projects. Entrepreneurs must undertake costly screening before they
can nd out the probability of success of their project, so some with low endowments
(and thus high funding requirements) may choose to forego the lending opportunity
121
even before the screening stage. Those that do undertake screening are incentivized to
take excessive risks. This is because entrepreneurs enjoy limited liability and cannot
credibly reveal their probability of success to their creditors. The extent to which
an individual entrepreneur is prone to excessive risk-taking is also exacerbated by
lower initial endowments. Bernanke and Gertler concluded that the dependence of
aggregate investment on the initial distribution of endowment introduces 'nancial
fragility'. A 'nancially fragile' economy, dened as one with a sizeable proportion
of its entrepreneurs operating around the threshold level of endowment between
screening and not screening, may experience a dramatic collapse in investment if
subjected to a negative shock to endowments.
We make a number of changes to the Bernanke and Gertler (1990) model:
1. Banks : We introduce bank intermediation by distinguishing between two types
of Bernanke and Gertler 'entrepreneurs': those that can credibly communicate
the quality of their assets to creditors and access funding directly (we call these
'rms'); and those that cannot and thus rely on banks. We assume that banks
fund projects where it is hard for individual investors to assess their risks. Banks
eectively come to own these projects and nance them from internal equity
and from debt (and possibly equity) raised from outside investors. We therefore
have two types of corporations that invest: (1) 'rms' which fund risky assets
that are easy to assess and monitor by creditors; and (2) 'banks' which fund
assets that are hard to value and where information is not shared with other
investors.
2. Debt and Equity : We distinguish between two types of funding contracts: banks
in our model can raise funds from households either in the form of debt or in
the form of equity. Debt contracts promise to pay the creditor a xed sum;
equity contracts promise a share of the return on the risky project (net of any
debt obligations). There may be a non-zero pay-o for the risky project in the
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event it fails. Providers of debt have priority claim over this liquidation value
of the risky project.
3. Policy tools : The policy maker has two levers - interest rate policy and regula-
tory capital requirements - with which to ameliorate the eects of the asymmetry
of information in the banking sector that combine with limited liability to make
market outcomes inecient. Interest rate policy sets the safe rate paid on the
outside option (i.e. a risk-free deposit facility) that is available to all agents.
One could think of this safe rate as paid by the central bank on deposits it
takes, and recouped through taxes set by the scal authority. Regulatory
capital requirements prohibit banks with internal equity less than the regulatory
minimum from proceeding with the risky lending project, unless they raise the
additional equity from households. Banks for which the capital regulation is
binding will be nanced by a mixture of debt and external equity.
We nd that interest rate policy and prudential capital requirements operate as im-
perfect substitutes. A tightening of either instrument can improve 'prudence' (by dis-
incentivising the banks against acquiring excessively risky assets with sub-optimally
low probability of success); but only at the cost of decreased 'participation' (where
decreased 'participation' means that more banks will choose to forego the risky asset
even before they discover its probability of success through costly screening). The
substitutability between the policy instruments, and this trade-o between 'prudence'
and 'participation', implies that the optimal level of prudential capital requirements
rises as the safe real interest rate falls. We nd that, across a broad range of
calibrations, using capital requirements is more ecient as a way to get the level
of risk-taking right in the economy than changing the safe real interest rate. But
there are situations where using both tools is optimal and some where using only the
interest rate is optimal. However in a truly global market the government might be a
price taker, in which case the safe real rate is not a policy variable but an exogenous
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factor. Our results then illustrate how exogenous variations in that rate should aect
the design of capital limits on banks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic
theoretical model for analyzing bank risk taking decisions. Section 3 calculates
the outcome under the rst-best scenario. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium
under asymmetric information. The two policy instruments are introduced in Section
5 where we also describe the main propositions of the model. Section 6 provides
quantitative results from numerical simulations of the model. Section 7 concludes
with a discussion of policy implications.
4.2 The Model
We develop a two-sector, two-period, model at the center of which is the decision of
banks to acquire risky assets. We show conditions under which banks take excessive
risks and how capital requirements and variations in the safe real interest rate can
oset the extent of such mis-allocation. Banks are intermediaries that screen risky
projects, and then nance these risky assets by raising funds from households. By
undertaking costly screening, banks receive private information on the value of the
assets they acquire; and by borrowing from households, banks can maximize their
returns through leverage. When a bank's assets drop in value, the bank benets from
limited liability. The information asymmetry in the model give rise to moral hazard
and the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold.
Agents: The banking sector and the non-nancial corporate sector
Banks On the asset side, the banks in our model have access to a risky asset and
a risk-free deposit facility at the central bank.
The risk-free deposit facility remunerates any amount deposited at the risk-free
rate (1 + r). This is a purely real model so we could think of r as a safe real rate
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oered by the central bank and potentially requiring scal backing to make good on
the promise. One could equally think of the policy rate as being directly chosen by
the scal authorities who oer real government debt to households and nance the
real interest costs by levying taxes.
The risk-free asset is common to all banks while each bank has access to a risky
asset that is unique to them.26 (We will use the terms "risky asset" and "project"
interchangeably). The risky project requires 1 unit of input in the rst period. In
the second period, it pays out yh > 1 + r when it succeeds (with probability p), and
yl < 1 + r when it fails (with probability (1− p)). The probability of success for each
project, p, is independently and identically distributed between [0, 1] with probability
density function h (p) and cumulative density function H (p).
A key feature of banks is that they can undertake costly screening (xed cost
C  1) to discover the realization of p for their own projects in period 1, before
having to commit a full unit of input. We assume that the risky project is not
worthwhile in the absence of screening, so yl + E [p] (yh − yl) < 1 + r.
We allow for a continuum of banks in our model that are heterogeneous in two
dimensions. First, they dier in the realization of their probability of success (pi)
for their risky projects. Second each bank makes a draw of initial endowment ωi
(i.e. initial bank equity). The p.d.f. and c.d.f. of ω are denoted by f (ω) and F (ω)
respectively, with support [ωlb, ωub], where 0 ≤ ωlb < ωub  1.
Since ωub  1, all banks must seek funding from households in order to proceed
with their project. This external funding can take the form of additional equity (ω̃)
or debt (i.e. deposits from the general public).
Both the distribution of ω and each bank's realization of ωi are publicly observed.
But whilst the ex ante distribution of p is also common knowledge, each bank's
26We do not think of the risky asset as literally being one single asset. Rather we interpret it as a
portfolio of assets which pays out yh in a good state, and yl in a bad state. Risky assets dier only
in their probability of success p.
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individual realization of pi is assumed to be private information. We assume p and ω
to be independently distributed.
The assumption that the probability of success of a bank's assets pi is the private
information of the bank is crucial. This captures the idea that banks have assets
(projects) where the information gathered in screening is hard to share and where the
probability of success cannot be credibly announced. Households depositing in banks
know that they don't know much about the quality of the assets.
Firms The second sector in our model is composed of a continuum of rms. Firms
also have access to both the risk-free deposit facility and the risky asset/project.
But critically, rms are assumed to be suciently transparent that investors know
as much about the chances of success (pi) as the rms themselves know after screen-
ing. So rms directly issue securities to investors with no intermediation by banks.
The fraction of rms and banks in the population are given by µ and (1− µ)
respectively.
The existence of asymmetry of information in the banking sector, and the lack
of it in the non-nancial corporate sector, lies at the core of our model and results.
The model captures the idea that banks specialize in acquiring information on the
probabilities of good and bad outcomes for the value of the assets they acquire -
assets where the assessment of outcomes is time consuming and tricky and where
continued monitoring may be required. In many ways that is the fundamental reason
why banks, who largely hold non-marketable assets, exist (see Diamond (1984); and
Gale and Hellwig (1985)).
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Households Households provide funding to both banks and rms. For simplicity27,
we do not model the households explicitly and assume they, like all other agents, are
risk-neutral and so demand an expected return of at least (1 + r).
Timing
The model has two periods. The timing in the rst period is sub-divided into three
stages:
1. In the rst stage of the rst period, each rm and bank draws a realization
of their initial endowments, ωi, from the common distribution for endowments.
Given the realization of ωi, each then decides whether or not to undertake costly
screening to discover the success rate of the risky assets that they can acquire,
pi. Those that do not screen put the entirety of their endowments in the risk-free
facility.
2. In the second stage, those rms or banks that did screen discover their proba-
bility of success, pi, and decide whether to proceed with the acquisition of risky
assets. When rms/banks do proceed, they commit the entirety of their initial
endowment 28 and begin to seek external funding
3. In the third stage, those rms/banks that are proceeding with their projects
decide whether to fund the shortfall through debt, additional equity, or a
combination of the two. Any external equity injections take place before the
rm/bank seeks debt. By assumption, households can observe the capital of
the rm/bank (ω + ω̃, composed of the initial endowment plus any subsequent
27Our framework can be extended to a general equilibrium setting where households maximize
utility across two periods, and the risk-free interest rate on the deposit facility r adjust endogenously
to clear the market for household funds. Such an extension does not aect our key results regarding
the behavior of banks.
28Firms and banks would only proceed with the project if its expected return exceeds the certain
return from the deposit facility (recall that all agents are assumed to be risk neutral). Therefore,
when a project is deemed worthwhile, a rm or bank would prefer to commit the entirety of their
endowment rather than to place a portion in the safe deposit facility.
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equity injections). Firms can also credibly communicate their probability of
success pi, whereas banks cannot.





, where ω̃ is the size of the
equity injection, ω is the rm/bank's own endowment, and ω̃
ω+ω̃
is the
share of net return promised to the external equity providers.
 A debt contract between a household and a bank takes the form {R(ω +
ω̃, r), (1− ω − ω̃)}, where ω + ω̃ is the total capital of the bank and (1−
ω− ω̃) is the amount of debt sought. R(ω+ ω̃, r) denotes the gross amount
(principal plus interest) that is promised on debt. A bank that funds its
shortfall only through debt sets ω̃ = 0; whereas a bank that uses only
equity sets ω̃ = 1− ω. All intermediate cases are permitted.
 A debt contract between a household and a rm takes a similar form,
except the terms of the contract is also conditioned on p.
 All rms and banks have limited liability, so when the project fails the
return to debtors is min {yl, R}.
In the second period, the returns from the risky projects are realized and deposits in
the safe facility mature, contracts are fullled (or defaulted).
Mechanics
Since there is no asymmetry of information between households and rms, their
analysis is relatively straight-forward. Ineciencies arise in the relationship between
households and banks.
Two key thresholds drive the mechanics of the model for banks:
1. The threshold level of a banks' initial endowment, ω̂, at which point it is
indierent between screening and simply depositing its endowments in stage
1 to earn the safe rate; and
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2. The threshold level of the success probability of projects, p̂, at which point a
bank in stage 2 is indierent between proceeding after screening and depositing
at the safe-rate .
The level of bank endowment matters for the screening decision because a lower
initial endowment implies a larger funding gap and higher cost of funding. A bank
with initial endowment (i.e. internal equity) less than ω̂ would nd that the funding
cost, plus the xed cost of screening, exceed the expected return from acquiring risky
assets. The endowment threshold ω̂ is dened formally in Section 4.3.
The realization of a bank's success probability pi determines whether it proceeds
with the project after screening. A bank with pi < p̂ nds that it can achieve a
higher expected return by using the risk-free deposit facility, so will forego the lending
opportunity. We dene p̂ more formally in Section 4.3.
For the rest of the paper, we will refer to ω̂ as the 'participation threshold'
of a bank and p̂ as the 'prudence threshold' of a bank. ω̂ is described as the
'participation threshold' because banks with initial endowment (or internal equity)
below this level do not 'participate' in acquiring risky assets. p̂ is described as
the 'prudence threshold' because the success rate banks are willing to accept is an
indicator of how prudent they are in handling funds from households. Imprudent
banks will tend to take excessive risks to take advantage of their private information
and limited liability  that is they acquire assets with a probability of success lower
than a fully informed, risk-neutral agent would nd acceptable.
4.3 The First-Best - the model under perfect information
Under the rst-best, households can observe a bank's probability of success, pi, as well
as its level of capitalization (ωi + ω̃i). Therefore there is no information asymmetry,
and no distinction between rms and banks. Thus for the rest of this section, we will
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use the rms to encapsulate the behavior of both rms and banks under perfect
information.
The Prudence Threshold - First-Best Contracts
Working backwards, we start by examining the prudence threshold (at Stage 2 of the
game) for those rms that have discovered their individual realization of pi through
screening. The prudence threshold, p̂, is dened as the success rate required to make
a rm indierent between undertaking the risky project and simply depositing its
endowments in the risk-free facility.
Specically, for a rm with initial endowment ωi, and which is looking for ω̃i in
additional equity and 1 − (ωi + ω̃i) in debt from households, its prudence threshold
p̂i = p̂(ωi + ω̃i) and the terms of its funding contract are jointly determined by the
following three equations29:




(p̂ (yh −R) + (1− p̂) max [0, yl −R]) = ω(1 + r); or
p̂ (yh −R) + (1− p̂) max [0, yl −R] = (ω + ω̃) (1 + r) (4.1)
where ω̃ is the size of the equity injection from households; ω + ω̃ is the total
capital of the rm; and ω
ω+ω̃
is the share of the return retained by the rm.
A rm with capital of ω + ω̃ needs to nance the remainder of the project
(1−ω− ω̃) through debt. R(ω+ ω̃, p) denotes the gross amount (principal plus
interest) that is promised on that debt.
29For brevity, we suppress the i subscript henceforth where possible.
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2. The condition where the households are receiving, in expectation, their required
return from providing debt funding to a rm:
pR + (1− p) min [yl, R] = (1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r) (4.2)
3. The condition where for the households providing additional equity to the rm




(p (yh −R) + (1− p) max [0, yl −R]) ≥ ω̃(1 + r)
or p (yh −R) + (1− p) max [0, yl −R] ≥ (ω + ω̃) (1 + r) (4.3)
This last condition is always satised given equation 4.1, and the fact that
corporations will only proceed with p ≥ p̂fb, where p̂fb is the rst-best level of
prudence that reects risk neutrality of all agents. Specically, p̂fb is the lowest
level of p that gives an expected return of at least (1 + r).
Proposition 11. When p is common knowledge between all agents, rms will not
take excessive risks, regardless of the level of their capitalization.
p̂(ωi + ω̃i) =
(1 + r)− yl
(yh − yl)
≡ p̂fb for ∀ (ωi + ω̃i) (4.4)
Proof. See Annex. The intuition of the proof is simple. Creditors to the rm can
perfectly observe the risks the rm is taking, so they can structure their contracts
such that there are no incentives for the rm to engage in excessive risk-taking, where
excessive risk taking is dened as pi < p̂fb.
Let ω∗ (p) denote the level of capital (ω + ω̃) such that yl = R (p, ω
∗), so for a rm
with {p, ω∗ (p)}, we can re-arrange equation 4.2 and 4.1 to give:
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 ω∗ (p) = ω∗ = 1− yl
(1+r)
[so ω∗ is independent of p];
 R (p, ω∗) = R (ω∗) = (1− ω∗) (1 + r) [so R (ω∗) is independent of p]; and
 p̂ (ω∗) = (1+r)−yl
(yh−yl)
= p̂fb
We will refer to any rm with ω + ω̃ ≥ ω∗ as a 'fully capitalized' rm, because such
a rm can pay its debt in full - even in the bad state30.
Proposition 12. After screening in the rst-best:
1. rms invest in the risky asset if and only if p ≥ p̂(ω + ω̃, r); and
2. 'fully-capitalised' rms weakly prefer debt funding to equity funding. 'Not-fully-
capitalised' rms (with ωi + ω̃i < ω
∗) are indierent between using all debt, or
using a mixture of debt and additional equity (provided that the additional
equity injection does not make the rm 'fully-capitalised').
For simplicity, we assume that when rms are indierent between debt and
equity, they will proceed with the project using debt nance only.
Proof. See Annex. Part (1) follows from the denition of p̂(ω+ ω̃): rms with success
probability p < p̂(ω + ω̃, r) would receive a higher expected return from the risk-free
facility than the risky asset. Part (2) holds because for 'fully-capitalised' rms (ω +
ω̃ > ω∗), debt can be obtained at the risk-free rate [see the proof for proposition 11],
but equity comes at the cost of sharing a proportion of the expected return - and
that expected return exceeds the expected return on debt. We know that a rm will
proceed with the project if and only if the expected return is weakly greater than the
safe-rate of return (from part (1) and equation 4.1). Thus equity is more expensive
than debt for a 'fully-capitalised' rm. For 'not-fully capitalized' rms, households
with perfect information set debt contracts as a function of both p and ω. Additional
30These rms can still 'fail' in the sense that their equity holders may be wiped out in the bad
state.
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equity injections lowers the cost on the bank's entire stock of debt, so equity becomes
just as attractive as debt [the Modigliani-Miller Theorem holds]. We oer a more
formal proof of this proposition in the Annex.
Corollary 2. In the absence of capital regulations, rms will not seek external equity
injections when they undertake risky lending.
The Participation Threshold - First Best Case
Having established the 'prudence threshold' of rms, we continue to work backwards
to nd rms' 'participation threshold' - the threshold amount of internal capital
below which screening is not worthwhile. Upon discovering its realization of ωi at
Stage 1 of the game, a rm decides whether to engage in costly screening. The
'participation threshold' of rms is dened as the level of initial endowment that
equates the expected value of screening (V ) to the xed cost of screening (C). The
costly screening process can be interpreted as buying an option on the risky asset. In
general, the value of the option will depend on the funding structure of the rm, in
particular how much additional equity it is trying to attract from households.
Formally, V is given by:
V (ω, ω̃, r)
≡ Ep
max
0 , ωω + ω̃
 p (yh −R) +
(1− p) max [0, yl −R]








[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp (4.5)
where the last line follows because the debt is provided by households at an
expected return of 1 + r (more detail can be found in the annex).
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Denition. The participation threshold for rms, ω̂, is implicitly dened by:





[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp = C (4.6)
where C is the xed cost of screening.
We know that in the absence of any capital requirements (ωreg = 0), ω̃ = 0; and




Vfb(ωreg = 0, r) =
∫ 1
p̂fb
[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp (4.7)
We impose by assumption that screening is socially optimal in the rst-best:
∫ 1
p̂fb
[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp > C
so that in the rst-best, every rm screens in the absence of any policy intervention
and the participation threshold is zero:
ω̂fb (ωreg = 0, r) = 0 (4.8)




[yl + p (yh − yl)− (1 + r)]h (p) dp− C (4.9)
Summary
In the rst-best households can observe the probability of success (pi). This is
sucient to ensure that rms (and banks) operate in the most appropriate and
prudent manner, regardless of the level of their capitalization/leverage. Specically,
every rm sets the prudence threshold at p̂fb =
(1+r)−yl
(yh−yl)
, the level which ensures
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that every risky project undertaken after screening is expected to deliver at least
the risk-free return. In addition, with the participation threshold (ω̂) equal to zero,
all rms screen so no protable lending opportunities are wasted. Leverage and
limited-liability, in the absence of asymmetric information, do not lead to ineciencies
and do not necessitate any policy intervention.
4.4 The Model with Asymmetry of Information
Frictions in the model arise because of the interaction between asymmetric informa-
tion, leverage and limited liability. When households cannot observe banks' proba-
bility of success (pi), moral hazard becomes prevalent in the banking sector. This
problem manifests itself in a sub-optimal level of screening for the risky asset; and for
those banks that do screen, a lower level of prudence than ideal in deciding whether
to invest in the risky asset.
Analytically, the structure of the model remains unchanged under asymmetric
information (the majority of the equations are identical). The main distinction is
that for banks p̂ becomes a function of ω, and therefore can no longer be evaluated
outside of the integral over ω. The analysis for rms is identical to the rst-best case.
The Prudence Threshold
As with the rst-best, we start by examining the prudence threshold (at Stage 2 of the
game) for those banks that have discovered their individual realization of pi through
screening. Under asymmetric information, the analogues of equations 4.1-4.4 are:
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1. The condition that a bank with initial capital ω and additional equity injection
ω̃ is indierent between the risky asset and the risk-free asset:
ω
ω + ω̃
{p̂ (yh −R) + (1− p̂) max [0, yl −R]} = ω(1 + r)
or:
p̂ (yh −R) + (1− p̂) max [0, yl −R] = (ω + ω̃) (1 + r) (4.10)
this is identical to equation 4.1.
2. The condition that the households are indierent between providing debt and
the risk-free facility:
A (p̂)R + (1− A (p̂)) (min [yl, R]) = (1− ω − ω̃) (1 + r) (4.11)




ph (p) dp denotes the conditional
expectation of p given that p ≥ p̂.
Note that the key dierence here (relative to equation 4.2) is that instead of
observing the p directly, households now need to form a conditional expectation
of p.
3. The condition that for households providing additional equity to the bank their




{A (p̂) (yh −R) + (1− A (p̂)) (max [0, yl −R])} ≥ ω̃ (1 + r)
or:
A (p̂) (yh −R) + (1− A (p̂)) (max [0, yl −R]) ≥ (ω + ω̃) (1 + r) (4.12)
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This last condition is always satised given equation 4.10 and the fact that
A (p̂) ≥ p̂.
Proposition 13. With asymmetric information, banks that are not 'fully capitalized'
will take excessive risks (p̂ < p̂fb):
1. As before, let ω∗ = ω + ω̃ denote the level of capital such that R (ω∗) = yl, so
ω∗ = 1− yl
(1+r)
. We refer to any bank with ωi + ω̃i ≥ ω∗ as a fully capitalized"
bank.
2. Banks become more prudent as they increase their capital, up to a cap when
they become fully capitalized.
(a) For ω + ω̃ ≥ ω∗, we have p̂ = (1+r)−yl
(yh−yl)
; R = (1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r);








The function for p̂ (ω + ω̃) kinks at ω∗, with right-hand derivative given by
∂+p̂ (ω
∗) /∂ω = 0 and left-hand derivative given by ∂−p̂ (ω




An increase in internal equity has the same marginal impact on prudence as an
increase in external equity. Banks behavior is inuenced by the quantity of their
equity rather than its source.
Proof. A full proof is in the annex, here we give the intuition. In the rst part of the
proposition, ω∗ is dened as the level of internal capital such that yl = R (ω
∗, r), so
ω∗ = 1 − yl
(1+r)
follows directly from re-arranging equation 4.11. Banks with capital
above this level can borrow at the risk free rate because the liquidation value of their
risky assets is sucient to cover the bank's debt obligations (again from re-arranging
equation 4.11 after setting R (ω∗) = yl). The second part of the proposition says
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that banks that are not fully capitalized will take excessive risks. Limited liability
encourages banks to take excessive risks when the liquidation value of the assets is
less than the bank's debt obligations. Households can anticipate this, so will increase
the cost of debt R(ω+ω̃,r)
(1−ω−ω̃) for banks with low capital (and thus high funding needs).
The fact that banks cannot credibly communicate their success rate (pi) to households
exacerbates this issue as the debt contract can only be formulated as a function of the
bank's observable capital (ω+ω̃). This means two banks with the same level of capital
will face the same borrowing costs regardless of the success probabilities on their assets
- the bank with the better project is eectively subsidizing the borrowing costs of the
one with the worse asset. Taken together, limited liability and this cross-subsidization
towards less attractive assets give rise to moral hazard. The fact that prudence is
an increasing function of capital reects the observation that the moral hazard issue
becomes less pronounced when banks have more 'skin in the game'.
Proposition 14. Preference for Debt
1. After screening banks invest in the risky asset if and only if p ≥ p̂(ω + ω̃, r);
and
2. when banks acquire risky assets they prefer to use as much debt nance as
possible (i.e. banks will choose to set ω̃ = 0) .
Proof. See Annex. Part (1) follows from the denition of p̂(ω+ω̃): banks with success
probability p < p̂(ω+ ω̃) would receive a higher expected return from investing in the
safe asset. Part (2) holds because banks expect to pay out a higher rate of return to
external equity providers than to debt providers. We show this formally in the annex.
Qualitatively, equity is more costly in this model because debt is available at a rate
which makes households indierent (in expectation) between providing the debt and
using the safe deposit facility. Equity, on the other hand, allows the household to
share the surplus from banks acquiring risky assets, and therefore delivers a rate of
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return for households that is greater than the risk-free facility. The original owners of
bank equity have the value of their claims diluted by raising new equity from outsiders.
Consequently banks stick with debt in the absence of any policy intervention, because
this is the cheapest way for them to raise funds at the margin.
Corollary 3. In the absence of capital regulations, banks will not seek external equity
injections when they acquire risky assets.
The Participation Threshold
As in the rst-best case, the value of screening for banks is still given by equation
4.5:
V (ω, ω̃, r + δr)
≡ Ep
max
0 , ωω + ω̃
 p (yh −R) +
(1− p) max [0, yl −R]








[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp (4.13)





[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp = C (4.14)
with the only dierence that p̂ is now a function of ω + ω̃. Since p̂ (ω + ω̃) ≤ p̂fb,
this means that even when ω̃ = 0, the participation threshold under asymmetric
information will in general be a positive number.
Proposition 15. ∂V (ω,ω̃=0,r)
∂ω
 > 0 for ω < ω
∗
= 0 for ω ≥ ω∗
. In the absence of capital regula-
tions (and ω̃ = 0), the expected value of screening is increasing in the bank's initial
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endowments (up to a cap when the bank becomes fully well capitalized). (see proof in
the annex)
Since we have established through corollary 3 that banks will only use debt funding
in the absence of capital regulations, for now we can restrict attention to the case
where ω̃ = 0.
Summary and Implications
The presence of moral hazard in the model give rise to sub-optimal outcomes com-
pared to the rst-best scenario. Banks have no incentives to top-up their capital.
Consequently, the hurdle for participation, ω̂ > 0, is too high; and the level of
prudence, p̂(ω, r) ≤ (1+r)−yl
(yh−yl)
= p̂fb is too low. As a result aggregate value added
of the banking sector is lower than it is in the rst-best (where we assumed that p
is common knowledge). Banks do not do enough screening (and so will be missing
opportunities that investors would value), but those that do screen will accept some
investments that well-informed, risk-neutral investors would reject.
4.5 Policy Tools and Their Transmission
Interest rate policy and capital regulations can be used to drive outcomes closer to
the rst-best level in the banking sector. Both policy tools function through their
eects on the participation and prudence thresholds.
Interest Rate Policy / Variations in the safe real interest rate
Let us assume that the policy maker (either through its central bank or directly by
oering assets to the private sector) can set the risk-free rate of return on the deposit
facility (r) and this aects the attractiveness of the risky asset relative to the risk-free
deposit. (We return to the issue of whether the national authority have control over
r below). The central bank remunerates all resources placed in its deposit facilities at
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the rate r, the servicing cost of which is covered by lump sum taxation of households.
This interest rate (r) is revealed to all agents at the very beginning of the game.
We normalize r = 0 as the neutral interest rate. In the rst-best scenario, there






The rst-best level of the participation threshold ω̂fb (ωreg = 0) = 0 remains the
same as before (see equation 4.8)
Note that the possibility of interest rate policy intervention introduces a wedge
between the socially optimal outcome and what is privately optimal in the absence
of asymmetric information. In particular, the privately optimal level of prudence is
given by
p̂∗ (r) =
1 + r − yl
(yh − yl)
(4.16)
which will be dierent to p̂fb (the socially optimal level of prudence) for non-zero
r. So using interest rate policy to combat the ineciencies of the banking sector will
lead to distortions in the non-bank sector (i.e. the risk-taking behavior of rms).
This makes the relative size of the banking sector to that of the non-nancial sector
(µ) a factor in assessing the extent to which the authorities should use the inuence
they may have over r to curb excess risk taking.
The eect of interest rate policy on banks' behavior is summarized in the propo-
sition below.
Proposition 16. Interest rate tightening improves 'prudence' at the cost of decreasing








Proof. We describe the intuition for the proposition here; formal proof is in the annex.
Interest rate policy tightening improves prudence for all rms and banks by increasing
the attractiveness of the outside option. A quick way to illustrate the result ∂p̂
∂r
> 0
is by appealing to proposition 13: p̂(ω + ω̃) ≤ p̂fb. Recall from equation 4.15: p̂fb =
1−yl
(yh−yl)
; and from Proposition 13: p̂(ω + ω̃, r) ≤ 1+r−yl
(yh−yl)
= p̂∗ (r). So by increasing r,
a central bank can increase p̂∗ (r) and thus push p̂(ω + ω̃, r) closer to p̂fb for all ω.
Interest rate policy tightening decreases the level of participation because it increases
the relative attractiveness of the outside option. Recall that ω̂ (ω̃, r) is implicitly
dened by





[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp = C
Increasing r reduces the value of screening, so for a given xed cost of screening
C, banks need a higher amount of internal equity to make the screening process
worthwhile.
Prudential Policy
We model capital regulations in the simple form of a leverage ratio restriction. Regu-
lators impose a minimum capital requirement ωreg such that banks with endowments
ωi < ωreg must seek outside equity of at least (ωreg − ωi) or are barred from investing
in the risky asset. We rule out the possibility that the regulator can set a capital
requirement that depends on the riskiness of bank assets by assuming the asset specic
chance of success pi remains private bank information.
The capital requirement ωreg is announced as soon as banks nd out their indi-
vidual realizations of ωi. A strengthening of capital requirements achieves the same
qualitative eect as a tightening of interest rate policy on banks' decisions, albeit
through dierent means. Critically, capital regulations can be imposed on banks
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alone, without aecting the behavior of rms. This is an important dierence between
the blunt instrument of interest rate policy (one "that gets in all the cracks") and the
targeted instrument of bank capital requirements.
Proposition 17. Capital regulations improve prudence by forcing some banks to seek
additional equity funding, but do so at the cost of decreased participation:
1. ω̃ = max [0, ωreg − ω]. Only banks that are constrained by the capital regulations
will seek equity injections from households. And when they do, they will only
top-up to the minimum capital standard.
2. ∂p̂(ω+ω̃,r)
∂ωreg
≥ 0 with strict inequality as long as ω̂ (ω̃ = 0, r) < ωreg < ω∗. Capital
requirement will improve the prudence level of banks for which it binds, so long
as they are not already 'fully capitalized'.
3. ω̂ (ω̃ = ωreg − ω, r) > ω̂ (ω̃ = 0, r) for all ωreg such that ωreg > ω̂ (ω̃ = 0, r). The
participation threshold is higher for banks that require external equity injections
(i.e. banks that falls short of the capital requirement), than for banks that are
not bound by the capital requirement.
4. ∂ω̂(ωreg−ω,r)
∂ωreg
≥ 0 . A tightening of capital standards increases the participation
threshold.
Proof. We give the intuition of the result here, details are in the annex.
1. ω̃ = max [0, ωreg − ω] follows directly from the observation that banks weakly
prefer debt to equity (proposition 14). Consequently, banks for which the
regulations are binding will only top-up their capital to the regulatory minimum,
and seek the remaining funds in the form of debt.
2. ∂p̂(ω+ω̃,r)
∂ωreg
≥ 0 is a corollary of proposition 13 (∂p̂(ω+ω̃,r)
∂ω̃
≥ 0 ) and the previous
observation that ω̃ = max [0, ωreg − ω]. In particular, ∂p̂(ω+ω̃,r)∂ωreg = 0 for banks
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with ωi > ωreg or ωi ≥ ω∗. Banks with ωi > ωreg obviously will remain
unaected by a marginal increase in ωreg. Banks with ωi ≥ ω∗ already operate
at the optimal level of prudence, so pushing ωreg above ω
∗ does not bring any
further gains in prudence.
3. ω̂ (ωreg − ω, r) > ω̂ (0, r) holds because equity funding is more costly than debt
funding due to the dilution eect (proposition 14). Therefore, the value of
screening is lower for banks that are constrained by the capital requirement.
(ωreg is announced in Stage 1, so banks can anticipate capital needs in advance of
screening.) Consequently, the presence of binding capital regulations increases
the participation threshold for a given xed cost of screening.
4. ∂ω̂(ωreg−ω,r)
∂ωreg
≥ 0 follows from part 1 and 3. Higher capital requirements increase
the size of equity injection required, and thus reduce the value of screening and
increase the threshold for participation.
Summary of Policy Implications
An increase in the risk-free interest rate increases the opportunity cost of funding risky
assets. This pushes up prudence for all banks at all levels of initial endowments /
internal equity. So poorly endowed (or highly leveraged) banks become more prudent,
but rms which do not suer asymmetric information will become too cautious31. A
strengthening of bank capital standards forces more banks to seek out more external
equity, inducing them to behave as if they are a better endowed bank.
The two policy instruments will also aect participation. Because external equity
is more costly than debt, tougher capital requirements make the break-even level of
initial endowment for banks higher for a given xed cost of screening. So more banks
31Very well capitalized banks will also become too cautious. But this side eect falls away if we
restrict the upper support of ω to a value signicantly below 1.
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will drop out from screening due to a low level of initial endowments. A tightening
of interest rate policy shares the same drawback.
So the trade-o between 'prudence' and 'participation' is common across both
interest rate policy and capital regulations. But there are two important dierences.
First, interest rate policy distorts incentives for all banks and rms ; whereas capital
regulations only aect those banks for which it is binding (i.e. poorly capitalized
banks). Second, a fall in the safe real interest rate below the neutral level (i.e. an
negative r) can increase participation of banks beyond the level possible in the absence
of any intervention (and thus gets closer to the state of universal participation under
the rst-best). In contrast, capital regulations can be at best non-binding. This means
capital requirements alone can never correct the participation distortions relative to
the rst best.
Aggregate Outcomes
Expected bank investment In the presence of a binding regulatory regime (where
ωreg > ω̂ (ωregr) > ω̂ (0, r)), the expected amount of investment by banks in the risky
asset is given by:
I (r, ωreg) = (1− µ)
 ∫ min[ωreg ,ωub]ω̂(ωreg ,r) (1−H (p̂ (ωreg, r))) dF (ω) +∫ ωub
min[ωreg ,ωub]
(1−H (p̂ (ω, r))) dF (ω)
 (4.17)
where:




(1−H (p̂ (ωreg, r))) dF (ω) is the amount of investment expected
from banks whose initial endowment fell short of the capital regulations (and





(1−H (p̂ (ω, r))) dF (ω) is the amount of investment expected from
banks that are not aected by the capital regulations (and hence can nance
themselves with debt and internal equity).
In the absence of prudential regulation (or if the regulation is completely non-binding:
ωreg ≤ ω̂ (0, r)), the expected level of bank investment is given by:
I (r) = (1− µ)
∫ ωub
ω̂(0,r)
(1−H (p̂ (ω, r))) dF (ω) (4.18)
The expected level of bank investment in the rst-best is:




A comparison of these equations shows that whilst both interest rate policy and
capital requirements can be used to push up the prudence threshold of banks to a
level that is closer to the rst best, this can only be achieved with a decline in the
funding of risky assets. Part of the fall in the investment in risky assets is socially
desirable - banks with low pi should rightly give up their risky asset after screening.
What is not desirable is the decline in bank acquisition of risky assets due to falling
participation. When capital requirements and the stance of interest rate policy are
strict, more banks may choose to pass up the chance to fund risky investments even
before the screening stage. This fall in participation is sub-optimal because ω and
p are assumed to be independently distributed. Banks with low initial endowments
(low ωi) will be disincentivised from screening by the regulatory environment, even
though they might discover very good assets (with high pi) if they screen.
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Expected value added Under a binding regulatory regime, where ωreg > ω̂ (ωregr) >
ω̂ (0, r)), the expected amount of value added from rms and banks is given by:






























where V (ωreg, r) is composed of:





[yl + p (yh − yl)− 1] dH (p)− C
]
dF (ω),
where p̂∗ (r) = 1+r−yl
(yh−yl)
.






[yl + p (yh − yl)− 1] dH (p)
]
dF (ω)






[yl + p (yh − yl)− 1] dH (p)
]
dF (ω)





In the absence of capital regulations (or when it is entirely non-binding), the expected
aggregate value-added is given by:


























In the following section, we treat the expected level of aggregate value added
V (ωreg, r), which is also the weighted average rate of return on all savings invested
in rms and banks, as the objective function for policymakers32. This allows us to
employ numerical techniques to calculate the optimal setting of interest rate policy
and capital requirements under illustrative parameterizations of the model.
4.6 Numerical Simulations
We use numerical simulations to illustrate the trade-o between interest rate policy
and capital requirements. The model we have outlined above is necessarily a sig-
nicant simplication of the nancial intermediation process. A precise calibration
of the model is not straight-forward because there are no direct empirical counter-
parts to some of the key parameters of the model, specically the pair of binary
outcomes(yh, yl) for the risky asset. We chose a wide range of parameter combinations
for (yh, yl) which cover high and low risk investment environments. And we rely on
robustness tests to demonstrate that our main qualitative results are sound, namely
that: (1) interest rate policy and capital regulations function as imperfect substitutes;
(2) these policy interventions can trade-o between 'prudence' and 'participation' of
banks; (3) the level of the optimal capital requirement is sensitive to variations in
the safe real interest rates; and (4) across a wide, plausible, range of calibrations, the
optimum setting of policy is one where the capital requirement plays the main role
in addressing the asymmetric information distortions in the banking sector.
32Using the expected aggregate value added as the objective function makes sense given the
assumption of risk neutrality.
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We allow the binary outcomes for the risky asset (yh, yl) to vary between permis-
sible values in the model33, whilst making some assumptions on the remaining model
parameters. Specically, we assume that the probability of success, p, is uniformly
distributed between [0, 1]; initial endowments ω are uniformly distributed between
[0, 0.1]34; and the cost of screening C is 1%. In our model, µ represents the proportion
of initial endowments in the economy that are available to rms rather than banks.
We set µ to 0.85, to reect the fact that nancial companies account for roughly 15%
of the capitalization of major stock indices in the US and the UK.
Table 4.1 presents the optimal policy combinations when we allow (yh, yl) to vary.
The range of combinations of yh and yl that we consider runs from very low to very
high risk worlds. A world in which yh is as low as 1.1 and yl as high as 0.8 is one
in which at the rst best losses on those investments which fail are only 3% of total
investment. But the expected return on investments are also quite low at 5%. At the
other extreme when yh is 1.9 and yl = 0 optimal investment implies that losses from
projects failing are around 24% of total investment, but the expected return is over
45%.
33As part of the theoretical model, we impose two conditions on the permissible levels for (yh, yl):
1. The risky asset must not be so attractive that banks will always proceed without screening:
yl + E [p] (yh − yl) < 1
2. The risky asset must be attractive enough such that all banks will screen in the rst-best:∫ 1
p̂fb




In the numerical simulation, we also required that the risky asset must be attractive enough such that
at least some banks will screen under asymmetric information when there is no policy intervention:
ω̂ (r = 0, ωreg = 0) < ω
ub. This additional restriction ruled out the combination (yh = 1.1, yl = 0.6)
in table 4.1.
34Note that because the prudence threshold of rms is independent of ω, and that rms are
essentially indierent between debt and equity funding, the results of the model is invariant to the
distribution of rm's initial endowments. So for simplicity, we assume that banks and rms share
the same distribution for ω. In the Appendix, we show that when we extend the model to allow for
taxes (that have debt deductions), the distribution of endowments for rms does matter.
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In Table 4.1 the gures in curved brackets for each combination of (yh, yl) are
the optimal interest rate (deviation from the neutral policy setting) and the cap-
ital requirement. The gure in square brackets is the associated maximal value
added (as per equation 4.20, which is also the weighted average rate of return on
all savings invested in rms and banks ). The results here shows that, across these
wide-ranging parameterizations, capital regulations are generally the main tool policy
makers should use in addressing banking ineciencies. Only in the safest investment
environment (yh = 1.1; yl = 0.8) should interest rate policy be used on its own, and
then the safe real interest rate should be set to 0.5 percentage points above a neutral
level. In most cases capital requirements are substantial - ranging from around 10%
to up to 30%. In the most risky environment (yh = 1.9; yl = 0.9), where incentives
for banks to raise too much debt and invest too much are at their greatest, both
interest rate policy and capital requirements are very tight; the safe real interest rate
is 2.5% above neutral and capital should be 30% of total bank assets.
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Table 4.1: Optimal Policy Setting across (yh, yl) pairs
In order to examine the trade-os between interest rate policy and capital reg-
ulations, and to demonstrate the more detailed implications of the model, we take
a specic illustrative parameterization (see Table 4.2) and present the associated
results. We have chosen the pair (yh, yl) = (1.4, 0.5) for this illustrative example. This
combination generates rst-best outcomes where about 20% of those assets acquired
(after screening) become non-performing (and in this low state, the loss of value is
such that the residual worth of the asset is only one half of the investment). This
scale of risk and of losses is not implausible for loans to nance corporate activity -
particularly of small businesses that rely on bank intermediation. Given the losses on
sub-prime mortgage lending that was behind the nancial crisis of 2007-08, this scale
of risk may not be excessive even for lending backed by residential property which
used to be considered relatively safe. Our aim in choosing these values is not however
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an attempt to closely match returns on past investment, but rather to provide a
numerical illustration of outcomes that are broadly indicative of the levels of risk.
Table 4.2: Illustrative Baseline Parameterization
Parameters Illus. Calibration
Good state payo on risky asset (yh) 1.4
Bad state payo on risky asset (yl) 0.5
Success prob. of risky asset (p) p ∼ U [0, 1]
Cost of screening (C) 0.01
Proportion of rms relative to banks (µ) 0.85
Initial endowments for banks and rms (ω) ω ∼ U [0, 0.1]
With the set of parameters in Table 4.2, we compute the aggregate value-added of
rms and banks for dierent settings of the safe interest rate and regulatory capital
requirements. Table 4.3 present the results for ωreg between 0% and 30% (step size
of 2.5 percentage points), and r between −2% and 10% (step size of 50 basis points).
Table 4.3: Aggregate value added under selected policy combinations
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Each row in Table 4.3 illustrates how expected aggregate value added changes as
we vary the level of capital requirements, for a given safe real interest rate. This
allows us to trace a path for the optimal capital requirement conditioned on the safe
interest rate (italic, underlined, blue ll). Table 4.3 thus shows that the optimal
regulatory capital standards strengthens as the safe real interest rate falls.
In particular, under this illustrative calibration, the optimal capital requirement
is 20% when the safe real interest rate is at its neutral stance (r = 0). Even when
the safe real interest rate rises to 5.5% above its neutral level, the optimal capital
requirement is still as high as 12.5%. Given that ω is assumed to be distributed
between 0 and 0.1, this means a leverage ratio that is binding for all banks in the
population. For no capital requirements to be (locally) optimal, the safe real rate of
interest need to rise to 6 percentage points above the neutral rate and beyond.
We could alternatively read Table 4.3 on a column-by-column basis. This would
allow us to trace out a path for the optimal the real safe interest rates for given level
of bank capital requirements (bold, green ll). We nd that the optimal stance of
interest rate policy loosens as regulatory capital standard strengthens. Under this
specic set of parameters, the globally optimal outcome is achieved when capital
requirement is set to 17.5% and the real safe interest rate is 0.5 percentage points
above the neutral level.
The model also allows us to describe the banks' behavior under each policy
setting (see Table 4.4). Under the globally optimal combination of r = 0.5% and
ωreg = 17.5%, the capital regulation is binding for all banks in the population. The
participation threshold equals 0.023, meaning that 23% of banks would choose not
to screen the risky asset. For banks that do screen, they will invest if and only if the
probability of success exceeds the prudence threshold of 0.41 (the rst-best level is
0.56). The conditional expectation of success is therefore E [p|p ≥ p̂ (ωreg) = 0.41] ≈
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0.70, which implies that around 30% of the risky investments made are expected to
underperform. In aggregate about 46% of banks invest in risky assets.
Table 4.4 also shows that across a broad range of measures - including aggregate
value added, investment in the risky asset, and probability of failure - the outcomes
under optimal policy are between rst-best levels (where there is no asymmetry of
information, no capital requirements and interest rate policy is neutral) and levels
under asymmetry of information but no policy intervention. The table shows that
investment in the risky asset is signicantly lower in the rst-best case and under
optimal policy than compared to the case of no-intervention. Free market outcomes
with asymmetric information generate much too much bank funding of risky assets.
Note that although the banks in our model are heterogeneous at the start (they
take independent draws from the distribution of ω), having a minimum capital re-
quirement that exceeds the upper bound of the ω distribution (i.e. ωreg ≥ ωub)
imposes homogeneity of leverage amongst those banks that do proceed with investing
in the risky asset. All banks that proceed will top-up their equity to the minimum
level required (ω = 17.5% in the optimal case) and fund the remainder through
debt. These banks therefore share a common prudence threshold: p̂ (ωreg) = 0.41. In
contrast, if ωreg was lower than ωub (say ωreg = 5%), then we would observe a cluster
of banks with capital equal to the regulatory minimum, as well as some banks with a
surplus of capital for regulatory purposes (having started with a better endowment).
Since the prudence threshold p̂ is a function of capital ω, banks would no longer
behave in a homogeneous fashion.
An alternative interpretation - the safe rate is set in global capital markets
We have assumed so far that the authorities (possibly through the central bank) can
oer a safe asset with an oered real rate of return that is a choice variable  though
it must accept the scal implications of that choice. Suppose instead that the safe
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Table 4.4: Behavior of banks under illustrative baseline parameterization
rate is a price set in a global capital market. We can still use our results to draw
implications for the setting of bank capital requirements. We have shown that the
lower is the safe real interest rate the worse is the problem of excessive risk taking by
banks. An exogenous fall in the safe real rate should be countered by tight capital
requirements.
Table 4.3 illustrates the scale of the eects. In recent decades global safe real rates
 proxied by the average yield on ination-proof debt issued by developed country
governments  have fallen dramatically, from nearly 4% 30 years ago to close to 0%
today. At a 4% safe real rate Table 4.3 shows the optimal capital requirement is
12.5%; at a 0% safe real rate the optimal capital requirement is 20%. Movements in
real rates appear to have a sizeable eect on appropriate capital requirements.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
We nd that prudential capital requirements and variations in the safe real interest
rate (implemented as part of an interest rate policy) operate as imperfect substitutes
when used to counter excessive risk taking by banks. A tightening of either instru-
ments can improve 'prudence' (by disincentivising banks against investing in risky
assets with low probability of success); but only at the cost of decreased 'participation'
(as more banks will choose to forego the opportunity to acquire a risky asset even
before they discover its probability of success through costly screening).
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Numerical simulations of our model help to illustrate, and to broadly quantify, the
magnitude of this interaction between the safe real interest rate and capital regulation.
We nd that the trade-o between 'prudence' and 'participation' is such that the
optimal level of prudential capital requirements rises as the safe real interest rate falls.
In general the global optimum is one where interest rates should be slightly higher
than a neutral setting and capital requirements should be substantial and binding.
Investment in risky assets is much lower when policy is set optimally. This suggests
how very weak is the argument that regulations on banks should not be so tight
as to materially reduce bank lending. Our ndings also suggest that the signicant
and simultaneous decline in global real interest rates on ination proof debt of many
governments in recent years should have prompted a rise in bank capital requirements.
There are several interesting ways one could extend the baseline analytical frame-
work presented here. One of these is to introduce corporate taxation and explore
whether using the tax rate can help oset a tendency to over-invest in risky assets.
We present one version of this extension in the appendix and discuss preliminary
results.
We assumed here that banking regulators have no more information on the riski-
ness of bank assets than outside investors. If they have some - but less than complete
- information on risks (pi) then risk based capital requirements become feasible. That
could mean that optimal risk weighted bank capital requirements are on average lower
than the leverage ratios we have calculated. It is not clear however that regulators
having very imperfect information on bank risk pi should mean that average leverage
requirements would be very substantially lower. If they are not - so that capital
requirements of 10% or more of bank assets are indeed optimal - then this suggests
that current rules on bank leverage that allow capital to be as low as 3% or so of total
assets may well be far too lax.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 11- No excessive risk-taking under perfect infor-
mation
Consider the case where min [yl, R (p, ω + ω̃)] = R (p, ω + ω̃) (the debt obligation is
less than the liquidation value), re-arranging equations 4.1 and 4.2 gives:
R (p, ω + ω̃ | yl > R) = (1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r)
p̂(ωi + ω̃i | yl > R) =
(1 + r)− yl
(yh − yl)
Consider the case where min [yl, R (p, ω + ω̃)] = yl (the debt obligation is greater than
the liquidation value): So from equation 4.2 we have pR+(1− p) yl = (1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r),
or
R (p, ω + ω̃ | yl < R) =
(1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r)− (1− p) yl
p





(ω + ω̃) (1 + r), which simplies to
p̂ (ω + ω̃| yl < R) =
(1 + r)− yl
(yh − yl)
Since it is easy to see that R is a decreasing function of (ω + ω̃), from the denition
of ω∗ we can conclude that yl < R whenever ω + ω̃ < ω
∗, and yl > R whenever
ω + ω̃ > ω∗. So p̂ ((ω + ω̃) > ω∗) = p̂ ((ω + ω̃) < ω∗) = p̂ (ω∗) = (1+r)−yl
(yh−yl)
. We dene
this rst-best level of prudence as p̂fb ≡ (1+r)−yl(yh−yl) .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 12 - Weak preference for debt in the First-Best
1. Case A: For a rm with ω ≥ ω∗, and thus yl > R (ω), we show that the rm
has at least a weak preference for external nance using debt, through proof by
contradiction:
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(a) Statement A: suppose that the rm with ω ≥ ω∗ strictly prefers using some
amount of external equity as opposed to only using debt:
p (yh −R (ω))+(1− p) (yl −R (ω)) < ωω+ω̃ [p (yh −R (ω + ω̃)) + (1− p) (yl −R (ω + ω̃))]
for some ω̃ ∈ [0, 1− ω].
Then this implies:
p (yh − yl) + (yl −R (ω)) < ωω+ω̃ [p (yh − yl) (yl −R (ω + ω̃))]
From proposition 11: R (ω + ω̃) = (1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r), so:
p (yh − yl)+(yl − (1− ω) (1 + r)) < ωω+ω̃ [p (yh − yl) + (yl − (1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r))]
ω̃ [p (yh − yl) + yl] < −ω (1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r) + (ω + ω̃) (1− ω) (1 + r)
ω̃ [p (yh − yl) + yl] < [(ω + ω̃)− ω (ω + ω̃)− ω + ω (ω + ω̃)] (1 + r)
p (yh − yl) + yl < (1 + r)
p < (1+r)−yl
yh−yl
= p̂fb. Contradiction - since we know from the denition of the
prudence threshold p̂fb, that rms will only proceed with lending if p ≥ p̂fb.
2. Case B: Consider rms with ω < ω∗, and thus yl < R (ω). As before, we show
weak preference for debt through proof by contradiction.
(a) Statement B1: rms strictly prefer to use some external equity when the
equity injection means they are still not 'fully capitalized':
p (yh −R (ω)) < ωω+ω̃ [p (yh −R (ω + ω̃))] for some ω̃ ∈ [0, ω
∗ − ω)
(b) Statement B2: rms strictly prefer to use some external equity when the
equity injection means they become 'fully capitalized':
p (yh −R (ω)) < ωω+ω̃ [p (yh −R (ω + ω̃)) + (1− p) (yl −R (ω + ω̃))] for some
ω̃ ∈ [ω∗ − ω, 1− ω]
Consider statement B1, which simplies to
yh −R (ω) < ωω+ω̃ [(yh −R (ω + ω̃))]
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From equation 4.1 and proposition 11, we have: p̂fb (yh −R (ω)) = ω (1 + r) =
ω
ω+ω̃
[p̂fb (yh −R (ω + ω̃))]
So (yh −R (ω)) = ωω+ω̃ (yh −R (ω + ω̃)). Contradiction. In fact, the same
proof shows that a 'not-fully-capitalised rm' would be indierent between using
all debt, or using a mixture of debt and additional equity (provided that the
additional equity injection does not make the rm 'fully-capitalised').
Consider statement B2, which simplies to:
p (yh −R (ω)) < ωω+ω̃ [p (yh − yl) + yl −R (ω + ω̃)],
where R (ω < ω∗) = (1−ω)(1+r)−(1−p)yl
p
, and
R (ω + ω̃ > ω∗) = (1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r).
From equation 4.1 and proposition 11, we have:
p̂fb (yh −R (ω)) = ω (1 + r) = ωω+ω̃ [p̂fb (yh −R (ω + ω̃)) + (1− p̂fb) (yl −R (ω + ω̃))],
so when p = p̂fb, the statement is false.
For the remainder of the proof we just need to show that the statement is also
false for p > p̂fb.
The derivative of the LHS of statement B2 w.r.t. p is: (yh −R (ω))− p∂R(ω)∂p =







= (yh − yl)
The derivative of the RHS of statement B2 w.r.t. of p is ω
ω+ω̃
(yh − yl) <
(yh − yl). The LHS increases faster than the RHS when p increases from p̂fb.
Therefore p (yh −R (ω)) ≥ ωω+ω̃ [p (yh − yl) + yl −R (ω + ω̃)] for any p ≥ p̂fb.
Contradiction reached.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 13 - Prudence Threshold under Asymmetric
Information
Proposition 13.1
The proof for ω∗ = 1− yl
(1+r+δr)
follows directly from re-arranging equation 4.11, which
also shows that banks with ωi + ω̃i = ω
∗ can borrow at the risk-free rate 1 + r. For
banks with ωi + ω̃i > ω
∗, their funding shortfall is smaller and thus their gross debt
obligation is lower: R (ωi + ω̃i) < R (ω
∗) = yl (since
∂R(ωi+ω̃i,r)
∂ω
< 0, a result we will
show in the proof to part 2 of the proposition below). The rate at which the debt is
provided is still oored at 1 + r, again from re-arranging equation 4.11.
Proposition 13.2
1. Consider case A where yl ≥ R.
Re-arrange the banks' and the households' indierence equations to give: R =
(1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r) and p̂ = (1+r)−yl
(yh−yl)
.
Note that under this case: ∂R
∂ω
< 0 so we can deduce that yl > R holds whenever
we have (ω + ω̃) > ω∗.
2. Consider case B where yl ≤ R.
Re-arranging the indierence equations gives:
p̂ [yh −R] = (ω + ω̃) (1+r); and A (p̂)R+(1− A (p̂)) yl = (1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r).
Partially dierentiate both w.r.t. ω, [or ω̃], and solve the system of linear









Since (A (p̂)− p̂) > 0 and A′ (p̂) > 0 unless p̂ = 1 (i.e. the degenerate case where
no banks lend - which we will rule out by parameterization), and yh ≥ R ≥ yl,
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we can deduce that ∂p̂
∂ω
> 0 and ∂R
∂ω
< 0. Also, yl < R whenever we have
(ω + ω̃) < ω∗.
3. To summarize: whenever (ω + ω̃) ≥ ω∗, we have p̂ (ω + ω̃) = (1+r)−yl
(yh−yl)
; and
whenever (ω + ω̃) < ω∗, we have ∂p̂
∂ω




A.4 Proof of Proposition 14 - Preference for Debt under Asymmetric
Information.
Part 1 of the proposition follows directly from the denition of p̂(ω + ω̃, r) as the
'prudence threshold' for banks (see discussion in main body).
For part 2 of the proposition, we show that for any given level of initial endowment
banks weakly prefer to fund the remainder of the project through debt rather than
through any other funding arrangements:
 Case A: consider a bank with ω ≥ ω∗, and thus yl ≥ R, we show that the bank
has a weak preference to top-up the remainder using debt through proof by
contradiction:
Statement A: suppose that the bank with ω ≥ ω∗ strictly prefers using some
amount of external equity as opposed to only using debt:
p (yh −R (ω))+(1− p) (yl −R (ω)) < ωω+ω̃ (p (yh −R (ω + ω̃)) + (1− p) (yl −R (ω + ω̃)))
for some 0 < ω̃ ≤ 1− (ω + ω̃).
Then this implies yl −R (ω) + p (yh − yl) < ωω+ω̃ [yl −R (ω + ω̃) + p (yh − yl)]
Recall from Proposition 13, for ω ≥ ω∗: R (ω) = (1− ω) (1 + r); R (ω + ω̃) =






(yl + p (yh − yl)) < R (ω)− ωω+ω̃R (ω + ω̃)
ω̃
ω+ω̃
(yl + p (yh − yl)) < (1− ω) (1 + r)− ωω+ω̃ (1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r)
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ω̃ (yl + p (yh − yl)) < (ω + ω̃) (1− ω) (1 + r)− ω (1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r)
ω̃ (yl + p (yh − yl)) < [(ω + ω̃) (1− ω)− ω (1− (ω + ω̃))] (1 + r)
ω̃ (yl + p (yh − yl)) < [(ω + ω̃)− ω (ω + ω̃)− ω + ω (ω + ω̃)] (1 + r)
ω̃ (yl + p (yh − yl)) < ω̃ (1 + r)
yl + p (yh − yl) < (1 + r)
p < (1+r)−yl
(yh−yl)
But recall from Proposition 1 that for any bank with ω ≥ ω∗, p̂ = (1+r)−yl
(yh−yl)
.
Therefore, given banks will proceed with the project if and only if p > p̂ =
(1+r)−yl
(yh−yl)
, statement A cannot be true, and the bank will weakly prefer to use
debt for any ω̃ ∈ [0, 1− (ω + ω̃)]. [For simplicity, we assume that when banks
are indierent between debt and equity, they will proceed with the project using
debt nance].
 Case B: consider a bank with ω < ω∗, and thus yl < R (ω), we show a weak
preference for debt through proof by contradiction:
1. Statement B1: the bank strictly prefers to use some external equity:
p (yh −R (ω)) < ωω+ω̃p (yh −R (ω + ω̃)) for some ω̃ ∈ [0, ω
∗ − ω); and
2. Statement B2: the bank strictly prefers to use some external equity:
p (yh −R (ω)) < ωω+ω̃2 [p (yh −R (ω + ω̃2)) + (1− p) (yl −R (ω + ω̃2))] for
some ω̃2 ∈ [ω∗ − ω, 1− ω]
Consider Statement B1, which simplies to yh −R (ω) < ωω+ω̃ (yh −R (ω + ω̃)).
Let w = ω+ω̃ denote total capital. Recall from the bank's indierence condition
p̂ (w) [yh −R (w)] = w(1 + r); so yh −R (w) = w(1+r)p̂(w)






; or p̂ (ω + ω̃) < p̂ (ω) when
ω + ω̃ < ω∗
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i.e. a better capitalized bank is less prudent. Contradiction [see Proposition
13].
Consider Statement B2, which simplies to:
p (yh −R (ω)) <
ω
ω + ω̃2
[(yl −R (ω + ω̃2)) + p (yh − yl)]
for some ω̃2 ∈ [ω∗ − ω, 1− ω], where R (ω + ω̃2) = (ω + ω̃2) (1 + r)
But from bank's indierence condition we know:
p̂ (ω) [yh −R (ω)] = ω(1+r); and ωω+ω̃2 ((yl −R (ω + ω̃2)) + p̂ (ω + ω̃2) (yh − yl)) =
ω(1 + r)
So p̂ (ω) [yh −R (ω)] = ωω+ω̃2 ((yl −R (ω + ω̃2)) + p̂ (ω + ω̃2) (yh − yl))
Since ω < ω∗ ≤ ω + ω̃2 by assumption, we know from proposition 13 that
p̂ (ω) < p̂ (ω + ω̃2)
Therefore we have p (yh −R (ω)) ≥ ωω+ω̃2 [(yl −R (ω + ω̃2)) + p (yh − yl)] for any
p ∈ [p̂ (ω) , p̂ (ω + ω̃2)]. Contradiction.
For the last part of the proof by contradiction, just need to show that as p
increases, the return from debt nanced investments increases faster than that
from mixed nanced investments:










Recall again yh − R (ω) = ω(1+r)p̂(ω) , and p̂ (ω) <
(1+r)−yl
(yh−yl)
, we have yh − R (ω) >
ω(1 + r) (yh−yl)
(1+r)−yl
= ω (yh − yl) (1+r)(1+r)−yl
so to complete the contradiction to statement B2, just need to show ω (yh − yl) (1+r)(1+r)−yl ≥
ω
ω+ω̃2
(yh − yl); or (1+r)(1+r)−yl ≥
1
ω+ω̃2

















A.5 Value of Screening (equation 4.5)
We present the proof for the last line of equation 4.5:
V (ω, ω̃, r)
≡ Ep
max
0 , ωω + ω̃
 p (yh −R) +
(1− p) max [0, yl −R]








[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp
The last equality follows because household provide debt at the risk-free rate:
1. For fully capitalized banks with ω + ω̃ ≥ ω∗ = 1− yl
(1+r)
:
V (ω, ω̃, r) = Ep
max
 0 , ω
ω + ω̃
 p (yh −R) +(1− p) (yl −R)
− ω(1 + r)


So from equation 4.10 we have:





 p (yh −R) +(1− p) (yl −R)
− ω(1 + r)
h(p)dp
Which can be simplied to:




[p (yh − yl) + yl −R (ω + ω̃)− (ω + ω̃) (1 + r)]h(p)dp
But when ω + ω̃ ≥ ω, we know from proposition 13 that R (ω + ω̃) = (1 −
(ω + ω̃)) (1 + r)




[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp.
2. For banks with ω + ω̃ < ω∗:
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p (yh −R (ω + ω̃))− ω(1 + r)
)]
Which can be simplied again to:




[p (yh −R (ω + ω̃, r))− (ω + ω̃) (1 + r)]h(p)dp
Recall from equation 4.11 A (p̂)R (ω + ω̃)+(1− A (p̂)) yl = (1−ω− ω̃) (1 + r),
so A (p̂) (R (ω + ω̃, r)− yl) + yl = (1− ω − ω̃) (1 + r).







(R (ω + ω̃)− yl) + yl = (1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r)
Re-arrange to give:∫ 1
p̂










pR (ω + ω̃)h (p) dp =
∫ 1
p̂
[pyl − yl + (1− ω − ω̃) (1 + r)]h (p) dp




[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp Q.E.D.
3. Note that when ω̃ = 0 (i.e. in the absence of capital regulation):
V (ω, 0, r) =
∫ 1
p̂
[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp.
Note further that when ω̃ = ωreg−ω (i.e. when a bank tops-up to the regulatory
minimum - see proposition 17):
V (ω, ω̃ = ωreg−ω, r) = ωωreg
∫ 1
p̂(ωreg ,r)
[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp = ωωregV (ω =
ωreg , ω̃ = 0 , r).
So the value of screening for a bank which falls short of the regulatory capital
requirement (ωi < ωreg) is a
ωi
ωreg
fraction of the value of screening for a bank
that is just meeting the regulatory requirement:
V (ω, ω̃ = ωreg − ω) =
ω
ωreg
V (ω = ωreg, ω̃ = 0) (4.22)
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and the participation threshold for a capital constrained bank is given by:
ω̂ (ω̃ = ωreg − ω) =
ωregC
V (ω = ωreg, ω̃ = 0)
(4.23)
(see denition 4.6).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 15 - Participation Threshold




[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp








[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp
− ω
ω + ω̃











[p̂ (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p̂) ∂p̂∂ω .
Recall ω̃ = max [0, ωreg − ω] (see proposition 17):
 So when ω̃ = 0, ∂V (ω,ω̃=0,r)
∂ω
= − [p̂ (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p̂) ∂p̂∂ω ≥ 0
where the inequality holds because ∂p̂
∂ω
≥ 0 with equality when (ω + ω̃) ≥ ω∗;
and p̂ (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r) ≤ 0 with equality when (ω + ω̃) ≥ ω∗.
 When ω̃ = ωreg − ω, equation 4.22 shows V (ω, ω̃ = ωreg − ω) = ωωregV (ω =





V (ω = ωreg, ω̃ = 0) ≥ 0.





















dx provided f and fx are both continuous
over a region in the form [x0, x1]× [y0, y1]
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2. For banks with ω + ω̃ < ω∗ (and thus yl < R (ω + ω̃)) we have from equation
4.10 and equation 4.11:
p̂ (yh −R (ω + ω̃)) = (ω + ω̃) (1 + r); and
A (p̂)R (ω + ω̃) + (1− A (p̂)) yl = (1− ω − ω̃)(1 + r).
Partially dierentiate both equations with respect to r, and solving the resulting






Proposition 16.2: ∂ω̂/∂r > 0
Recall that ŵ (ω̃, r) is implicitly dened by:





[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)]h(p)dp = C








> 0 for ŵ < ω∗36, it would be sucient to show that ∂V (ω,ω̃,r)
∂r
< 0 for
ω + ω̃ < ω∗ (by the implicit function theorem).
Using the Leibniz Integral Rule we get:




[1−H (p̂)] + ω
ω + ω̃





< 0 for ω + ω̃ < ω∗ i ∂p̂
∂r
(ω + ω̃ < ω∗) < 1−H(p̂)
[(1+r)−yl−p̂(yh−yl)]h(p̂)
37
For ω + ω̃ < ω∗, recall from the rst part of this proposition that:
∂p̂
∂r
(ω + ω̃ < ω∗) = A(p̂)(ω+ω̃)+p̂(1−ω−ω̃)
(yh−R)A(p̂)+p̂A′(p̂)(R−yl)
36 ∂ŵ
∂r for ω + ω̃ ≥ ω
∗ is not well dened.
37We are looking at cases where ω + ω̃ < ω∗, so [(1 + r + δr)− yl − p̂ (yh − yl)] > 0.
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Re-arranging equation 4.10 and 4.11 (when ω + ω̃ < ω∗) gives:
yh − R = (ω+ω̃)(1+r)p̂ ; R =
(1−(ω+ω̃))(1+r)−yl
A(p̂)








(to be shown in Annex #
below).




































p̂ ((1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r)− yl)

... which can be further simplied to:




Recall from equation 4.11 : (1− (ω + ω̃)) (1 + r)− yl = A (p̂) (R− yl) > 0, so for
the above inequality to hold it is sucient to show that:















> 1 > (1− (ω + ω̃)). Therefore, ∂V
∂r
< 0 for
ω + ω̃ < ω∗, and ∂ŵ
∂r
> 0 for ŵ < ω∗. Q.E.D.
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ph (p) dp and pub is
the upper bound of the p distribution with pdf h (.) and cdf H (.).
Proof. Let g (p) =
∫
ph (p) dp, then A (p̂) = 1
[1−H(p̂)] [g (pub)− g (p̂)], and
A′ (p̂) = h(p̂)
[1−H(p̂)]2 [g (pub)− g (p̂)] +
1
[1−H(p̂)]g










A.9 Proof of Proposition 17
Part 1 and 2 of the proposition are proved in the main text (these are corollaries of
previous propositions). We start with the proof for part 4 of the proposition here,
and use the result ∂ω̂(ωreg−ω,r)
∂ωreg
> 0 to prove part 3 of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 17.4: ∂ω̂(ωreg−ω,r)
∂ωreg
≥ 0






















V (ω = ωreg, ω̃ = 0)− ωreg ∂V (ω=ωreg ,ω̃=0)∂ωreg ≥ 0.
Recall that V (ω, ω̃) ≥ 0 by denition (V is the value of an option in risky bank
lending), so when ωreg = 0: V (ω = ωreg, ω̃ = 0) − ωreg ∂V (ω=ωreg ,ω̃=0)∂ωreg = V (0, 0) ≥ 0.
All that remains is to show V (ω = ωreg, ω̃ = 0)− ωreg ∂V (ω=ωreg ,ω̃=0)∂ωreg is non-decreasing
for ωreg ∈ [0, 1].



















∂2V (ω = ωreg, ω̃ = 0)
∂ω2reg




Recall from the proof to proposition 15 that:
∂V (ω, ω̃ = 0)
∂ω





















h′(p̂ (ωreg)) [p̂ (ωreg) (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)] ∂p̂(ωreg)∂ω +




For uniformly distributed p, h′ (.) = 0. So ∂
2p̂(ωreg)
∂2ω
















38Recall for ω + ω̃ < ω∗: ∂p̂∂ω =
(A(p̂)−p̂)(1+r)
(yh−R)A(p̂)+p̂A′(p̂)(R−yl) > 0. For uniformly distributed p, we have
h (p) = 1pub−plb , h



















Proof of Proposition 17.3: ω̂ (ω̃ = ωreg − ω, r) > ω̂ (ω̃ = 0, r) for all ωreg >
ω̂ (0, r)
From the (implicit) denition of ω̂, we have:
V (ω̂ (0, r) , ω̃ = 0) = C; and
V (ω̂ (ωreg − ω, r) , ω̃ = ωreg − ω) = C.
We also know from equation 4.22: V (ω, ω̃ = ωreg − ω) = ωωregV (ω = ωreg, ω̃ = 0)
[i.e. the value of screening for a bank which falls short of the regulatory capital
requirement (ωi < ωreg) is a
ωi
ωreg
fraction of the value of screening for a bank that is
just meeting the regulatory requirement].
Taken together, the above equations imply
V (ω̂ (ωreg − ω, r) , ω̃ = ωreg − ω) =
ω̂ (ωreg − ω, r)
ωreg
V (ω = ωreg, ω̃ = 0) = C
and therefore ω̂ (ωreg − ω, r) = ωreg i ωreg = ω̂ (0, r). In other words, when the
minimum capital requirement is set at the level of participation threshold which
prevails in the absence of the requirement, then the capital requirement has no impact
on participation. We can dene a 'binding regulatory regime' as one where ωreg >
min [ω̂ (ωreg − ω, r) , ω̂ (0, r)], because if the capital requirement is less than or equal
to the lower of the two participation thresholds then no banks would be bound by it
should their decide to engage in lending.
The rest of the proof is shown by contradiction:
Suppose ω̂ (ω̃ = ωreg − ω, r) ≤ ω̂ (ω̃ = 0, r) and the regulatory regime is binding
ωreg > min [ω̂ (ωreg − ω, r) , ω̂ (0, r)]. We can then examine the participation thresh-
olds for banks with ωi < ωreg (banks for which the regulatory regime is binding), and
show that a contradiction must arise:
1. First consider regulatory regime (i): ω̂ (ω̃ = 0, r) ≥ ωreg > ω̂ (ω̃ = ωreg − ω, r).
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Under this regime ωreg > ω̂ (ω̃ = ωreg − ω, r). So for the condition shown at the
start of the proof
V (ω̂ (0, r) , ω̃ = 0) = V (ω̂ (ωreg − ω, r) , ω̃ = ωreg − ω)
=
ω̂ (ωreg − ω, r)
ωreg
V (ω = ωreg, ω̃ = 0)




0 (see proof to proposition 15) means ωreg > ω̂ (0, r). Contradiction.
2. Now consider regulatory regime (ii): ωreg > ω̂ (ω̃ = 0, r) ≥ ω̂ (ω̃ = ωreg − ω, r)
We have already shown that ω̂ (ωreg − ω, r) = ωreg i ωreg = ω̂ (0, r); which
implies ω̂ (ωreg − ω, r) = ω̂ (0, r) when ωreg = ω̂ (0, r). So given ∂ω̂(ωreg−ω,r)∂ωreg ≥ 0
(Proposition 17.4), when ωreg > ω̂ (0, r), ω̂ (ωreg − ω, r) > ω̂ (0, r). Contradic-
tion.
Therefore ω̂ (ω̃ = ωreg − ω, r) > ω̂ (ω̃ = 0, r) for all ωreg > ω̂ (0, r). Q.E.D.
A.10 The Model with Corporate Taxation
Suppose the government imposes a proportional tax on corporate prots t.
The key equations for rms (and banks when there is no asymmetric information)
become:
p̂firm (yh −R) + (1− p̂firm) max [0, yl −R] = (ω + ω̃) (1 + r) + tp̂firm (yh −R− (ω + ω̃))
(4.24)
pR + (1− p) min [yl, R] = (1− ω − ω̃) (1 + r) (4.25)
p (yh −R) + (1− p) max [0, yl −R] ≥ (ω + ω̃) (1 + r) + tp (yh −R− (ω + ω̃))
(4.26)
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So for rms that are not 'fully capitalized', we can show that:
p̂firm (r, t) =
(1 + r)− yl − t ((1− ω − ω̃) (1 + r)− yl)
yh − yl − t (yh − yl − (ω + ω̃))
(4.27)
The participation threshold for rms is given by:
V (ω̂, ω̃, r) =
∫ 1
p̂firm
[p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)− tp (yh −Rfirm − (ω + ω̃))]h(p)dp = C
Note that since debt payments are tax deductible in this set-up, the distribution
of rms' initial endowments now matters for the equilibrium outcome. Modigiliani-
Miller no longer holds.
The key equations for banks under asymmetric information (eqns 4.10, 4.11 and
4.12) become:
p̂ (yh −R) + (1− p̂) max [0, yl −R] = (ω + ω̃) (1 + r) + tp̂ (yh −R− (ω + ω̃))
(4.28)
A (p̂)R + (1− A (p̂)) min [yl, R] = (1− ω − ω̃) (1 + r) (4.29)
A (p̂) (yh −R) + (1− A (p̂)) max [0, yl −R] ≥ (ω + ω̃) (1 + r) + tA (p̂) (yh −R− (ω + ω̃))
(4.30)
For banks that are not 'fully-capitalised', we can show that a sucient condition




which is satised when p follows a uniform distribution. It is not dicult to show
that banks that are not 'fully-capitalised' retains a preference for debt funding.
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Next, the value of screening for banks is given by:
V (ω, ω̃) = Ep
max
0, ωω + ω̃
 p (yh −R)− tp (yh −R− (ω + ω̃)) + . . .
(1− p) max [0, yl −R]








 p (yh −R)− tp (yh −R− (ω + ω̃)) + . . .
(1− p) max [0, yl −R]







(yl + p (yh − yl)− (1 + r)− tp (yh −R− (ω + ω̃)))h (p) dp
]
where the last equality can be shown by considering the two cases ω ≥ ω∗ and ω < ω∗
separately.





(p (yh − yl) + yl − (1 + r)− tp (yh −R− (ω̂ + ω̃)))h (p) dp
]
= C
where ω̃ = max {0, ωreg − ω}.
Accounting for corporate taxation as an additional dimension of policy does not
aect the main results in our baseline model. All three tools: interest rate policy,
capital regulation, and corporation tax operate as imperfect substitutes which trade-
o prudence and participation. Similar to the interest rate policy, the corporation
tax aects both the transparent 'rms' sector and the banking sector indiscriminately
and therefore can lead to ineciencies when used to tackle excessive risk taking in
the banking sector. Numerical simulations based on parameterizations in table 4.2
shows that the optimal policy combination now depend on the initial distribution of
endowments for rms: ωfirm. When leverage is just as high in the transparent rms
sector as the banking sector: ωfirm ∼ U [0, 0.1], the optimal policy response is to rely
on an (prohibitively) high rate of corporate tax (>0.75) to boost prudence, with a
lower than neutral (i.e. negative) interest rate to oset the costs in participation. But
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the level of leverage in the non-nancial sector of developed economies is generally
very much lower than it is for banks. When we allow for even slightly lower levels
of leverage in the rm sector, say ωfirm ∼ U [0, 0.2], the optimal policy setting
becomes (r = 0, ωreg = 17.5%, t = 5%). Under more realistic assumptions, ωfirm ∼
U
[
0, ωubfirm ≥ 0.3
]
, we revert back to the solution in the main body of the text:
(r = 0.5%, ωreg = 17.5, t = 0). Thus blunt instruments, such as the interest rate,
and particularly the corporate tax rate, are not the ideal tools when dealing with
high leverage and excessive risk taking in the banking sector.
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